GHSA-224P-PCHV-5R3R
HTTP/3 header decoding takes quadratic time and ignores the size limit on trailers
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-224P-PCHV-5R3R divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Impact
An HTTP/3 peer can make the receiving side spend minutes of CPU on a single HEADERS frame. Decoding a QPACK literal field line with a name reference copied the rest of the header block for every field line, so a block made of many small field lines took time quadratic in its size: about 1.7 s for 64 KB and over 10 minutes for 1 MiB on a laptop. The field section size limit was only checked after the whole block had been decoded, so it did not stop this, and request and push trailers were not checked against it at all. No authentication is needed beyond completing the handshake; a few streams are enough to keep a server's schedulers busy.
This is a variant of the QPACK amplification attacks described in https://foxio.io/blog/header-accordions-qpack-amplification-attacks-against-http-3-servers.
Patches
Fixed in 2.3.0. Field lines are decoded in linear time, the advertised `max_field_section_size` (32 bytes per field included) is enforced while decoding, and trailers that exceed it reset the stream with H3_EXCESSIVE_LOAD.
Workarounds
None short of not accepting HTTP/3 connections from untrusted peers.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hexquic |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/benoitc/erlang_quic/security/advisories/GHSA-224p-pchv-5r3rLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
