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Advisory · EEF · Hex · plug

EEF-CVE-2026-120287

Multipart `:length` limit not charged for part and header framing in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART

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CVSS
—
N/D
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión1.20.4
Exposición2 dDesde la divulgación, 17 nov 2026, 11:53 a. m.
Detección1 hDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
Verificada
11:53 a. m.
12:55 p. m.
02:00 a. m.
12:47 a. m.
11:53 a. m.
03:07 a. m.
06:20 p. m.
09:34 a. m.
12:47 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada EEF-CVE-2026-120287 divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · EEF · en inglés

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART` in elixir-plug plug allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust memory via a multipart request body built from parts without headers, or from header lines without a name and a value. The parser charges the `:length` limit only with the name and value bytes of each part header and the bytes of each part body. The part delimiter, the header separator, and the line endings cost nothing.

In `lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex`, `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5` keeps an entry for every part without a `content-disposition` header, together with its header list, until the whole body is read. A request made of such parts does not reach the limit at any size, and the parser process holds a multiple of the request size in memory until parsing completes. Any endpoint that uses `Plug.Parsers` with the `:multipart` parser is reachable.

This issue affects plug: from 1.13.0 before 1.20.4.

Details

1. What the limit counts. `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5` subtracts the result of `headers_size/1` from the remaining `:length` limit. `headers_size/1` sums `byte_size(key) + byte_size(value)` for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.

2. Inputs that cost zero. A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only `:` followed by CRLF also costs 0, because `:plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3` accepts the empty name and returns the header `{"", ""}`.

3. Retention. `multipart_type/1` returns `{:binary, nil}` for a part without a `content-disposition` header. The parser then prepends `{nil, headers, body}` to its accumulator for that part. `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3` drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.

4. Limits that stay in effect. `Plug.Conn.read_part_headers/2` limits one header block to the smaller of `:length` and `:read_length`. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.

On plug 1.20.3 with `length: 100_000`, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 `:` header lines each peaked at 283 MiB.

Proof of concept

  1. Build a multipart body with the boundary `b` that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening `--b\r\n\r\n`, then `\r\n--b\r\n\r\n` repeated 500,000 times, then `\r\n--b--\r\n`. The body is 4.5 MB.
  2. Create a connection with `Plug.Test.conn(:post, "/", body)` and the request header `content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b`.
  3. Call `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5` with the options from `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000)`.
  4. Observe that the call returns `{:ok, %{}, conn}` and not `{:error, :too_large, conn}`, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.
  5. Repeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of `:\r\n`. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size.

Impact

One request makes the process that parses it hold many times the request size in memory until parsing completes, and concurrent requests add up. An application that accepts multipart requests from unauthenticated clients can run out of memory.

Workarounds

Limit the request body size in a reverse proxy in front of the application, for example with `client_max_body_size` in nginx. The proxy rejects a larger body before it reaches the parser. This limits the memory that one request can hold but does not remove the multiplication: a body below the proxy limit still passes the `:length` limit.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
plug≥ 1.13.0 < 1.20.4
1.13.0
1.20.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Hexplug
Corregida 1.20.4 — —
Versiones corregidas1.20.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/security/advisories/GHSA-qj4r-jh2r-rw3f
Parchehttps://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/497913f2a6d744d693e98e96c5b9c6d88c265695
Parchehttps://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/3d3fb645323643935c6c94863c1b3edfd62e2828
Otrahttps://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-120287.html
Otrahttps://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/e06acbd3d381931f23cbde7d763136c9ccb091ac
Otrahttps://hex.pm/packages/plug

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