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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · praisonai

GHSA-22CJ-M4WF-FV2C

PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición154 dDesde la divulgación, 18 jun 2026, 8:52 a. m.
Detección151 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.6.59
Monitoreo
Detectada
17 jun 26
18 jun 26
23 jul 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
17 jun 26
26 jul 26
3 sept 26
12 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.6.59 praisonai · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-22CJ-M4WF-FV2C divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal

Summary

PraisonAI's Dynamic Context module provides filesystem-backed history and
terminal-log storage. The SDK reference describes the module as providing:

  • artifact storage for tool outputs, history, and terminal logs;
  • history persistence with search; and
  • terminal session logging.

The module also exports agent-callable tool factories:

  • `create_history_tools()` returns `history_search`, `history_tail`, and
  • `create_terminal_tools()` returns `terminal_tail`, `terminal_grep`, and

Those tools accept `run_id` and `agent_id` arguments from the tool caller. The
underlying stores join those values into filesystem paths without rejecting
absolute paths or `..` traversal:

history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "history"
return history_dir / f"{agent_id}.jsonl"
terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "terminal"
return terminal_dir / f"{agent_id}.log"

Because `run_id` can be an absolute path and `agent_id` can contain traversal,
a lower-trust prompt/user that can call these tools can read `.jsonl` and
`.log` files outside the configured Dynamic Context base directory.

Affected Product

  • Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`
  • Ecosystem: `pip`
  • Package: `praisonai`
  • Component: Dynamic Context history and terminal tools
  • Current source paths:
  • `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/history_store.py`
  • `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/terminal_logger.py`
  • Latest PyPI version validated: `4.6.58`
  • Current `origin/main` validated:
  • Current `origin/main` tag validated: `v4.6.58`

Suggested affected range:

pip:praisonai >= 3.8.1, <= 4.6.58

Representative local sweep:

  • `3.8.1`: vulnerable
  • `4.0.0`: vulnerable
  • `4.5.113`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.33`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.34`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.40`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.50`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.58`: vulnerable

Root Cause

`HistoryStore._get_history_path()` and `TerminalLogger._get_log_path()` treat
logical identifiers as path segments, but never validate that the resolved path
stays under `base_dir`.

History path construction:

def _get_history_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -> Path:
    history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "history"
    history_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    return history_dir / f"{agent_id}.jsonl"

Terminal path construction:

def _get_log_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -> Path:
    terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "terminal"
    terminal_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    return terminal_dir / f"{agent_id}.log"

The agent tools pass caller-controlled `run_id` and `agent_id` directly into
these helpers:

def history_tail(agent_id: str = "default", run_id: str = "default", count: int = 10) -> str:
    messages = history_store.get_last_messages(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, count=count)
def terminal_tail(agent_id: str = "default", run_id: str = "default", lines: int = 50) -> str:
    return term_logger.tail_session(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, lines=lines)

There is no check equivalent to:

resolved = candidate.resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
resolved.relative_to(base)

There is also no identifier allowlist preventing `/`, `\`, or `..` in
`run_id` or `agent_id`.

Local PoV

Run against the latest PyPI package:

uv run --with 'praisonai==4.6.58' \
  python poc/pov_prai_cand_027_history_terminal_tools_path_traversal.py --json

The PoV:

  1. Creates a temporary Dynamic Context base directory.
  2. Creates a separate outside directory containing `secret.jsonl` and
  3. Creates legitimate in-base history and terminal log controls.
  4. Calls `history_tail()` and `history_get()` with
  5. Calls `terminal_tail()` and `terminal_grep()` with the same traversal.
  6. Confirms the traversal paths resolve to files outside the configured base.

Observed output summary from `evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json`:

{
  "package": "praisonai",
  "package_version": "4.6.58",
  "controls": {
    "valid_history_read_works": true,
    "valid_terminal_read_works": true,
    "outside_history_file_outside_base_dir": true,
    "outside_terminal_file_outside_base_dir": true,
    "traversal_history_path_resolves_to_outside_file": true,
    "traversal_terminal_path_resolves_to_outside_file": true
  },
  "outside_history_tail": "Last 1 messages:\\n\\n[system]: PRAI-CAND-027-HISTORY-SECRET",
  "outside_terminal_tail": "PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\nsecond line\\n",
  "outside_terminal_grep": "Found 1 matches:\\n\\n--- Line 1 ---\\n> PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\n  second line",
  "vulnerable": true
}

The PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party
target, or use real credentials.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

This report does not claim that history and terminal helpers should be unable
to read legitimate history or terminal logs. The issue is narrower: logical
`run_id` and `agent_id` values can escape the configured Dynamic Context base
directory.

The controls show the intended boundary:

  • legitimate in-base history remains readable;
  • legitimate in-base terminal logs remain readable;
  • the outside `.jsonl` and `.log` files are not under the configured
  • the tools still disclose those outside files through traversal identifiers.

The official context reference describes history persistence and terminal
logging as filesystem-backed Dynamic Context features. The context security
documentation also treats absolute paths, path traversal, and sensitive files
as privacy/security risks. Reading files outside the configured context store
conflicts with that documented boundary.

Impact

If a PraisonAI application exposes these Dynamic Context tools to untrusted or
lower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can read files outside the
configured context storage when the target file can be reached with the
tool-imposed suffix:

  • `history_*` tools can disclose reachable `.jsonl` files;
  • `terminal_*` tools can disclose reachable `.log` files; and
  • cross-run or cross-agent context/history/logs can be disclosed if their path

This can expose conversation history, prompts, terminal output, command logs,
tokens, API keys, cloud credentials, operational data, or other secrets stored
in JSONL/log files readable by the PraisonAI process.

The impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and
availability are not claimed for this report.

Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Rationale:

  • `AV`: applies when an application exposes an agent with these tools over a
  • `AC`: the traversal needs only chosen `run_id` and `agent_id` values.
  • `PR`: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited
  • `UI`: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the
  • `C`: conversation history and terminal logs can contain secrets and private
  • `I:N/A`: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.

Remediation

Treat `run_id` and `agent_id` as logical identifiers, not path components.

Recommended fixes:

  1. Reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components in
  2. Build candidate paths, call `.resolve()`, and reject any path that is not
  3. Apply the same containment helper to history append/read/search/clear/export
  4. Prefer opaque server-generated run and agent IDs in tool schemas.
  5. Add regression tests for absolute `run_id`, `../` in `run_id`, and `../` in

Minimal containment shape:

def _safe_child(self, *parts: str) -> Path:
    candidate = self.base_dir.joinpath(*parts).resolve()
    base = self.base_dir.resolve()
    try:
        candidate.relative_to(base)
    except ValueError as exc:
        raise PermissionError("Context path is outside configured base_dir") from exc
    return candidate

Pair this with an identifier allowlist, because `run_id` and `agent_id` should
not need filesystem syntax.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
praisonai≥ 3.8.1 < 4.6.59
3.8.1
4.6.59
4.7.26
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypipraisonai
Corregida 4.6.59 -1 d 4.7.26 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.6.59
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c
Otrahttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.