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Ignition Software

CVE-2025-13913

Inductive Automation Ignition Software Deserialization of Untrusted Data

Parche disponibleunsafe deserialization
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 4.0
5.4
Media
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión8.3.0
Exposición251 dDesde la divulgación, 12 mar 2026, 1:17 p. m.
Detección249 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
12 mar 26
17 mar 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
12 mar 26
14 may 26
16 jul 26
17 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2025-13913 divulgada · CVSS 5.4 (CNA)
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen

A privileged Ignition user, intentionally or otherwise, imports an external file with a specially crafted payload, which executes embedded malicious code.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:A
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:N
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:A
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
Ignition Software< 8.3.0
8.3.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Ignition Software
Corregida 8.3.0 — —
Versiones corregidas8.3.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Registro
EscenarioGENERALicscert
MitigaciónMITIGATION (8.1.x Linux). Implement Ignition Security Hardening Guide Appendix A. https://inductiveautomation.com/resources/article/ignition-security-hardening-guideicscert
MitigaciónMITIGATION (8.1.x Windows). Covered in Ignition Security Hardening Guide Appendix A.  * Create a new dedicated local Windows account that will be used exclusively for the Ignition service (e.g. svc-ign). a. The best security practice is that the Ignition service should not be a domain account (unless otherwise needed). b. Remove all group memberships from the service account (including Users and Administrators). c. Add to security policy to log in as a service. d. Add to "Deny log on locally" security policy.  * Provide full read/write access only to the Ignition installation directory for the service account created in #1. a. Add read/write permissions to other directories in the local filesystem as needed (e.g.: if configured to use optional Enterprise Administration Module to write automated backups to the file system).  * Set deny access settings for service account on other directories not needed by the Ignition service. a. Specifically the C:\Windows, C:\Users, and directories for any other applications in the Program Files or Program Files(x86) directories. b. Use java param to change temp directory to a location within the Ignition install directory so the Users folder can be denied access to the Ignition service account. * Restrict project imports to verified and trusted sources only, ideally using checksums or digital signatures. * Use multiple environments (e.g. Dev, Test, Prod) with a staging workflow so that new data is never introduced directly to  production environments. See Ignition Deployment Best Practices. * When feasible, segment or isolate Ignition gateways from corporate resources and Windows Domains.a. The Ignition service account or AD server object should never need Windows Domain or Windows Active Directory privileges. This would only be needed if an Asset Owners IT or OT department uses this for management outside Ignition.b. Ignition may be federated with Active Directory environments (e.g. OT domains) by entering "Authentication Profile" credentials within the Ignition gateway itself. This could use secure LDAP, SAML, or OpenID Connect. * When feasible, enforce strong credential management and MFA for all users with Designer permissions (8.1.x and 8.3.x), Config Page permissions (8.1.x), and Config Write permissions (8.3.x). * When feasible, deploy Ignition within hardened or containerized environments.icscert
solutionUpgrade Ignition software from 8.1.x to 8.3.0 or greater.icscert
Referencias
Otrahttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-071-06
Otrahttps://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-071-06.json
Otrahttps://inductiveautomation.com/resources/article/ignition-security-hardening-guide

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