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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · surrealdb

GHSA-2JJ6-V2FQ-RWPP

COMPUTED fields expose values hidden by field-level SELECT permissions

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Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -4 d de la divulgación
Exposición54 dDesde la divulgación, 28 sept 2026, 6:15 a. m.
Detección53 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Sin drama: ventana de mantenimiento y listo.Esta la tienes controlada, confío en ti.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.3.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
24 sept 26
28 sept 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
24 sept 26
9 oct 26
23 oct 26
7 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.3.0 surrealdb · -4 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-2JJ6-V2FQ-RWPP divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

A record user could read values hidden from them by field-level SELECT permissions through `COMPUTED` fields. On the default read path, a readable `COMPUTED` field derived from a hidden field carried that field's value. In the `RETURN` clause of a write, a `COMPUTED` field that was itself hidden could still be returned.

Reads. The streaming query planner (the default for read-only statements since 3.0.0) evaluated a record's `COMPUTED` fields before removing the fields the caller may not select, and did not evaluate them again afterwards. A readable `COMPUTED` field whose expression read a hidden stored field therefore kept that field's value:

DEFINE FIELD secret  ON item PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE;
DEFINE FIELD derived ON item COMPUTED secret PERMISSIONS FOR select FULL;

-- As a record user: `secret` is removed, but `derived` still held its value.
SELECT * FROM item:one;

The same happened when the expression read the field through the record's own id (`COMPUTED id.secret`), and when the record was reached through a record link or a graph traversal. The legacy executor evaluates `COMPUTED` fields again against the permission-reduced record, and returned `NONE` in these cases.

Writes. A `COMPUTED` field hidden by its own SELECT permission was removed from a statement's output only by a final pass that matched output field names. A write statement's `RETURN` clause could read the field through `$before` or `$after`, under an alias, or with `RETURN VALUE`, which put it where that pass did not look. For example, `UPDATE person:one SET name = 'x' RETURN { before: $before, after: $after }` returned the hidden field in both documents. Writes take this path whichever planner strategy is configured. The legacy executor's `SELECT` had the same gap for an aliased field or a `WHERE` condition on it.

Impact

Only schemas with `COMPUTED` fields are affected: either a readable `COMPUTED` field that reads a field hidden from the caller, or a `COMPUTED` field hidden by its own SELECT permission.

What an attacker can do:

  • As a record user with SELECT on a table, read a hidden stored field wherever a readable `COMPUTED` field on that table derives from it, just by selecting the record (default configuration).
  • As a record user allowed to create, update, upsert or delete records in a table, read a `COMPUTED` field that is hidden from them, as it was before and after the write, through the statement's `RETURN` clause.
  • Where a `SELECT` ran on the legacy executor, read or test such a hidden `COMPUTED` field through an alias or a `WHERE` condition.

What it can't do:

  • Read hidden fields that no `COMPUTED` field reads: hidden stored fields are still removed from every row.
  • Reach records the caller could not already select or write. This issue concerns field-level permissions only, and does not bypass table-level permissions.
  • Affect system users (root, namespace or database users), who bypass `PERMISSIONS` clauses, or gain write access the caller did not already have (confidentiality only).
Patches

When a hidden stored field has been removed, streaming reads now evaluate `COMPUTED` fields again against the permission-reduced record before applying each `COMPUTED` field's own SELECT permission, which is the order the legacy executor uses. A `COMPUTED` field that reads its own record through `id` now sees that same reduced record, and never a value left in storage by a field that was later redefined as `COMPUTED`. Hidden `COMPUTED` fields are also removed from every permission-reduced document before a projection, a `RETURN` clause, `$before`/`$after` or a `WHERE` condition can read them.

  • Versions 3.3.0 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds

Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:

  • For reads, force the legacy executor with `--planner-strategy compute-only` (env `SURREAL_PLANNER_STRATEGY`, or `PlannerStrategy::ComputeOnly` in the embedded SDK's `Capabilities`). Before 3.3.0 the legacy executor let a `COMPUTED` field that is itself hidden be read through an alias or a `WHERE` condition, so use this only where no `COMPUTED` field relies on its own SELECT permission.
  • Give a readable `COMPUTED` field the same SELECT permission as the fields its expression reads.
  • Do not rely on a `COMPUTED` field's own SELECT permission to hide it from users who can create, update, upsert or delete records in its table. The planner strategy does not affect writes.
  • Where record users do not need to send their own queries, deny them arbitrary queries with the `--deny-arbitrary-query` capability flag.
References
  • SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE FIELD https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/field
  • SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/table
  • `Fix field-level select permissions on computed fields, array fields and RETURN DIFF` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
  • `fix(exec): re-derive computed fields against the reduced record` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
  • `fix(exec): resolve a computed field's self-dereference against the reduced row` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
  • `fix(exec): sanitise self-reads when a computed name shadows a stored key` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
  • `fix(exec): derive the self-read view where computed fields are evaluated` (included in SurrealDB 3.3.0)
Acknowledgements

Thank you to santhreal https://github.com/santhreal for reporting this issue.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
surrealdb≥ 3.0.0 < 3.3.0
3.0.0
3.3.0
4.0.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iosurrealdb
Corregida 3.3.0 -4 d 4.0.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.3.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-2jj6-v2fq-rwpp

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