GHSA-2J4X-QH6Q-Q8MM
Cross-realm gateway websocket events are not checked against the GatewayConnector realm
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 1.31.0 | io.openremote:openremote-manager · -14 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-2J4X-QH6Q-Q8MM divulgada · CVSS 2.1 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Once a gateway websocket session is established only the gateway ID is used to lookup the GatewayConnector to handle the event, this means that if a user in realm A with `WRITE:ADMIN` role knows the ID of a gateway in realm B they can create a service user for that gateway ID in realm A and then via a websocket client they can connect to the GatewayConnector for realm B thus allowing them to impersonate that gateway across realms.
Details
`GatewayService.onGatewayMessageIntercept()` does a simple username ID check in `isGatewayClientId()` but does not pass the authenticated gateway service user's realm to `GatewayService.processGatewayConnected(), GatewayService.processGatewayDisconnected(), GatewayService.processGatewayMessage()` which means that provided a service user in Realm A is correctly named with the ID of a gateway in Realm B, any messages received for the user will be forwarded to the `GatewayConnector`.
Proof of concept
- Find the gateway ID of a gateway asset in Realm B (potentially from logs or other exploitable means)
- As a user with `WRITE:ADMIN` in realm A create a service user with the username `gateway-GATEWAY_ID_IN_LOWER_CASE`
- Use a websocket client to connect to the manager websocket server and send any information to perform CRUD operations on Gateway descendant assets in Realm B
Impact
The rogue user would be able to create SSH tunnels during initial sync handshake thus gaining access to the local network of the gateway.
The rogue user can completely overwrite the Gateway Asset descendant assets but cannot read existing assets, this is more a destructive impact as existing assets will be lost.
The rogue user in Realm A would need `WRITE:ADMIN` role and know the gateway ID from Realm B which mitigates the attack
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
maven io.openremote:openremote-manager |
Corregida | 1.31.0 | -14 d | 1.34.1 no afectada |
1.31.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/openremote/core/security/advisories/GHSA-2j4x-qh6q-q8mmLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
