CVE-2026-104012
Rox Appointment Booking privilege escalation
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: CNA
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | CVE-2026-104012 divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (CNA) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: NIST NVD | Registro visto por primera vez en NIST NVD | |
| Divulgación | Evaluación SSVC | CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: ENISA EUVD | Registro visto por primera vez en ENISA EUVD | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
The Rox Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress, in versions up to and including 1.3.1, is affected. An unauthenticated attacker could abuse its public booking feature to link a customer record to an administrator's WordPress account and change that administrator's email address, potentially taking over the site.
Descripción original del registro (Wordfence)
The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1).
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Rox Appointment Booking – Event, Calendar & Appointment Scheduling |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2a32f428-fa6e-469b-b004-e80a1029af80?source=cvehttps://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/REST/SaveCustomer.php#L262https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/FrontendBookingPanel/Services/CustomerService.php#L74https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/Customer/Data/CustomerModel.php#L38https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/rox-appointment-booking/tags/1.3.0/src/Modules/FrontendBookingPanel/REST/BookingConfirm.php#L61https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/rox-appointment-booking.1.3.2.zipLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
