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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-2VF9-2QW7-8HMR

Key generation lets any session holder replace their own account password without the current one, and returns the new password

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
6.8
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.2.4.1
Exposición17 dDesde la divulgación, 4 nov 2026, 12:47 a. m.
Detección15 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 nov 26
8 nov 26
12 nov 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-2VF9-2QW7-8HMR divulgada · CVSS 6.8 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The key generation endpoint lets any session holder replace their own account's password without knowing the current password, and returns the new password in clear text. Whoever holds a user's web session (a stolen cookie, an unattended browser) can therefore turn it into a valid password for the account. That locks the owner out and keeps the access after the session ends.

Details

Paths under `app/sources/`, line numbers as of 3.2.4.0.

`keyHandler()` handles `user_new_keys_generation` (`main.queries.php:869-911`):

  1. The action is open to every user (`$all_users_can_access`, lines 738-742).
  2. When the request carries no `user_id`, the target defaults to the caller's own account (line 751), and the authorization block for other accounts (753-793) is skipped.
  3. The current password is verified only when the client-supplied flag `generate_user_new_password` is not the boolean `true` (line 875).

With the flag set, `handleUserKeys()` (`main.functions.php:9297-9575`) does the following:

  • generates a random password (9357-9360);
  • writes its hash and a new key pair to the account (9423-9443);
  • puts the new private key into the caller's session (9500-9506);
  • queues the background re-key, which re-encrypts the account's item keys under the new key pair;
  • returns the new password to the caller as `user_password` (9561-9568).

When `send_email_to_user` is false, the owner is not notified. Only the administrator dialogs send the flag, for another user's account. The server never enforced that.

The profile path `change_pw` (`changePassword()`, `main.queries.php:1314-1461`) does not verify the current password either. On a standard schema it fails before writing anything (it updates `users.fonction_id`, a column dropped in 3.1.5), so it is not exploitable there. It is fixed in the same release.

History:

  • 3.1.2 started returning the generated password. In 3.1.2 the endpoint also accepted any `user_id` from any user.
  • 3.1.3 restricted other accounts to administrators and managers, which left the caller's own account open.
Proof of concept

The attacker holds user U's session cookie. The decoded response of step 2 holds a new password for U's account.

  1. Load any page with U's cookie and read the session key (the `key` value embedded in the page).
  2. `POST sources/main.queries.php` with:
  3. `type=user_new_keys_generation`
  4. `type_category=action_key`
  5. `key=<session key>`
  6. `data` = `{"generate_user_new_password":true,"user_pwd":"","encryption_key":"","delete_existing_keys":false,"send_email_to_user":false,"encrypt_with_user_pwd":true,"email_body":"","user_self_change":false,"recovery_public_key":"","recovery_private_key":""}`, encrypted with the session key when client-server encryption is enabled. No `user_id`.
  7. Once the background re-key has finished, the new password signs in to U's account. U's own password no longer does.
Impact

The attacker must already hold a live session of the user. In return, they:

  • gain the account password and keep access to the vault after that session ends;
  • lock the owner out of a locally authenticated account.

Two-factor authentication, when enabled on the account, still has to be passed at sign-in. For LDAP and OAuth2 accounts the generated password is not the one used to sign in, but the account's keys are still replaced. This also defeats the owner's recovery: per GHSA-p84q-3h9h-qvh6, a recovery does not end the attacker's session, so the attacker can run the request again.

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.4.1:

  • A password is generated only for another account, by a user authorized to manage it.
  • A key generation on the caller's own account always verifies the current password.
  • `change_pw` verifies the current password before any write.
Workarounds

None short of upgrading. Enabling two-factor authentication keeps the generated password from signing in, but the owner is still locked out.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
5.9/ 10Medio
Vector 5.9 (moderada) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≥ 3.1.2 < 3.2.4.1
3.1.2
3.2.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Corregida 3.2.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas3.2.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-2vf9-2qw7-8hmr

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.