ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones4.15.0 · 5.0.0-rc.14
Exposición62 dDesde la divulgación, 17 sept 2026, 4:58 p. m.
Detección60 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Evaluación SSVC
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
Verificada
17 sept 26
18 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
17 sept 26
3 oct 26
19 oct 26
3 nov 26
19 nov 26
Fecha
Fase
Evento
Detalle
Divulgación
Publicada
CVE-2026-86688 divulgada · CVSS 7.4 (CNA)
Divulgación
Evaluación SSVC
CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Monitoreo
Detectada
Ingresó al índice
Divulgación
Modificada
Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo
Verificada
Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Session Fixation vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a session identifier in a victim's browser to hold an authenticated session once that victim signs in.
AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.store_in_session/2 writes the authenticated subject into the existing session with Plug.Conn.put_session/3 and never calls Plug.Conn.configure_session(renew: true), so the identifier the visitor arrived with carries into their authenticated session. Every authentication event reaches this one function: the default success/4 injected by AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Controller.__using__/1, the AuthController emitted by mix ash_authentication_phoenix.install, and remember-me auto-login. AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Plug.store_in_session/2 is a defdelegate to it. Logout does not close the window either, because clear_session/2 ends with Plug.Conn.clear_session/1, which clears session contents but leaves the identifier intact, so a planted identifier survives a logout-then-login cycle.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Affects ash_authentication 0.2.0 up to 4.15.0 and 5.0.0-rc.0 up to 5.0.0-rc.14, only where sessions live in a server-side store rather than a signed cookie. Fixed in 4.15.0 and 5.0.0-rc.14.
¿Qué significa?The session identifier is not renewed when a user signs in, so an identifier set before sign-in remains valid afterward. An attacker who planted that identifier in the victim's browser can then hold the victim's authenticated session and take over the account.
¿Quién está afectado?Versions from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14 are affected. The setup involves a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database) where the cookie carries a stable session identifier; the signed cookie store is not affected. The ash_authentication version can be checked in the project's mix.lock file, and the configured session store in the application's session settings.
¿Qué hacer?Upgrade ash_authentication to 4.15.0 or 5.0.0-rc.14. The vendor's workaround until then is to call Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true) in the success/4 callback before store_in_session/2, and to add Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true) at sign-out.
Contexto
Condiciones y alcance
Condiciones necesarias para que el fallo sea explotable
01
Affected ash_authentication versions: 0.2.0 up to before 4.15.0, and 5.0.0-rc.0 up to before 5.0.0-rc.14.“This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.”
02
Server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database) where the cookie carries a stable session identifier; the signed cookie store is not affected.“Exploitation for account takeover requires a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database), where the cookie carries a stable session identifier”
03
Attacker must be able to plant the session cookie in the victim's browser (e.g. cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser).“a position from which the attacker can plant that cookie in the victim's browser: cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.”
MitigaciónCall Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true) in your own success/4 before store_in_session/2; and add Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true) at sign-out.
Vector CVSS 4.0
Desglose de métricas
Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:P
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:A
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones
Rangos afectados
AfectadaCorregida
ash_authentication≥ 0.2.0 < 4.15.0
ash_authentication≥ 5.0.0-rc.0 < 5.0.0-rc.14
0.2.0
4.15.0
5.0.0-rc.0
5.0.0-rc.14
Remediación
Estado del parche por paquete
Paquete / producto
Estado
Corregida en
Desde divulgación
Última versión
ash_authentication
Corregida
4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14
—
—
Versiones corregidas4.15.05.0.0-rc.14
Explotación
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
Registro
EscenarioGENERALEEF
configurationExploitation for account takeover requires a server-side session store (ETS, Mnesia, Redis or a database), where the cookie carries a stable session identifier, and a position from which the attacker can plant that cookie in the victim's browser: cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, an HTTP host without HSTS, or a shared or kiosk browser.
Phoenix defaults to the signed cookie store, and neither package's installer changes it. Under that store the authenticated session lives in the re-signed cookie delivered only to the victim, so a planted pre-authentication copy does not become an authenticated session. Attacker-planted session contents, such as a return_to value, still survive into the authenticated session there.EEF
MitigaciónCall Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, renew: true) in your own success/4 before store_in_session/2. This is a one-line change in application code and closes the controller sign-in path, though not remember-me auto-login, which does not pass through application code.
Add Plug.Conn.configure_session(conn, drop: true) at sign-out so a planted identifier does not survive a logout-then-login cycle.EEF
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