ExplotaciónSin evidenciaSSVC: none · no figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones4.15.0 · 5.0.0-rc.14
Exposición63 dDesde la divulgación, 17 sept 2026, 9:15 a. m.
Detección60 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión SSVCSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Timeline
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
Verificada
17 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
17 sept 26
3 oct 26
19 oct 26
3 nov 26
19 nov 26
Fecha
Fase
Evento
Detalle
Divulgación
Publicada
CVE-2026-88952 divulgada · CVSS 9.1 (CNA)
Divulgación
Evaluación SSVC
CISA-ADP · explotación ninguna
Monitoreo
Detectada
Ingresó al índice
Divulgación
Modificada
Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo
Verificada
Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Improper Authentication vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker to be signed in as another user by linking an OAuth2 identity to an account that is not theirs.
AshAuthentication.Strategy.OAuth2.UserResolver.resolve/3 matches an existing account using the register action's upsert_identity keys, then gates linking the incoming provider identity to it on email_trusted?/2, which reads only the provider's email_verified boolean and never compares the provider's email value with the matched account's email. That gate assumes the account was matched by its email field, so under any other upsert_identity it is vacuous and an attacker presenting their own verified email is attached to, and issued a session for, an account matched on some other attribute. The same unguarded gate applies in OAuth2.SignInPreparation on the registration_enabled? false path, where the account is matched by the sign-in action's read filter instead. The upsert also rewrites the matched account's email to the attacker's address, so later account recovery reaches the attacker rather than the owner.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.14.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Affects ash_authentication 4.14.0 to before 4.15.0 and 5.0.0-rc.10 to before 5.0.0-rc.14 when OAuth2 sign-in trusts verified emails and matches accounts on a non-email key. Fixed in 4.15.0 and 5.0.0-rc.14.
¿Qué significa?An OAuth2 sign-in can be attached to an existing local account without comparing emails. A sign-in using the attacker's own verified email can then be linked to another user's account and issued a session for it, and the link rewrites that account's email to the attacker's address, so account recovery reaches the attacker.
¿Quién está afectado?Versions 4.14.0 before 4.15.0 and 5.0.0-rc.10 before 5.0.0-rc.14 are affected when the OAuth2 strategy has trust_email_verified? enabled and accounts are matched on something other than the email. That setting defaults to false on the base oauth2 strategy but is true for the apple, auth0, github, google and slack strategies. Check the ash_authentication version in mix.lock and the trust_email_verified? setting in the strategy's DSL.
¿Qué hacer?Upgrade to ash_authentication 4.15.0 or 5.0.0-rc.14.
Contexto
Condiciones y alcance
Condiciones necesarias para que el fallo sea explotable
01
The OAuth2 strategy must have trust_email_verified? enabled.“The strategy must have trust_email_verified? enabled”
02
The account must be matched on something other than the email: a register action whose upsert_identity keys are not the email attribute, or, with registration_enabled? false, a sign-in action whose read filter is not the email.“the account must be matched on something other than the email: a register action whose upsert_identity keys are not the email attribute”
03
trust_email_verified? defaults to false on the base oauth2 strategy, but is set to true by the apple, auth0, github, google and slack strategies.“trust_email_verified? defaults to false on the base oauth2 strategy, but the apple, auth0, github, google and slack strategies each set it to true in their own DSL”
¿Quién debe revisar?Teams running ash_authentication 4.14.x or 5.0.0-rc.10 through rc.13 with OAuth2 sign-in (Apple, Auth0, GitHub, Google, Slack) where the register or sign-in action matches on something other than email.
No protegeUpgrading alone does not unlink existing accounts or undo rewritten emails.
MitigaciónSet trust_email_verified? false on the affected strategy, which refuses the sign-in rather than linking it.
Vector CVSS 4.0
Desglose de métricas
Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:P
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones
Rangos afectados
AfectadaCorregida
ash_authentication≥ 4.14.0 < 4.15.0
ash_authentication≥ 5.0.0-rc.10 < 5.0.0-rc.14
4.14.0
4.15.0
5.0.0-rc.10
5.0.0-rc.14
Remediación
Estado del parche por paquete
Paquete / producto
Estado
Corregida en
Desde divulgación
Última versión
ash_authentication
Corregida
4.15.0, 5.0.0-rc.14
—
—
Versiones corregidas4.15.05.0.0-rc.14
Explotación
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
Registro
EscenarioGENERALEEF
configurationThe strategy must have trust_email_verified? enabled, and the account must be matched on something other than the email: a register action whose upsert_identity keys are not the email attribute, or, with registration_enabled? false, a sign-in action whose read filter is not the email.
trust_email_verified? defaults to false on the base oauth2 strategy, but the apple, auth0, github, google and slack strategies each set it to true in their own DSL.EEF
MitigaciónSet trust_email_verified? false on the affected strategy, which refuses the sign-in rather than linking it and closes both the register and the sign-in path.
Alternatively, key the register action's upsert_identity, or the sign-in action's read filter, on the email attribute, which restores the premise the gate assumes.EEF
solutionUpgrading prevents new links but does not unpick existing ones. An account already linked through this path stays linked, and a victim's email may already have been rewritten to the attacker's address.
Operators whose register action or sign-in action matched on anything other than the email should review their UserIdentity rows for links whose provider email does not match the linked account's email, and check affected accounts for a rewritten email address.EEF
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