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Advisory · GitHub · npm · bun

GHSA-26Q8-H657-PF84

Bundled root certificates trust compromised eMudhra (emSign) intermediate CAs

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición29 dDesde la divulgación, 22 oct 2026, 9:02 p. m.
Detección27 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Mis orejas detectan algo raro por aquí.Sospechosa como un adjunto llamado factura_final2.exe.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.4.4
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
22 oct 26
23 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
22 oct 26
29 oct 26
6 nov 26
14 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 1.4.4 bun · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-26Q8-H657-PF84 divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Bun's bundled root certificates included `emSign ECC Root CA - G3`. Eight eMudhra (emSign) intermediate CAs were revoked for key compromise in October 2026, and the six of them that issue TLS certificates chain to that root. Bun 1.4.3 and earlier accept certificates issued by those intermediates. The private keys have been independently recovered by multiple people and some have been disclosed publicly, so any attacker in the network path can impersonate any TLS server to Bun.

Bun 1.4.4 removes the root from the bundle and rejects any certificate chain that contains one of the eight compromised public keys.

This is a compromise of a certificate authority's keys, not a bug in Bun's certificate validation. Other projects that ship their own trust store were affected in the same way.

Details

Any TLS client connection that uses Bun's default trust store is affected. That includes `fetch`, `bun install`, `bun add`, `bunx`, `node:https`, `node:tls`, `WebSocket`, `Bun.connect` and `fetch` over HTTP/3.

A TLS server that sets `requestCert: true` without a `ca` also verifies client certificates against the default trust store, so it is affected in the same way.

Bun checks revocation only against a CRL passed in the `crl` option, so the CA's revocation of the intermediates does not protect affected versions by default.

Executables built with `bun build --compile` embed the Bun runtime and its trust store. An executable built with an affected version stays affected until it is rebuilt.

Impact

An attacker in the network path can present a forged certificate that Bun accepts as valid for any hostname. They can then read and modify the traffic. For `bun install` and `bunx` this includes the packages that are downloaded.

Patches

Upgrade to Bun 1.4.4, and rebuild any `bun build --compile` executables with it.

Bun 1.4.4 has two changes:

  • Three emSign roots are removed and the bundle is updated to NSS 3.131.1 (#46159, #46300). This removes `emSign ECC Root CA - G3`, `emSign Root CA - C1` and `emSign ECC Root CA - C3`. `emSign Root CA - G1` stays in the bundle, as it does in NSS 3.131.1.
  • A chain that contains one of the eight compromised public keys fails with `CERT_REVOKED` (#46300). The check matches the key rather than the certificate, and it applies whichever root the chain ends at. It therefore also covers cross-signed copies of the intermediates, roots loaded from the system store, `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, `SSL_CERT_FILE`, `SSL_CERT_DIR`, and a `ca` option. It applies to TLS over TCP, the HTTP/3 client and `node:quic`, and to client certificates that a server verifies. `fetch` over HTTP/3 reports the failure as `HTTP3HandshakeFailed`. The list of keys is the one Node.js, Go and Chrome block.
Workarounds

There is no process-wide workaround for affected versions.

  • `--use-system-ca` and `NODE_USE_SYSTEM_CA=1` do not help. They add the system's certificates to the bundled ones and do not replace them.
  • Updating the operating system's certificates does not help, for the same reason.
  • Passing an explicit `ca` (or `tls.ca`) on a connection replaces the default trust store for that connection only. A list that leaves out the emSign roots protects that connection.
  • `bun install --cafile <path>` (or `--ca`) does the same for that install. `bunx` does not accept those flags before 1.4.4.
  • `cafile` under `[install]` in `bunfig.toml` does the same for `bun install`. In `~/.bunfig.toml` it also applies to `bunx`.
References
  • https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/pull/46159
  • https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/pull/46300
  • https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/issues/46526
  • Mozilla incident report: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083449
  • uv: https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/security/advisories/GHSA-hq85-5cpj-mr62
  • certifi: https://github.com/certifi/python-certifi/security/advisories/GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2
  • Go: CVE-2026-111943
  • Rust: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0381.html, https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0382.html, https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0383.html
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
bun< 1.4.4
1.4.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmbun
Corregida 1.4.4 -1 d 1.4.4 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.4.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/oven-sh/bun/security/advisories/GHSA-26q8-h657-pf84

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