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zephyr

CVE-2026-19742

IPv6 stable and temporary interface identifiers derived from a non-cryptographic PRNG secret key

Parche disponibleweak randomness
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
3.7
Baja
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones4.3.2 · 4.5.0
Exposición23 dDesde la divulgación, 26 oct 2026, 11:08 a. m.
Detección23 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +2
Fuente: OSV
Verificada
26 oct 26
4 nov 26
16 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 oct 26
1 nov 26
7 nov 26
13 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-19742 divulgada · CVSS 3.7 (CNA)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Monitoreo Fuente: NIST NVD Registro visto por primera vez en NIST NVD
Monitoreo Fuente: ENISA EUVD Registro visto por primera vez en ENISA EUVD
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Resumen generado por IA · CC-BY 4.0

The IPv6 networking stack in Zephyr RTOS is affected, specifically its stable and temporary interface identifier generation, which relies on a non-cryptographic random number source for its secret key. An observer of a device's network traffic could potentially recover that key, allowing an attacker to track the device across networks and predict its IPv6 addresses, which undermines address privacy.

Descripción original del registro (zephyr)

The IPv6 stack derived the long-lived secret key used to compute RFC 7217 stable interface identifiers (gen_stable_iid() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6.c) and RFC 8981 temporary interface identifiers (gen_temporary_iid() in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_pe.c) with sys_rand_get(). That API is documented as not cryptographically secure, while both RFCs require this key to be an unpredictable random value of at least 128 bits — the unpredictability of every generated IID rests entirely on it. Depending on the platform, sys_rand_get() resolves either to a hardware entropy device or, on boards whose entropy driver sets CONFIG_ENTROPY_NEEDS_PRNG, to the non-cryptographic xoshiro128++ generator in subsys/random/random_xoshiro128.c, which keeps a single global 128-bit state shared with every other sys_rand_get() consumer. Many of those consumers put their output directly on the wire (ephemeral source ports, DNS query IDs, CoAP message IDs and tokens, DHCPv6 transaction IDs, WebSocket masking keys), and the xoshiro state transition is invertible, so an observer of a device's traffic can recover the generator state and reconstruct the IID secret key. Additionally, with the entropy-device backend sys_rand_get() silently falls back to k_cycle_get_32() samples when the entropy driver fails, and returns no error, so the key could be derived from the cycle counter without the caller noticing. With the key known, stable IIDs become directly computable for any prefix (the remaining HMAC inputs — prefix, interface index, interface name, DAD counter — are guessable), and temporary IIDs become linkable after a cheap search over the mixed-in k_uptime_get_32() value. This defeats the properties both features exist to provide: an attacker can track a device across networks and prefixes, and can predict its address inside a /64 without scanning, removing the usual barrier to directly targeting the host. There is no memory-safety, integrity, or availability impact. The fix generates the key with sys_csrand_get() and aborts IID generation with -EIO when no cryptographic randomness is available, instead of silently deriving addresses from a predictable key. Both CONFIG_NET_IPV6_IID_STABLE and CONFIG_NET_IPV6_PE are experimental and disabled by default; builds using CONFIG_TEST_RANDOM_GENERATOR remain predictable by design, as sys_csrand_get() is deliberately routed back to the test generator there.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
zephyr≥ 3.7.0 < 4.3.2
zephyr≥ 4.4.0 < 4.5.0
3.7.0
4.3.2
4.4.0
4.5.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
zephyr
Corregida 4.3.2, 4.5.0 — —
Versiones corregidas4.3.24.5.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Fabricantehttps://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-xfm2-gr93-8mx9
Parchehttps://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/253315829d3cb5906c660d8418d8408d40bd266f

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