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ash_authentication

CVE-2026-65633

Purpose-limited JWT accepted as full bearer authentication in AshAuthentication

Specific setups onlyParche disponibleauthentication bypass
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CVSS 4.0
7.6
Alta
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónPoC públicaSSVC: poc · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones4.14.2 · 5.0.0-rc.13
Exposición86 dDesde la divulgación, 25 ago 2026, 3:03 a. m.
Detección83 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Existe PoC pública, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
Verificada
25 ago 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
25 ago 26
15 sept 26
7 oct 26
29 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-65633 divulgada · CVSS 7.6 (CNA)
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación PoC pública
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen

Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows purpose-limited JWTs to be replayed as full bearer API credentials when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification. The bearer-token authentication helper AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 verifies an Authorization: Bearer JWT's signature and rejects tokens containing an act claim, but performs no check that the token's purpose claim equals user at the bearer boundary. When the resource is configured with require_token_presence_for_authentication?: false (the DSL default), the follow-on validate_token/3 helper returns {:ok, nil} without consulting the token resource, so no downstream check on purpose takes place either. As a result, any valid, non-expired JWT the library itself issued for a narrow, single-purpose flow (most notably the purpose: sign_in token that WebAuthn always emits during sign-in, and that the Password strategy emits when sign-in tokens are enabled) is accepted directly as a general-purpose bearer credential and resolves to a full current_user assignment. This bypasses the library's intended token-exchange contract, in which the sign_in token is meant to be presented exactly once to a preparation that validates the purpose claim and immediately revokes the token. The first use of a still-valid sign-in token presented directly in the Authorization header succeeds because the stateless bearer path never scopes it to purpose == "user". An attacker who obtains a not-yet-exchanged sign-in token for a target subject (for example via log or referrer leakage, an intercepted magic-link delivery channel, or a partially compromised intermediary) can present it as a bearer token and be authenticated as that subject, fully bypassing the intended one-time-use and revocation semantics. Exploitation additionally requires that the host application wire up retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a reachable route and uses either WebAuthn (sign-in tokens are always issued) or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. Resources configured with require_token_presence_for_authentication?: true (including applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0) and the session-based path (authenticate_resource_from_session/4) enforce purpose == "user" against the stored token record and are not affected. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.10.5 before 4.14.2 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.13.

Affects ash_authentication 3.10.5 to 4.14.2 and 5.0.0-rc.0 to 5.0.0-rc.13 only in stateless bearer-token setups using WebAuthn or Password sign-in tokens. Fixed in 4.14.2 and 5.0.0-rc.13.

¿Qué significa?A purpose-limited sign-in JWT, meant only to be exchanged for a session, is accepted as a full bearer token. Whoever presents a captured token that has not yet been exchanged is authenticated as the victim, with the victim's current_user and application privileges.
¿Quién está afectado?Versions 3.10.5 up to 4.14.2 and 5.0.0-rc.0 up to 5.0.0-rc.13 are in range. The bypass needs a resource using stateless bearer-token verification (require_token_presence_for_authentication? set to false, the DSL default), the host wiring AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a reachable route, and WebAuthn or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. Check the ash_authentication version in mix.lock and search the code for these three settings.
¿Qué hacer?Upgrade ash_authentication to 4.14.2 or 5.0.0-rc.13 or later, depending on the release line in use.
Contexto

Condiciones y alcance

Condiciones necesarias para que el fallo sea explotable
01
Resource uses stateless bearer-token verification: require_token_presence_for_authentication? is false (the DSL default).“The bypass is reachable only when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification, i.e. require_token_presence_for_authentication? is false (the DSL default).”
02
Host application wires AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a route the attacker can reach.“Exploitation additionally requires the host application to wire up AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a route the attacker can reach”
03
Uses WebAuthn, or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true, which issue purpose-limited sign-in JWTs.“either the WebAuthn strategy (sign-in tokens are always emitted, no opt-in required) or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true”
¿Quién debe revisar?Teams running ash_authentication 3.10.5 up to 4.14.2, or 5.0.0-rc.0 up to 5.0.0-rc.13, with stateless bearer verification and retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a route, using WebAuthn or Password sign-in tokens.
Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:P
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:P
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
ash_authentication≥ 3.10.5 < 4.14.2
ash_authentication≥ 5.0.0-rc.0 < 5.0.0-rc.13
3.10.5
4.14.2
5.0.0-rc.0
5.0.0-rc.13
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
ash_authentication
Corregida 4.14.2, 5.0.0-rc.13 — —
Versiones corregidas4.14.25.0.0-rc.13
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Registro
EscenarioGENERALEEF
configurationThe bypass is reachable only when a resource uses stateless bearer-token verification, i.e. require_token_presence_for_authentication? is false (the DSL default). In that mode validate_token/3 returns {:ok, nil} without consulting the token resource, so the JWT's purpose claim is the only remaining scoping signal at the bearer boundary and it is never checked. When require_token_presence_for_authentication? is true, validate_token/3 looks the token up with get_token(%{"jti" => jti, "purpose" => "user"}); purpose-limited tokens are stored under their own purpose (sign_in, remember_me, ...), so that lookup fails and those tokens are rejected. Applications scaffolded by the Igniter installer since v4.5.0 default to require_token_presence_for_authentication?: true and are therefore not exposed as generated; applications configured manually or that deliberately opt into stateless JWT verification are. Exploitation additionally requires the host application to wire up AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.retrieve_from_bearer/3 on a route the attacker can reach, and to use a strategy that issues purpose-limited JWTs carrying a resolvable sub claim: either the WebAuthn strategy (sign-in tokens are always emitted, no opt-in required) or the Password strategy with sign_in_tokens_enabled?: true. The session-based path (authenticate_resource_from_session/4) already enforces purpose == "user" against the token resource and is not affected.EEF
Referencias
Fabricantehttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-6vcj-3h59-rrc3
Parchehttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/8cf8b2d4426172be0900a3505e9491800b951750
Parchehttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/124eddd1bbeb40289c3fe8831ac10677a19fcf09
Otrahttps://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65633.html
Otrahttps://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65633
Otrahttps://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/eca8cadea0f1595ed2c10a0c177b1da9aa9e5269

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