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pgAdmin 4

CVE-2026-17350

pgAdmin 4: Tool permission bypass via backend routes and Socket.IO handlers

Parche disponiblemissing authorization
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CVSS 3.1
5.4
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión9.17
Exposición110 dDesde la divulgación, 31 jul 2026, 11:00 a. m.
Detección108 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +2
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
31 jul 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
31 jul 26
28 ago 26
25 sept 26
22 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-17350 divulgada · CVSS 5.4 (CNA)
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen

The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single "front door" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission. The reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure. During remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class. An authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs. Because the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means. Socket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission. Fix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user. This issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
pgAdmin 4≥ 9.3 < 9.17
9.3
9.17
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pgAdmin
Corregida 9.17 — —
Versiones corregidas9.17
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Registro
EscenarioThreat model: an authenticated SERVER-mode pgAdmin user, who already has a stored working database connection, has been explicitly denied one or more tool permissions by an administrator as an in-app segregation-of-duties policy. By calling the tool's non-entry-point backend routes or Socket.IO handlers directly (bypassing the UI, which only surfaces the gated entry point), the user regains functional access to the tool. Scope is Unchanged: the bypass stays entirely within pgAdmin's own authorization model and the database connection the user already legitimately holds -- it does not grant any new database privilege, only pgAdmin's own UI/feature access that an administrator intended to withhold. Confidentiality/Integrity impact is capped at Low because the marginal capability gained beyond the user's own pre-existing database role is bounded (an alternate in-app SQL client / GRANT-issuing UI / interactive psql session against a database they can already reach); Availability is None since none of the bypassed routes on their own cause denial of service.PostgreSQL
EscenarioSame reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: an authenticated, permission-denied user drives ungated backend routes/sockets to use a tool they were blocked from, but the marginal capability gained is bounded by the database privileges the user already legitimately holds. VC:L/VI:L reflect that bounded marginal gain; VA:N since none of the bypassed routes independently cause denial of service. No subsequent system beyond pgAdmin's own authorization scope is affected, so SC:N/SI:N/SA:N.PostgreSQL
Referencias
Parchehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/461c3afba92baad37c70a6fbd52d205d13a9de53
Parchehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/d36bd8dc96812c716664feac533d240544e70adc
Parchehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ba1984718ad703011740ad48cb9b82402b89cc2c
Parchehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779
Reportehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10190

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