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pgAdmin 4

CVE-2026-12044

pgAdmin 4: SQL injection in COMMENT ON ... IS '<description>' rendering across dialog templates

Parche disponibleSQL injection
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CVSS 3.1
8.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión9.16
Exposición153 dDesde la divulgación, 18 jun 2026, 6:37 p. m.
Detección151 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Evaluación SSVC +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
18 jun 26
22 jun 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
18 jun 26
27 jul 26
3 sept 26
11 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-12044 divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (CNA)
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen

SQL injection in pgAdmin 4 across every dialog template that renders ``COMMENT ON ... IS '<description>'`` for a user-supplied description field. The Jinja templates for Domains (and their constraints), Foreign Tables, Languages, and Event Triggers, plus the Views OID-lookup query, interpolated the description directly inside a single-quoted SQL literal -- ``'{{ data.description }}'`` -- instead of passing it through the ``qtLiteral`` escape filter. An authenticated pgAdmin user with permission to create or alter the affected object types could submit a description containing an apostrophe, break out of the literal and chain arbitrary SQL. The injected SQL runs under the PostgreSQL role the user is already authenticated as; for a connected role with ``COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM`` (typically PostgreSQL superuser), this chains to OS command execution on the PostgreSQL host. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through pgAdmin's Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants. The marginal impact captures bypass of any application-layer Query Tool gating an operator may have configured. The defect was originally reported against the Domain Dialog ``description`` field; a code-wide audit identified sixteen sites of the same pattern across the templates listed above. The same review also surfaced ten related sinks in the pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats templates -- ``pgstattuple('{{schema}}.{{table}}')`` and the matching pgstatindex shape -- where ``qtIdent`` escapes embedded double quotes inside the identifier but not apostrophes, so a user with CREATE privilege on a schema could plant a table or index named ``foo'bar`` and a later stats viewer would render an unbalanced literal. Fix is layered: 1. Sites: replace every ``'{{ x.description }}'`` with ``{{ x.description|qtLiteral(conn) }}`` (no surrounding quotes -- the filter wraps the value in escaped quotes itself). Plumb ``conn=self.conn`` through every ``render_template`` call that loads one of these templates. Also corrects a ``{ % elif`` Jinja typo in the foreign-table schema diff (dead branch). Rewrite the ten pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats sites to address the relation via OID + ``::oid::regclass`` cast (e.g. ``pgstattuple({{ tid }}::oid::regclass)``), eliminating the embedded literal-call form entirely so that bug-class can no longer recur there. 2. Driver hardening: ``qtLiteral`` (in ``utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py``) used to silently return the raw unescaped value when its ``conn`` argument was falsy. It now raises ``ValueError`` -- surfacing the entire bug class going forward. The change immediately uncovered eight latent plumbing bugs (in ``schemas/__init__.py``, ``schemas/functions/__init__.py``, ``schemas/tables/utils.py``, ``foreign_servers/__init__.py``, and seven sites in ``roles/__init__.py``) -- all fixed as part of this patch. The inner ``except`` block that swallowed adapter-level failures and returned the raw value is also removed, so unadaptable inputs raise instead of leaking unescaped values. 3. Regression tests: a per-template behavioural test renders each previously-vulnerable template with an apostrophe-injection payload and asserts the escaped fragment is present and the vulnerable fragment absent; a lint test walks every ``*.sql`` template flagging any ``'{{ ... }}'`` single-quote-wrapped interpolation against an explicit allowlist; unit tests cover the new qtLiteral fail-fast and inner-except raise paths. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
pgAdmin 4≥ 1.0 < 9.16
1.0
9.16
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pgAdmin
Corregida 9.16 — —
Versiones corregidas9.16
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Registro
EscenarioThe 8.8 is earned by the stored pgstattuple / pgstatindex sinks (commit 2ae0d3610). The chain: a low-privilege user with CREATE on a schema names a table or index containing an apostrophe (e.g. foo'bar); pgAdmin's stats templates render that identifier inside a string literal -- pgstattuple('schema.foo'bar') -- when a *different* user views statistics on the object. If the viewing user is a PostgreSQL superuser, the SQL injection executes under the superuser role, reaching COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM and OS code execution on the DB host. The privilege crossing (low-priv planter -> superuser viewer) is what justifies C:H/I:H/A:H even with S:U: the impact is felt by a different security principal than the attacker, but it lands inside the same DB authority. The originally-reported Domain Dialog description field is the same code-class but is self-SQLi -- the user injecting the apostrophe is the user whose role runs it. That sub-vector alone would score in the #10026 range (4.3 MEDIUM); it is bundled here because the fix is the same qtLiteral plumbing across all sixteen sites. S:U because pgAdmin does not mediate a privilege boundary between the planter, the viewer, and the DB role; the boundary that is crossed lives entirely inside PostgreSQL's privilege model.PostgreSQL
EscenarioSame reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: the stored pgstattuple sink is the load-bearing impact (low-priv planter, superuser viewer, superuser-role SQL). VC:H/VI:H/VA:H from the COPY ... TO PROGRAM reach; SC/SI/SA:N because pgAdmin is not the security authority being crossed -- the boundary lives in PostgreSQL.PostgreSQL
Referencias
Parchehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/658bb585d
Parchehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/2ae0d3610
Reportehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10078

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