CVE-2026-41583
ZEBRA: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H
Fuente: CNA
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 4.3.1 | zebrad · -21 d desde divulgación | |
| Remediación | Parche 6.0.0 | zebra-script · -7 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | CVE-2026-41583 divulgada · CVSS 9.3 (CNA) | |
| Divulgación | Evaluación SSVC | CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iozebrad |
Corregida | 4.3.1 | -21 d | 7.0.0 no afectada |
crates.iozebra-script |
Corregida | 6.0.0 | -7 d | 14.0.0 no afectada |
4.3.15.0.26.0.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jjLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
