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CVE-2026-99281

Linux kernel access control bypass in TUN/TAP driver

Any local user can attach to ownerless TUN devices without admin privileges and gain access to them.

Specific setups onlyParche disponibletun
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CVSS 3.1
7.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: CNA
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones6.18.61 · 7.3.2
Exposición11 dDesde la divulgación, 7 nov 2026, 9:08 a. m.
Detección8 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
Fuente: OSV
Verificada
7 nov 26
10 nov 26
16 nov 26
19 nov 26
7 nov 26
10 nov 26
13 nov 26
16 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada CVE-2026-99281 divulgada · CVSS 7.8 (CNA)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Fuente: NIST NVD Registro visto por primera vez en NIST NVD
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Resumen generado por IA · CC-BY 4.0 · 7 nov 2026

The Linux kernel's TUN/TAP driver does not require the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability before a local user attaches to a persistent TUN device that has no owner set. Any local user who can open /dev/net/tun can therefore attach to those devices and gain access to them.

Affects the Linux kernel tun driver from 2.6.18 to before 6.18.61 and from 6.19.0 to before 7.3.2, only for persistent tun devices with no owner or group. Fixed in kernel 6.18.61 and 7.3.2.

¿Qué significa?A local unprivileged user can attach to a persistent tun network device that has no owner or group set, after its creator has closed it. From there they can read or inject its packets, change its settings, or delete the interface.
¿Quién está afectado?The bug is in Linux kernel versions from 2.6.18 up to but not including 6.18.61, and from 6.19.0 up to but not including 7.3.2. Check the running kernel with uname -r, and check for persistent tun devices with ip tuntap list, looking for devices marked persist with no owner or group shown.
¿Qué hacer?Upgrade the kernel to 6.18.61 or 7.3.2, or a later release in the same branch. The fix makes attaching to an ownerless device require CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Descripción original del registro (Linux)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach to an ownerless device Twenty years ago I made creating a tuntap device require CAP_NET_ADMIN in commit ca6bb5d7ab22 ("[NET]: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to create tuntap devices.") The idea was to allow the permissions on /dev/net/tun to be relaxed to 0666 and thus allow owners of tun devices assigned with TUNSETOWNER to actually open it and get at their devices. What we missed at the time was that persistent devices with *no* owner were already essentially world-consumable, and anyone who could open the device node could also attach to those. Even then, using persistent devices with no explicitly set owner — on the (false) presumption that CAP_NET_ADMIN would be required to open them — wasn't an egregious userspace bug. There are cases where it does make sense to separate the creation/configuration of the netdevice, from the process which shovels packets into it. Since then, TUNSETGROUP was added a year later in commit 8c644623fe7e ("[NET]: Allow group ownership of TUN/TAP devices."). Its commit message noted that if both uid and gid are set, both have to match (in itself a bizarre choice) — but still not that with *neither* set, no permission at all was required. Then in 2012 commit c8d68e6be1c3 ("tuntap: multiqueue support") allowed new queues to be attached to a device from the moment of its creation, with no way for userspace to close the race between creation and a subsequent TUNSET{OWNER,GROUP}. In 2024, commit 3ca459eaba1bf ("tun: fix group permission check") tried to fix things to be saner: only require the user *or* the group to match, in line with standard POSIX permissions, and require CAP_NET_ADMIN if neither the user nor group authorised the access (although it put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check first, and would wrongly have reported the capability as having been used even when it was not). That fix was reverted in commit a70c7b3cbc06 ("tun: revert fix group permission check") due to allegedly causing a regression in an selinux test suite which *expected* the attachment to succeed when authorised by none of user, group, nor CAP_NET_ADMIN: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAFqZXNtkCBT4f+PwyVRmQGoT3p1eVa01fCG_aNtpt6dakXncUg@mail.gmail.com/ We should not break UAPI. But we don't have to consider an selinux test case which deliberately exercises a security flaw to be UAPI worth preserving either. To which end, I have fixed it in selinux-testsuite commit b2f894f0016b ("tests/tun_tap: set an owner on the device for the relabel tests"). So: fix the lack of CAP_NET_ADMIN check on devices which *haven't* been assigned an owner or group, while leaving the weird tun ownership model as it was (user *and* group have to match, if both are set). If someone still wants to fix the latter (which wasn't actually the reason the previous attempt was reverted), they can do it under separate cover. Permit attaching to an existing device only if an owner and/or group was set and the caller matches all that were set, or if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN. The only behavioural change is that a device with no owner or group now requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach — precisely the loophole we want to close. And put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check in the right place this time.

Contexto

Condiciones y alcance

Condiciones necesarias para que el fallo sea explotable
01
The target is a persistent tun device (IFF_PERSIST) with no owner or group set.“persistent devices with *no* owner”
02
The creator of the persistent device has closed it, so no queue is attached.“After the creator of an IFF_PERSIST device closes it, numqueues is 0”
Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · CNA
Vector de ataqueAV:L
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
Kernel≥ 2.6.18 < 6.18.61
Kernel≥ 6.19.0 < 7.3.2
2.6.18
6.18.61
6.19.0
7.3.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Linux
Corregida 6.18.61, 7.3.2 — —
Versiones corregidas6.18.617.3.2
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Registro
EscenarioAV:L - The attacker reaches the patched check by opening /dev/net/tun in tun_chr_open and issuing TUNSETIFF; __tun_chr_ioctl copies the ifreq and tun_set_iff looks the device up with __dev_get_by_name. The triggering input is that ioctl, on the ownerless branch of the old tun_not_capable predicate. AC:L - tun_setup stores INVALID_UID and INVALID_GID, so the old tun_not_capable predicate is false with no race. After the creator of an IFF_PERSIST device closes it, numqueues is 0 and tun_attach from TUNSETIFF succeeds on every try; an IFF_MULTI_QUEUE device accepts another queue the same way. PR:L - The ownerless path in the old tun_not_capable returns false without calling ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN). tun_chr_open has no capability check, and /dev/net/tun is mode 0666, so any local user can issue that TUNSETIFF. The caller is an unprivileged local user. UI:N - The attacker alone opens /dev/net/tun and passes the interface name to TUNSETIFF. That ioctl is the whole trigger. S:U - tun_chr_open binds the fd to current->nsproxy->net_ns, and tun_set_iff attaches only a device in that net. The impact is that namespace's tun packet queue and the tun ioctls on the resulting fd, under the same security authority as the caller. C:H - tun_net_xmit queues the device's egress skbs on the attached tfile, and tun_chr_read_iter, tun_do_read, and tun_put_user copy each full skb to the attacker. On a single-queue device that is every packet the host transmits on that interface. I:H - tun_chr_write_iter calls tun_get_user, which copies the attacker buffer into an skb, sets skb->dev, and injects it through netif_rx as ingress. On that same fd, __tun_chr_ioctl handles SIOCSIFHWADDR, TUNSETTXFILTER, TUNSETOWNER, and set_offload with no further capability check. A:H - Once numqueues is 1, a non-multiqueue tun_attach returns -EBUSY, so the legitimate opener cannot reclaim the device. TUNSETCARRIER calls netif_carrier_off, and TUNSETPERSIST(0) followed by close makes __tun_detach call unregister_netdevice and delete the interface.Linux
Referencias
Fabricantehttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0d98aab41b79b88609f33fb4d8e7a80ab8f648d
Fabricantehttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f92c0286cfd58bff9d6d54c01a771073d5eb775
Fabricantehttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e53d1cf05da8ea58a5743b7ce5894fb51b0b9700
Fabricantehttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffdf678dd16610e3f006dac904bd37c09684673c

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