GHSA-2RJR-44WX-8QPG
JwtSecret Overwrite via Settings API Causes Session Invalidation and Monopoly
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-2RJR-44WX-8QPG divulgada · CVSS 3.8 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
An administrator session or an `api:write` service token could overwrite `JwtSecret` through the app settings write. That invalidates every issued session at once, and the change persists in app.ini. Users can sign in again immediately, because sessions are issued and checked with the current secret, so this is a recoverable forced logout rather than an exclusive takeover.
Patches
Fixed in 2.9.1 (fecb2a8d71 https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/fecb2a8d71): settings writes always keep the saved JwtSecret; it can only be changed in app.ini.
Workarounds
Limit `api:write` tokens to trusted automation.
---
Original report
The maintainer narrowed the following points: the prerequisite is an administrator-equivalent credential rather than "any authenticated user"; "session monopoly" and "recovery requires direct server access" do not hold, since other users can sign in again right away.
Summary
The JwtSecret field in the cosy framework's App struct lacks the `protected:"true"` tag, allowing any authenticated user to overwrite it via `POST /api/settings/app`. This immediately invalidates ALL existing JWT sessions and allows the attacker to monopolize access. This is a regression — the v1 struct had `protected:"true"` on JwtSecret, and `restore.go` still treats it as a protected field.
Details
The `JwtSecret` field in the cosy framework's App struct lacks the `protected:"true"` tag, allowing any authenticated user to overwrite it via `POST /api/settings/app`. This immediately invalidates ALL existing JWT sessions (since they were signed with the old secret), and the attacker can log in again to hold the only valid session.
Evidence This Is a Regression
- The v1 struct (`settings/server_v1.go` line 19) had `protected:"true"` on JwtSecret — it was removed during the cosy framework migration.
- The restore function (`settings/restore.go` lines 20-27) explicitly lists JwtSecret in `protectedFields`:
protectedFields: map[string]struct{}{
"JwtSecret": {},
}This proves the maintainer knows JwtSecret needs protection.
- Inconsistency with other protected fields:
| Field | Has `protected:"true"` | Controls |
|-------|----------------------|----------|
| `Terminal.StartCmd` | YES | Command execution |
| `Logrotate.CMD` | YES | Command execution |
| `Crypto.Secret` | YES | Encryption key |
| `Casdoor.*` (all fields) | YES | SSO authentication |
| `OIDC.*` (all fields) | YES | SSO authentication |
| `JwtSecret` | NO | ALL JWT authentication |
JwtSecret, which controls the validity of every session in the system, is the only authentication-critical field missing protection.
Note on Token Forgery
Direct JWT forgery does NOT work because `GetTokenUser()` (`internal/user/user.go` lines 161-185) performs a dual check: JWT signature validation AND exact token string lookup in the `auth_tokens` database table. A forged JWT with a valid signature but no matching DB row is rejected. The real impact is session invalidation and monopoly, not token forgery.
Proof of concept
Step 1: Login as any user and note the JWT token.
Step 2: Overwrite JwtSecret:
POST /api/settings/app
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <jwt>
{"jwt_secret": "attacker-controlled-secret"}Result: HTTP 200 — accepted.
Step 3: Verify ALL existing sessions are killed:
GET /api/users
Authorization: Bearer <old-jwt>Result: HTTP 403 — session invalidated.
Step 4: Verify other sensitive fields ARE correctly protected (proving this is a gap):
POST /api/settings/terminal
Content-Type: application/json
{"start_cmd": "/bin/evil"}Result: Terminal.StartCmd remains unchanged — `protected:"true"` works correctly on other fields.
Step 5: Login again — the attacker is now the only user with a valid session.
Step 6: Verify persistence — survives server restarts:
cat /etc/nginx-ui/app.ini | grep JwtSecret
# JwtSecret = attacker-controlled-secretFull automated PoC tested on Docker (nginx-ui latest).
Impact
- Immediate session invalidation for ALL users (Denial of Service)
- Session monopoly — attacker is the only user with valid access after re-login
- Persistent — written to `app.ini`, survives server restarts
- Recovery requires direct server access — other admins must SSH in and manually edit `app.ini` to restore access. In cloud/containerized deployments, this may require infrastructure-level intervention.
Suggested Fix
Add `protected:"true"` to the `JwtSecret` field in the cosy App struct, consistent with:
- How it was protected in the v1 struct (`settings/server_v1.go` line 19)
- How `restore.go` treats it as protected (lines 20-27)
- How all other security-critical fields (`Terminal.StartCmd`, `Logrotate.CMD`, `Crypto.Secret`, Casdoor/OIDC) are protected
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.9.9 afectada |
2.9.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-2rjr-44wx-8qpgLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
