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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · amqtt

GHSA-2HJF-7455-W946

aMQTT: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption and Improper Input Validation

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión0.11.4
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 20 nov 2026, 9:43 a. m.
Detección35 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Si el fabricante actualiza el aviso, vuelve a mirar.Tu yo del futuro te agradecerá revisarla hoy.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
09:43 a. m.
10:00 a. m.
05:22 p. m.
09:43 a. m.
05:38 p. m.
01:33 a. m.
09:27 a. m.
05:22 p. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-2HJF-7455-W946 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Impact

`amqtt` is vulnerable to a remote denial of service caused by improper MQTT topic-filter validation combined with catastrophic regular-expression backtracking.

A single client can freeze the entire broker by sending one specially crafted `SUBSCRIBE` packet followed by one `PUBLISH` packet.

The vulnerability is caused by two defects:

  1. `add_subscription()` validates the placement of the single-level wildcard `+` using substring checks for `/+` and `+/`, rather than verifying that each `/`-delimited level containing `+` is exactly `+`. This allows malformed filters such as `"+/" + "+" * 60` to be accepted instead of rejected with return code `0x80`, as required by MQTT-4.7.1-3.
  2. `_matches()` converts every `+` character into the greedy regular-expression fragment `[^/]*` and evaluates the resulting expression with `re.fullmatch()`. A filter containing many adjacent `+` characters can cause catastrophic backtracking when matched against a topic that partially matches but ultimately fails.

Topic matching runs synchronously inside the broker’s global broadcast loop. When the malicious match is evaluated, it blocks the asyncio event loop and prevents the broker from processing any other work.

The issue was reproduced using a single raw MQTT 3.1.1 TCP connection with no third-party client dependencies.

Successful exploitation causes:

  • Existing message delivery to stop
  • New MQTT connections to receive no `CONNACK`
  • Keepalive processing to stop
  • Broadcast processing to stop
  • The broker to remain unavailable until the process is restarted

Under the default configuration, anonymous clients can exploit the vulnerability without credentials. When authentication is enabled, any authenticated client permitted to create arbitrary subscriptions and publish messages may still exploit it. Authentication alone is therefore not a sufficient mitigation.

  • Ecosystem: `pip`
  • Package: `amqtt`
  • Affected versions: `>= 0.11.0, <= 0.11.3`

The vulnerable code is present in the `v0.11.0` release commit, `352678c87e50e501a8a5bb91fab73c9400fa046c`, and remained present on the main branch as of `eeb1e254da9a1e8d9cc68ae754fcedac652e8fc0`. Versions before 0.11.0 were not evaluated.

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability only. `re.escape()` prevents arbitrary regular-expression injection, and there is no known path to remote code execution.

No confidentiality or integrity impact has been identified. Successful exploitation causes a complete loss of availability for the affected broker process.

Patches

The issue has been patched in the `v0.11.4` released version; all users should upgrade.

The completed fix:

  • Validate topic filters one level at a time
  • Require any level containing `+` to be exactly `+`
  • As part of comprehensive MQTT topic-filter validation, require `#` to occupy an entire level and appear only as the final level
  • Replace the regular-expression matcher with deterministic, level-by-level MQTT topic matching

Simply changing the validation logic is not sufficient defense in depth if malformed filters can reach the existing regular-expression matcher through another code path.

Workarounds

This is the temporary mitigation that was recommended prior to the patched release: administrators can install a topic-filtering plugin that rejects malformed wildcard subscriptions before they are added to the broker. Place the plugin in an importable Python module, enable it in the broker configuration, and restart the broker.

from amqtt.contexts import Action
from amqtt.plugins.base import BaseTopicPlugin
from amqtt.session import Session

class RejectInvalidTopicFilters(BaseTopicPlugin):
    """A plugin to prevent invalid wildcard subscriptions."""
    async def topic_filtering(
        self, *, session: Session | None = None,
        topic: str | None = None,
        action: Action | None = None
    ) -> bool | None:

        if topic and action == Action.SUBSCRIBE:
            levels = topic.split("/")
            return all(
                level in {"+", "#"} or ("+" not in level and "#" not in level)
                for level in levels
            ) and "#" not in levels[:-1]
        return True
        
config = {
    ...
    'plugins':{
        ...
        'myplugins.RejectInvalidTopicFilters': {}
    }
}

This workaround applies when subscription requests pass through the plugin. If the broker is configured to use a persistent session plugin, restarting the broker alone is not sufficient; any persisted sessions containing malformed topic filters need to be removed.

Restarting the broker restores availability after exploitation, but the broker remains vulnerable until the patch or workaround is installed.

Acknowledgments

aMQTT thanks the following security researchers for their professional, coordinated private disclosure:

  • Yongkang Xiao (Wuhan University)
  • Min Shi (Wuhan University)
  • Qiyi Deng (Wuhan University)
  • Jing Chen (Wuhan University)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
amqtt≥ 0.11.0 < 0.11.4
0.11.0
0.11.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPIamqtt
Corregida 0.11.4 — —
Versiones corregidas0.11.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104199
Otrahttps://github.com/Yakifo/amqtt/security/advisories/GHSA-2hjf-7455-w946
Otrahttps://github.com/Yakifo/amqtt/pull/361
Otrahttps://github.com/Yakifo/amqtt/commit/e48a8a65027667f936d415db7f01d3ac350104e0
Otrahttps://github.com/Yakifo/amqtt
Otrahttps://github.com/Yakifo/amqtt/releases/tag/v0.11.4

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