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pgAdmin 4

CVE-2026-17349

pgAdmin 4: Adhoc server clone leaks another user's stored database credentials and ownership to a non-owner

Crítica · CVSS alto en tecnología listadaParche disponibleinsecure direct object reference (IDOR)
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CVSS 3.1
9.6
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión9.17
Exposición110 dDesde la divulgación, 31 jul 2026, 10:59 a. m.
Detección108 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Evaluación SSVC +1
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
31 jul 26
1 ago 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
31 jul 26
27 ago 26
24 sept 26
22 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-17349 divulgada · CVSS 9.6 (CNA)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen

/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- that were never their own. Fix forces the cloned adhoc record's ownership fields (user_id, shared, shared_username) and stored credential fields (password, save_password, tunnel_password) to belong to the calling user and be cleared/private before committing, regardless of the source server's ownership, sharing state, or stored credentials. A regression test asserts that an adhoc connect triggered by a non-owner against another user's shared server persists a row owned by the caller, not shared, and without the source's stored credentials. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.0 before 9.17.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
pgAdmin 4≥ 9.0 < 9.17
9.0
9.17
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pgAdmin
Corregida 9.17 — —
Versiones corregidas9.17
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Registro
EscenarioThreat model: an authenticated, low-privilege pgAdmin user who knows or can enumerate the server id of another user's (e.g. an administrator's) shared server row triggers an adhoc connect against it. No special privilege beyond ordinary authenticated access is needed, and no interaction from the victim is required. Scope is Changed: the attacker's own pgAdmin authorization does not itself grant use of the source user's stored database credentials, so gaining and using those credentials crosses into another user's security authority -- specifically the database privileges the source user's stored credentials confer, which may substantially exceed the attacker's own. Confidentiality and Integrity are High because the attacker obtains a working, reusable database credential and can use it to read/write whatever the source user's database role permits. Availability is None: the leak itself does not directly cause denial of service.PostgreSQL
EscenarioSame reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: an authenticated low-privilege user obtains another user's stored database credential via server cloning, without any interaction from the victim. VC:H/VI:H for pgAdmin's own scope (the leaked credential itself); SC:H/SI:H because the credential is then usable against the underlying database server, a subsequent system whose privileges may substantially exceed the attacker's own. VA:N/SA:N since the leak alone does not cause denial of service.PostgreSQL
Referencias
Parchehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779
Reportehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10200
Otrahttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/a7e74a6ed685bc34e1f77a8b6a94d00fa3dff815

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