GHSA-23HJ-XM9R-GWX6
Authenticated SQL injection via col_filter string-key in Base::search() !'' branch (sibling of GHSA-rvxj not covered by its fix)
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Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-23HJ-XM9R-GWX6 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
[HIGH] Authenticated SQL injection via col_filter string-key in `Base::search()` `!''` branch (sibling of GHSA-rvxj, uncovered by its fix)
- CWE: CWE-89 SQL Injection.
- CVSS v3.1: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L` = 8.1 High
- Affected component:
- Sink: `api/src/Storage/Base.php::search()` filter loop, line 891 —
- Emitter: `api/src/Db.php::column_data_implode()` line 1772 —
- Entry: `api/src/Etemplate/Widget/Nextmatch.php::ajax_get_rows()` → app `get_rows` →
- Relationship: Sibling of GHSA-rvxj-7f72-mhrx (Nextmatch col_filter type-juggling). That
## Summary
The Nextmatch widget forwards the client-controlled `col_filter` map (both keys and values) into the
storage layer. The GHSA-rvxj fix removes integer-numeric keys (the type-juggling vector) but leaves
arbitrary string keys intact. In `Base::search()`, a filter whose value is the special string
`!''` takes a branch that concatenates the filter key directly into the SQL WHERE clause:
foreach($data2db_filter as $col => $val) {
if ($val !== '') {
if (!is_int($col) && ($c = array_search($col,$this->db_cols))) { $col = $this->table_name.'.'.$c; }
if (is_int($col)) { $db_filter[] = $val; }
elseif ($val === "!''") { $db_filter[] = $col." != ''"; } // <-- raw key
else { $db_filter[$col] = $val; }
}
}For a key that is not a real column, `array_search` fails, so `$col` stays as the attacker's raw
string; the `!''` branch appends `"<payload> != ''"` with an integer array key. `column_data_implode`
emits integer-keyed elements verbatim (no `quote`, no `name_quote`, and the string-key "unknown
column" `InvalidSql` throw is bypassed). The payload lands unescaped in the query.
## Reachability (hop-by-hop)
1. Authenticated user (no admin). Open any list backed by the default storage `get_rows`
(e.g. resources list `resources.resources_ui.get_rows` → `resources_bo::get_rows` →
`so->get_rows`; timesheet; any so_sql app not overriding `get_rows`).
2. `Nextmatch::ajax_get_rows($id,$range,$filters,…)` — `filters['col_filter']` is attacker JSON.
Guards: `Nextmatch.php:413` and `:1365` strip only integer keys. A string key survives. `order`/`sort`/`search`
are separately whitelisted and are not the vector. *(guard bypassed — key is a string)*
3. App `get_rows` leaves unknown col_filter keys untouched (`resources_bo` line 187 merges into,
never rebuilds, col_filter) and calls `so->get_rows` → `Base::get_rows:1653`:
`search($criteria, …, $query['col_filter'], …)` — col_filter passed verbatim. *(no key filtering)*
4. `Base::search` filter loop → `!''` branch → raw key concatenation (int-keyed).
5. `db->select(… $where …)` → `column_data_implode(' AND ', $where, True, …)` → int-key branch emits raw.
6. Injected SQL executes.
## Root cause
Trusting col_filter keys as safe column identifiers. The `!''` convenience branch builds SQL by
string concatenation of the key without validating it against the table schema or quoting it, and the
integer-keyed emit path in `column_data_implode` has no safety net.
## Impact
UNION-based extraction of arbitrary tables, notably `egw_accounts.account_pwd` (password hashes) and
session/credential tables → full authentication compromise. Blind/boolean and error-based techniques
also apply. Stacked write statements are blocked by the driver, capping direct integrity/availability
impact.
## Preconditions
- Any authenticated non-admin session; default configuration; a list view using the default so_sql
`get_rows` (resources, timesheet, and others).
## Evidence
- `api/src/Storage/Base.php:876-895` (filter loop, `!''` branch line 891), `:1653` (col_filter → search).
- `api/src/Db.php:1772-1775` (int-key raw emit).
- `api/src/Etemplate/Widget/Nextmatch.php:413,1365` (int-key-only strip — the incomplete guard).
- `resources/inc/class.resources_bo.inc.php:187-188` (col_filter passthrough to `so->get_rows`).
## Proof of Concept (safe, local; generated-SQL marker)
`scratchpad/sqli_poc.php` reproduces the `Base::search` filter loop and the `column_data_implode`
int-key branch verbatim. Input:
`col_filter = { "0=1) UNION SELECT account_lid,account_pwd,3,4,5,6,7 FROM egw_accounts -- " : "!''" }`
(after applying the real int-key strip, the string key survives). Output SQL:
SELECT ts_id,ts_title,ts_owner FROM egw_timesheet
WHERE (0=1) UNION SELECT account_lid,account_pwd,3,4,5,6,7 FROM egw_accounts -- != '')The injected UNION reaches the WHERE clause unescaped and the trailing `-- ` comments out the
appended `!= '')`. Marker confirmed. No live database was queried.
## Adversarial re-read
- *Does `data2db($filter)` drop/alter the malicious key?* `data2db` maps only known timestamp/columns;
an unknown key is identity — it passes through. (Verified: non-column key untouched.)
- *Does `array_search($col,$db_cols)` neutralize it?* Only if the key matches a real column; the SQL
payload is not a column name, so `array_search` returns false and `$col` is left raw.
- *Does `column_data_implode` throw "unknown column" for it?* That throw is only on the string-key
path; the `!''` branch produced an integer key, which takes the verbatim-emit branch. Confirmed.
- *Is the value `!''` filtered by the Nextmatch fix?* No — only keys are filtered (and only int keys);
values are untouched.
- *Do the apps rebuild col_filter?* resources_bo merges into col_filter (line 187) and never strips
unknown keys; Base::get_rows forwards them verbatim.
- Result: no concrete blocker. CONFIRMED.
## Remediation
In the `!''` branch, validate `$col` against `$this->db_cols`/`$this->table_def` and reject or
`name_quote` it (never concatenate a raw key). Additionally, at the Nextmatch boundary validate
col_filter keys against the widget's known columns/schema rather than only stripping integer keys;
and add a schema check to the integer-keyed branch of `column_data_implode`.
## Confidence
High — sink and emitter reproduced verbatim; injected SQL generated. Live DB confirmation of the
UNION read requires a running instance with a populated `egw_accounts`.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistegroupware/egroupware |
Corregida | 23.1.20260710, 26.7.20260710 | — | — |
23.1.2026071026.7.20260710Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/EGroupware/egroupware/security/advisories/GHSA-23hj-xm9r-gwx6Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
