llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Maven · org.omnifaces:omnifaces

GHSA-2689-9HM6-WM9Q

Forged combined resource IDs grow the combined resource content cache

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche5 versionesPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición61 dDesde la divulgación, 20 sept 2026, 9:08 a. m.
Detección60 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.14.4 +4
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
20 sept 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
20 sept 26
5 oct 26
21 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-2689-9HM6-WM9Q divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Remediación Parche 1.14.4 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · 0 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 2.7.34 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · 0 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 3.14.25 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · 0 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 4.7.14 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · 0 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 5.5.4 org.omnifaces:omnifaces · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`CombinedResourceHandler` serves a combined resource for any structurally valid ID presented in the URL. When server side caching of the combined resource content is activated, the response bytes are stored in an application scoped cache keyed by that raw ID. Distinct IDs which all decode to the same resource are stored as distinct entries, so an unauthenticated caller can grow the cache until the heap is exhausted.

Details

A combined resource ID is a deflated and base64 encoded list of resource identifiers. It travels in the URL and is decoded at serve time. `CombinedResource#getInputStreamFromCache` writes the assembled bytes under that ID:

combinedResourceCache.putObject(resourceId, cachedCombinedResource, cacheTTL);

`resourceId` is the raw string taken from the request. It is never canonicalized to the set of resources it decodes to, and nothing distinguishes a server issued ID from a minted one, so the number of distinct keys bears no relation to the number of resource combinations the deployment can actually render. `CombinedResourceInfo#fromUniqueId` collects the decoded identifiers in a `LinkedHashSet`, so `a.js|a.js|a.js` and `a.js` name the same single resource while remaining distinct keys. A single repeated resource yields roughly 6500 keys before the 64 KiB inflate limit stops it; two or more real resources in varying combinations lift that ceiling out of reach.

The entry is never reclaimed. The default cache expires lazily, on the next read of the same key, and an attacker key is read once, so its time to live elapses without anything removing it. The default cache store is a plain `ConcurrentHashMap` unless `APPLICATION_MAX_CAPACITY` is configured, so there is no capacity ceiling either.

Each entry holds the full combined content, and the caller chooses which resources to combine, so the cost per request is theirs to maximize. In a test on WildFly with Mojarra, 20 forged IDs which all decode to `jakarta.faces:faces.js` were each served with HTTP 200 and an identical 22661 byte body, and left exactly 20 entries in the application cache.

This requires the content cache to be activated. `org.omnifaces.COMBINED_RESOURCE_HANDLER_CACHE_TTL` defaults to 0, which disables it, and it is ignored when the Faces project stage is `Development`. Deployments which do not set it are unaffected. Deployments which set it and also configure a bounded cache provider, or `APPLICATION_MAX_CAPACITY` on the default provider, are bounded by that capacity.

Patches

The content cache is now populated only for server issued IDs, mirroring the resource info cache. A forged but structurally valid ID is still served, it is no longer cached.

Upgrade to 1.14.4, 2.7.34, 3.14.25, 4.7.14 or 5.5.4.

Workarounds

Leave `org.omnifaces.COMBINED_RESOURCE_HANDLER_CACHE_TTL` unset or 0, which disables the content cache, or bound the application scoped cache by setting the `org.omnifaces.CACHE_SETTING_APPLICATION_MAX_CAPACITY` context parameter as per `Cache` javadoc.

Related advisories
  • GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92 — forged combined resource IDs accepted without authenticity check. Its fix bounded the resource info cache, which is a different cache on a different code path.
  • GHSA-3r7q-f6gv-vv3q — unbounded source map cache in `SourceMapResourceHandler`, a different handler and a different cache.
Credits

Reported by zx (@manus-pi).

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 1.11 < 1.14.4
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 2.1 < 2.7.34
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 3.0 < 3.14.25
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 4.0 < 4.7.14
org.omnifaces:omnifaces≥ 5.0 < 5.5.4
1.11
1.14.4
2.1
2.7.34
3.0
3.14.25
4.0
4.7.14
5.0
5.5.4
5.5.7
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavenorg.omnifaces:omnifaces
Corregida 1.14.4, 2.7.34, 3.14.25, 4.7.14, 5.5.4 0 d · 0 d · 0 d · 0 d · 0 d 5.5.7 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.14.42.7.343.14.254.7.145.5.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/security/advisories/GHSA-2689-9hm6-wm9q

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.