llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
guzzle-services

CVE-2026-53723

guzzlehttp/guzzle-services' XML Request Serialization Vulnerable to XML Injection via CDATA Terminator

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponibleimproper input validation
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
5.8
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: ninguna · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión1.5.4
Exposición163 dDesde la divulgación, 11 jun 2026, 7:42 a. m.
Detección158 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Sin prisa pero sin pausa, como yo en el páramo.Revisa, agenda, parchea. El clásico de siempre.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +2
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
11 jun 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
11 jun 26
22 jul 26
1 sept 26
11 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-53723 divulgada · CVSS 5.8 (CNA)
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen

Guzzle Services provides an implementation of the Guzzle Command library that uses Guzzle service descriptions to describe web services, serialize requests, and parse responses into easy to use model structures. Versions prior ro 1.5.4 do not safely serialize scalar XML element values containing the CDATA terminator `]]>`. The XML request serializer writes values containing `<`, `>`, or `&` with `XMLWriter::writeCData($value)`. If attacker-controlled input contains `]]>`, the CDATA section closes early and the remainder is interpreted as XML markup. This is an outgoing request-body integrity issue, not a response parsing issue. The attacker does not need to control the service description or schema. Users are affected when all of the following are true: the application uses `guzzlehttp/guzzle-services` to serialize outgoing requests; a request parameter or `additionalParameters` schema uses `location: xml`; the value is serialized as XML element text, not an XML attribute; the value can contain attacker-controlled, user-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted input; the value is not constrained by a safe `enum`, `pattern`, or custom filter that excludes `]]>`; and the downstream service parses the generated XML structurally and may act on unexpected, duplicated, or injected elements. Applications that serialize untrusted input into `location: xml` request parameters can emit XML containing attacker-controlled elements outside the intended text node. Depending on the receiving service, this can alter operation semantics, smuggle privileged fields, bypass modeled parameter boundaries, or create conflicting duplicated elements. Fixed service descriptions are sufficient if they contain an XML element parameter populated from attacker-controlled input. Users are not directly affected if they only use Guzzle Services to deserialize HTTP response bodies. Response XML parsing uses the response XML location visitor and does not invoke the vulnerable request XML serializer. Response bodies matter only in a second-order flow, such as parsing attacker-controlled response XML, storing or forwarding a parsed string value, and later using it as a `location: xml` request parameter. The issue is patched in `1.5.3` and later by safely splitting embedded CDATA terminators before serialization. The fix preserves the original scalar value as XML text and prevents injected nodes. As a workaround, constrain attacker-controlled XML element values with a strict `enum`, `pattern`, or custom filter that excludes `]]>`, or avoid serializing untrusted data into `location: xml` element text until patched. Where appropriate for the service schema, XML attributes are not affected because they are written with XMLWriter attribute APIs rather than CDATA sections. To determine whether action is needed, search service descriptions for request parameters using `location: xml`, including operation `parameters` and `additionalParameters`. Response-only `models` are not directly affected unless parsed values are reused for request serialization. For object and array parameters, review nested scalar properties because leaf element values can still be affected.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
guzzle-services · guzzlehttp/guzzle-services< 1.5.4
1.5.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
guzzle-services
Corregida 1.5.4 — —
Versiones corregidas1.5.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Fabricantehttps://github.com/guzzle/guzzle-services/security/advisories/GHSA-q8r6-5hfw-5jff

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.