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GHSA-239G-WHFQ-7XJ9

GitPython: Repository content can impersonate the git directory, leading to arbitrary code execution

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -36 d de la divulgación
Exposición49 dDesde la divulgación, 30 sept 2026, 6:27 p. m.
Detección47 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.60
Monitoreo
Detectada
25 ago 26
30 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
25 ago 26
16 sept 26
7 oct 26
29 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.1.60 gitpython · -36 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-239G-WHFQ-7XJ9 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`Repo.__init__` decides which directory is the git directory by testing candidate paths in an order that
considers the real `.git` last. Two earlier tests can be satisfied by ordinary tracked files. Git
reserves only the literal name `.git`, so `HEAD`, `objects/`, `refs/`, `config`, `gitdir`, `commondir`
and `hooks/` at a repository root are all legal tracked content.

Consequently, after a victim opens or clones an attacker's repository, GitPython resolves `git_dir` to
the working-tree root while real git correctly resolves `<root>/.git`. Everything GitPython then
treats as "inside the git directory" is attacker-authored content — including `hooks/`, which it
executes.

CVE-2026-87817
Affected code (3.1.59)

The discovery loop in `git/repo/base.py` tests, in order:

  1. `git/repo/base.py:299` — `isfile(curpath/gitdir)` and `isfile(curpath/commondir)` and `isfile(curpath/HEAD)`
  2. `git/repo/base.py:320` — `is_git_dir(curpath)`
  3. `git/repo/base.py:341` — `dotgit = osp.join(curpath, ".git")` ← the real git dir, considered last

`is_git_dir` (`git/repo/fun.py:60`) requires only that `objects/` and `refs/` are directories and that
`HEAD` is a file; `HEAD`'s contents are never parsed. The hook path is resolved from
`index.repo.git_dir` (`git/index/fun.py:73`), i.e. the mis-resolved directory.

Proof of concept

Requires only `pip install GitPython==3.1.59`. Full script attached as `poc1_rce.py`; it runs entirely
in a temp directory and the payload only writes a marker file.

Attacker repository — four ordinary tracked files at the root:

| path | mode | content |
|---|---|---|
| `gitdir` | 100644 | `.git\n` |
| `commondir` | 100644 | `.git\n` |
| `HEAD` | 100644 | `ref: refs/heads/master\n` |
| `hooks/pre-commit` | 100755 | `#!/bin/sh` + payload |

Victim — two ordinary calls:

repo = git.Repo.clone_from(url, dst)     # or git.Repo(dst)
repo.index.commit("automated commit")    # code execution happens here

Observed on the PyPI release 3.1.59 (Linux and Windows):

real git says the git dir is : /tmp/.../victim/.git
GitPython says it is         : /tmp/.../victim      <- shadowed
attacker's hook executed     : True
git fsck                     : (clean)

The `pre-commit` hook runs at `git/index/base.py:1201`, before `write_tree()`, so it fires even though
the commit later fails.

Impact

A service that opens or clones an untrusted repository with GitPython — a CI runner building a fork
pull request, a code-scanning/SBOM service, a mirror, a dependency bot, an AI code-review/agent tool —
can be made to:

  1. Execute arbitrary commands via the tracked `<root>/hooks/pre-commit` when the victim calls
  2. Read files outside the repository: the tracked `<root>/config` becomes the repository config and
  3. Write a config file to an attacker-chosen directory via an absolute tracked `commondir`.

Delivery is silent: `git clone` exits 0, `git fsck` (including `--strict`, and with
`transfer.fsckObjects`/`fetch.fsckObjects=true`) reports nothing, and the clone passes every read-only
probe (`head.commit`, `branches`, `is_dirty()`, `untracked_files`, `iter_commits`) because a tracked
`commondir` of `.git` pins `common_dir` to the real `.git`.

Threat model / preconditions
  • Attacker controls the content of a repository the victim opens or clones with GitPython (public repo,
  • For code execution, the victim performs a commit via GitPython's native `index.commit()`. For the
  • `GIT_WORK_TREE` is not a mitigation — `git_dir` is assigned and the discovery loop breaks before
  • Real git is unaffected; only GitPython mis-resolves the directory.
Remediation
  1. Test `curpath/.git` before the `gitdir`/`commondir`/`HEAD` triple and before `is_git_dir(curpath)`.
  2. Resolve `hook_path` / `_commit_hook_path` / `_get_validated_reflog_path` through `repo.common_dir`.
  3. Containment-check `commondir`/`gitdir` contents before joining (reuse
  4. Validate `HEAD` in `is_git_dir` (require `ref: refs/...` or a 40-hex sha).
  5. Pass `merge_includes=False` in `Repo._config_reader` (`git/repo/base.py:765`).
Note for the maintainers

Commit `406b98e1` (2026-05-31, "respect core.hooksPath for commit hooks") resolved the hook path via
`git rev-parse --git-path`, which is immune because git rediscovers the true `.git`. Commit `9bc287a2`
(2026-07-20) reverted it to avoid an unconditional `rev-parse` dependency — reintroducing the exec step.
Measured at each commit with the healthy-looking layout: `406b98e1` → hook did not fire; `9bc287a2` …
`3.1.59` → hook fired.

Scope note

Only the repository-root case is reported: where a real `.git` exists, git prefers it, and GitPython
does not. A fake git dir in a subdirectory fools real git too, so that variant is out of scope as a
general ecosystem hazard rather than a GitPython defect.

###POC Files :
poc1_rce.py https://github.com/user-attachments/files/31388464/poc1_rce.py
poc2_file_read.py https://github.com/user-attachments/files/31388465/poc2_file_read.py

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
gitpython< 3.1.60
3.1.60
3.2.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypigitpython
Corregida 3.1.60 -36 d 3.2.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.60
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87817
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-239g-whfq-7xj9
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2218
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/c7cf4d13b1ed0a2e70f2a1f3c6b4fc6c2652cf0b
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.60
Otrahttps://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gitpython/PYSEC-2026-3982.yaml
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/gitpython-before-3.1.60-remote-code-execution-via-git-directory-impersonation

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