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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · vllm

GHSA-2823-QMQ8-RWVJ

vLLM: Loose `cache_salt` validation lets a single request kill EngineCore on LMCache-MP deployments — uncaught downstream `ValueError` denial of service

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CVSS
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medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -13 d de la divulgación
Exposición45 dDesde la divulgación, 5 oct 2026, 6:42 p. m.
Detección42 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.30.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
22 sept 26
5 oct 26
15 oct 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
22 sept 26
7 oct 26
22 oct 26
5 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.30.0 vllm · -13 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-2823-QMQ8-RWVJ divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Affected

  • Ecosystem / package: pip / `vllm`
  • Affected versions: vLLM ≤ 0.25.1 (confirmed on 0.25.1, commit `752a3a504485` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34). The lower bound predates 0.25.1; maintainers can confirm how far back the loose `cache_salt` validator and unguarded scheduling-path lookup reach.

Summary

vLLM's OpenAI-compatible request models (Completions, Chat Completions, Responses) accept a client-supplied `cache_salt` field and validate it only as "must be a non-empty string" — no character or length restrictions. On a deployment with the built-in LMCache-MP KV connector enabled, that value is stored verbatim on the request tracker and forwarded unguarded as a keyword argument into the scheduler's per-step cache lookup. The downstream LMCache library applies a *stricter* check in `IPCCacheServerKey.__post_init__`, which raises `ValueError` for any `cache_salt` containing `@`, `/`, `\`, or NUL (or longer than 128 characters).

Neither the LMCache-MP connector lookup call site nor `Scheduler.schedule()` wraps that call in a request-scoped `try`/`except`, so the `ValueError` propagates uncaught into `EngineCore`'s top-level handler, which treats any uncaught exception as fatal and kills the whole engine process. A single publicly reachable request with, for example, `cache_salt="/"` therefore takes down the engine for all concurrent users. vLLM's boundary validator is looser than the downstream consumer's, and the gap is never converted into a request-scoped failure on the scheduling path.

Affected code

Links pinned to the confirmed commit `752a3a504485` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34 (v0.25.1):

  • The three `check_cache_salt_support` validators require only a non-empty string — no character or length bound: `vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py#L502-L508` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py#L502-L508 (field at `#L172` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py#L172), `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py#L913-L919` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py#L913-L919 (field at `#L425` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py#L425), and `vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L459-L465` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L459-L465 (field at `#L235` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L235). The loose test itself is at `completion #L503-L505` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py#L503-L505, `chat_completion #L914-L916` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py#L914-L916, `responses #L460-L462` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py#L460-L462.
  • Two further request models accept `cache_salt` with the same or weaker checking, and should be hardened at the same time: `vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/protocol.py#L74-L85` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/protocol.py#L74-L85 carries the identical non-empty-string-only validator (field at `#L59` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/protocol.py#L59), and the token-in-token-out scale-out `GenerateRequest` exposes the field with no `cache_salt` validator at all: `vllm/entrypoints/scale_out/token_in_token_out/protocol.py#L110` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/scale_out/token_in_token_out/protocol.py#L110.
  • The LMCache-MP request tracker stores the salt verbatim: `vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L189` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L189 (`LMCacheMPRequestTracker`), assignment at `#L223` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L223.
  • The lookup call forwards `cache_salt` with no surrounding `try`: `vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L733-L774` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L733-L774 (`get_num_new_matched_tokens` → `maybe_submit_lookup_request(...)` at `#L770` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/lmcache_mp_connector.py#L770).
  • The scheduler invokes the connector unguarded: `vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py#L739` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py#L739 (`self.connector.get_num_new_matched_tokens(...)`, inside `schedule()` at #L396 https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py#L396).
  • The generic top-level handler treats the exception as fatal: `vllm/v1/engine/core.py#L1229-L1235` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/engine/core.py#L1229-L1235 — the `except Exception` in `run_engine_core` (`#L1154` https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/engine/core.py#L1154) logs `EngineCore encountered a fatal error.`, calls `_send_engine_dead()`, and re-raises.
  • Downstream strict validator (external LMCache library, not vLLM): `IPCCacheServerKey.__post_init__` in `lmcache/v1/multiprocess/custom_types.py` rejects `@ / \` NUL and >128-char salts (`_SALT_FORBIDDEN_CHARS = frozenset("@/\\\x00")`) by raising `ValueError`.

The three OpenAI `check_cache_salt_support` validators are identical; the completion one is representative — a non-empty-string test with no character or length bound:

# vllm/entrypoints/openai/completion/protocol.py Lines 503-509
        if data.get("cache_salt") is not None and (
            not isinstance(data["cache_salt"], str) or not data["cache_salt"]
        ):
            raise VLLMValidationError(
                "Parameter 'cache_salt' must be a non-empty string if provided.",
                parameter="cache_salt",
            )

On the scheduling path the connector is invoked with no surrounding `try` — a `ValueError` from the downstream salt check propagates straight out of `schedule()`:

# vllm/v1/core/sched/scheduler.py Lines 736-742
                    # Get externally-cached tokens if using a KVConnector.
                    if self.connector is not None:
                        ext_tokens, load_kv_async = (
                            self.connector.get_num_new_matched_tokens(
                                request, num_new_local_computed_tokens
                            )
                        )

`run_engine_core`'s generic handler — the next `except` up the stack — treats that as fatal, marks the engine dead, and re-raises:

# vllm/v1/engine/core.py Lines 1229-1235
        except Exception as e:
            if engine_core is None:
                logger.exception("EngineCore failed to start.")
            else:
                logger.exception("EngineCore encountered a fatal error.")
                engine_core._send_engine_dead()
            raise e

Impact

Availability only. `cache_salt` is an attacker-controlled, publicly reachable request field that vLLM validates too loosely. A value such as `"/"` passes vLLM's check, reaches the stricter downstream validator, and its `ValueError` is never converted into a request-scoped failure — instead it kills the EngineCore process, a denial of service for every concurrent request on that server (HTTP failures, then `/health` failing).

Applicability: the built-in LMCache-MP KV connector must be enabled (`lmcache >= 0.4.4`), which is itself an opt-in KV-connector boundary. On such deployments no other special configuration is required, and the crash is a resource-availability failure rather than expected behavior of the opt-in feature.

Suggested Fix

Two independent fixes:

  1. Tighten admission — add one shared `validate_cache_salt()` helper (for example in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/engine/protocol.py`) that matches or exceeds the downstream `IPCCacheServerKey` rules — reject `@`, `/`, `\`, NUL, and >128-character salts at the HTTP boundary with a 4xx — and route every request model that exposes `cache_salt` through it: the three `check_cache_salt_support` validators above, the pooling base request, and the token-in-token-out `GenerateRequest` (which has no validator today).
  2. Defense in depth — wrap the LMCache-MP lookup call reached from `Scheduler.schedule()` so a downstream validator `ValueError` becomes a request-scoped failure instead of an EngineCore-fatal exception. This is the fix that also covers future divergence between vLLM's and LMCache's salt rules; the right failure semantics (fail the request vs. fall back to a cold lookup) is a maintainer design call.

The core of fix 1 is a single shared helper; each `check_cache_salt_support` body then becomes `validate_cache_salt(data.get("cache_salt"))`, and `GenerateRequest` gains an equivalent `mode="before"` validator:

# vllm/entrypoints/openai/engine/protocol.py — new shared helper
_CACHE_SALT_FORBIDDEN_CHARS = frozenset("@/\\\x00")
_MAX_CACHE_SALT_LENGTH = 128


def validate_cache_salt(cache_salt: object) -> None:
    """Validate cache salts before they reach downstream cache backends."""
    if cache_salt is None:
        return
    if not isinstance(cache_salt, str) or not cache_salt:
        raise VLLMValidationError(
            "Parameter 'cache_salt' must be a non-empty string if provided.",
            parameter="cache_salt",
        )
    if len(cache_salt) > _MAX_CACHE_SALT_LENGTH or any(
        char in _CACHE_SALT_FORBIDDEN_CHARS for char in cache_salt
    ):
        raise VLLMValidationError(
            "Parameter 'cache_salt' must be at most 128 characters and must "
            "not contain '@', '/', '\\\\', or NUL.",
            parameter="cache_salt",
        )

This distinguishes the finding from GHSA-6qc9-v4r8-22xg https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-6qc9-v4r8-22xg: that advisory fixed only the `guided_json`/`xgrammar` trigger of the same `schedule()`-into-`run_engine_core` fatal-handler family, so the `cache_salt` admission gap and the `schedule()`-level defense-in-depth (fix 2) survive its published fix. A patch implementing fix 1 across all five request models, with a regression test covering the rejected (`"/"`, 129-char) and accepted salt shapes, applies to v0.25.1 with line offsets and no fuzz.

Credit

Reported by: Patch the Planet (Trail of Bits + OpenAI collaboration)

This vulnerability was discovered using GPT-5.5-Cyber as part of the Patch the Planet security initiative.

---

Proposed fix: a fix for this issue is proposed in a public pull request: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51444

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
vllm< 0.30.0
0.30.0
0.34.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypivllm
Corregida 0.30.0 -13 d 0.34.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.30.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-2823-qmq8-rwvj
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51444
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e962733e08d10f7ca65dac4df99e116460b8b174
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
Otrahttps://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.30.0

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