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Ignition

CVE-2025-13911

Inductive Automation Ignition Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

Sin parche publicadoexcessive privileges
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CVSS 3.1
6.4
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición335 dDesde la divulgación, 18 dic 2025, 3:24 p. m.
Detección333 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
18 dic 25
27 ago 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
18 dic 25
12 mar 26
4 jun 26
27 ago 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2025-13911 divulgada · CVSS 6.4 (CNA)
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen

Ignition by Inductive Automation, when installed with default OS service account settings, may expose the host system to an elevated code execution risk via the gateway backup restore functionality. An authenticated user with Gateway Administrator privileges can import a malicious gateway backup (.gwbk) file containing crafted project resources, scripts, or modules, resulting in code execution on the host system. This affects both Windows and Linux installations. On Windows, default installations often run the Ignition service as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, resulting in code execution with full local system privileges. On Linux, default installations commonly run the Ignition service as root or with elevated privileges. Specific privilege level depends on installation configuration.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:A
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Versiones afectadas

8.1.x8.3.x
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Ignition
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Registro
EscenarioGENERALicscert
MitigaciónInductive Automation encourages users to do the following in order to reduce the risk of this vulnerability: * Create a new dedicated local Windows account that will be used exclusively for the Ignition service (e.g. svc-ign) (this should not be a domain account). * Remove all group memberships from the service account (including Users and Administrators). * Add to security policy to log in as a service. * Add to “Deny log on locally” security policy. * Provide full read/write access only to the Ignition installation directory for the service account created in step 1. * Add read/write permissions to other directories in the local filesystem as needed (e.g: if configured to use optional Enterprise Administration Module to write automated backups to the file system). * Set deny access settings for service account on other directories not needed by the Ignition service. * Specifically the C:\Windows, C:\Users, and directories for any other applications in the Program Files or Program Files (x86) directories. * Use java param to change temp directory to a location within the Ignition install directory so the Users folder can be denied access to the Ignition service account. * Restrict project imports to verified and trusted sources only, ideally using checksums or digital signatures. * Use multiple environments (e.g. Dev, Test, Prod) with a staging workflow so that new data is never introduced directly to Production environments. See Ignition Deployment Best Practices. * When feasible, segment or isolate Ignition gateways from corporate resources and Windows Domains. * The Ignition service account or AD server object should never need Windows Domain or Windows Active Directory privileges. This would only be needed if an Asset Owners IT or OT department uses this for management outside Ignition. * Ignition may be federated with Active Directory environments (e.g. OT domains) by entering “Authentication Profile” credentials within the Ignition gateway itself. This could use secure LDAP, SAML, or OpenID Connect. * When feasible, enforce strong credential management and MFA for all users with Designer permissions (8.1.x and 8.3.x), Config Page permissions (8.1.x), and Config Write permissions (8.3.x). * When feasible, deploy Ignition within hardened or containerized environments.icscert
MitigaciónMitigation guidance covering OS-level service account hardening for both Windows and Linux is available in Annex A of the Ignition Security Hardening Guide. Application-level controls under a default installation are in development.icscert
MitigaciónFor more information and updates, users should refer to Inductive Automation's Trust Portal https://security.inductiveautomation.com .icscert
Referencias
Otrahttps://security.inductiveautomation.com/
Otrahttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-352-01
Otrahttps://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2025/icsa-25-352-01.json

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