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Heym

CVE-2026-67543

Heym code execution in unsandboxed skill runner

A low-privilege user can run code that reads server files and environment variables, and may gain root on the host.

Specific setups onlyParche disponiblecode injection
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CVSS 3.1
8.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónPoC públicaSSVC: poc · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión0.0.70
Exposición8 dDesde la divulgación, 11 nov 2026, 4:39 p. m.
Detección9 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Existe PoC pública, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Evaluación SSVC +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
Fuente: OSV
Verificada
11 nov 26
13 nov 26
16 nov 26
20 nov 26
11 nov 26
14 nov 26
16 nov 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-67543 divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (CNA)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Fuente: NIST NVD Registro visto por primera vez en NIST NVD
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación PoC pública
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Resumen generado por IA · CC-BY 4.0 · 11 nov 2026

Heym, a self-hosted platform for agentic systems and business-process automation, does not run skill Python code in a Docker sandbox the way it does Python tools, so a skill runs inside the backend execution context with filesystem access, network access, and some environment variables it should not see. A user with low-privilege login can exploit this remotely over the network, and in the default Docker setup it can escalate to root on the host; the issue is fixed in version 0.0.70.

Heym skill code runs via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation Python tools require. In the shipped Docker setup with the backend running as root and docker.sock mounted, it can reach host root. Fixed in 0.0.70.

¿Qué significa?Skills in Heym run through a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools require. Untrusted skill code then runs in the backend with network, filesystem, and secret access. In the default Docker deployment this can give host root and access to all tenants' data and credentials.
¿Quién está afectado?Affected are Heym versions before 0.0.70. The exposure applies when a malicious skill arrives through an everyone-visibility template (the default) or a shared workflow and runs in the importer's backend. The escalation to host root applies to the shipped Docker config where the backend runs as root with /var/run/docker.sock mounted; check the installed Heym version and that Docker config to see which setup applies.
¿Qué hacer?Upgrade Heym to 0.0.70 or later, which is the fixed version listed for this vulnerability.
Descripción original del registro (GitHub_M)

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.

Contexto

Condiciones y alcance

Condiciones necesarias para que el fallo sea explotable
01
The Docker config where the backend runs as root with /var/run/docker.sock mounted; in that setup the bug escalates to host root.“In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root.”
02
A malicious skill is run by a user who imports or runs a shared template or workflow containing it, such as an everyone-visibility template.“a malicious skill shared via an everyone -visibility template (the default) or a shared workflow executes in the importer's backend when they run it”
Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
heym< 0.0.70
0.0.70
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
heym
Corregida 0.0.70 — —
Versiones corregidas0.0.70
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Fabricantehttps://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73
Otrahttps://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e3a7b789d104f7fa96e92964e5
Otrahttps://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/28bb2901e4dea128ac493f67ee9478d230b7a3d7
Otrahttps://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70

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