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Advisory · GitHub · npm · ep_etherpad-lite

GHSA-35RJ-7VRX-29WQ

Open redirect in timeslider "Return to pad": unvalidated document.referrer allows redirect to attacker origin

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CVSS
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low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición23 dDesde la divulgación, 28 oct 2026, 4:59 a. m.
Detección21 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
28 oct 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
28 oct 26
3 nov 26
8 nov 26
14 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-35RJ-7VRX-29WQ divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The `timeslider_returnToPad` toolbar command navigates the browser to `document.referrer` when a one-character string check passes. Because the check only inspects the character immediately before the last `/` in the referrer, any attacker-chosen origin whose path contains a segment ending in `p` (for example `https://evil.example/p/login`) is accepted, and the browser is redirected off-site.

Difference from CVE-2026-55087 (please read first)

This is not a duplicate of CVE-2026-55087 / GHSA-fjgc-3mj7-8rg8. That issue is the attacker-controlled `x-proxy-path` request header being concatenated into the server-side `/p/:pad/timeslider` redirect (a server-issued 302). This report is a different sink with a different input:

| | CVE-2026-55087 | This report |
|---|---|---|
| Sink | `src/node/hooks/express/specialpages.ts` (server) | `src/static/js/pad_editbar.ts:609` (client) |
| Input | `x-proxy-path` request header | `document.referrer` |
| Trigger | 302, no user interaction | one click on a toolbar button |
| Fixed in | 3.1.0 | not fixed (present in 3.3.10) |

They are related, though, and that is the point of this report: the mitigation shipped for CVE-2026-55087 was to stop serving the legacy direct timeslider URL and redirect back to the pad instead (PR #7710, commit `8c6104c5`). That mitigation is still bypassable by requesting `/p/<pad>/timeslider?embed=1`, and the page served that way still renders the "Return to pad" button, which is itself an open redirect. In other words, the previous fix moved the entry point from a server-side 302 to a client-side button without closing the redirect class.

Affected product

  • Ecosystem: npm, package `ep_etherpad-lite`
  • Vulnerable: `<= 3.3.10` (no fixed version available at time of report)
  • The same code was confirmed present in release tags 1.8.18, 2.0.3, 2.2.7, 3.0.0, 3.1.0, 3.2.0 and 3.3.0, so the issue is long-standing rather than a recent regression.

Root cause

`src/static/js/pad_editbar.ts:605-614` (v3.3.10, HEAD `bc693d0`):

this.registerCommand('timeslider_returnToPad', (cmd) => {
  if (document.referrer.length > 0 &&
      document.referrer.substring(document.referrer.lastIndexOf('/') - 1,
          document.referrer.lastIndexOf('/')) === 'p') {
    document.location = document.referrer;
  } else {
    document.location = document.location.href
        .substring(0, document.location.href.lastIndexOf('/'));
  }
});

The condition is intended to mean "the referrer is one of our own `/p/<pad>` URLs", but it is implemented as "the single character before the last `/` is `p`". It never parses the referrer and never compares the origin, so any external URL of the form `https://attacker/<anything>/p/<anything>` satisfies it. `document.location = document.referrer` then performs the navigation with no allow-list.

Evaluating the condition itself:

| referrer | char before last `/` | check |
|---|---|---|
| `https://evil.example/p/` | `p` | passes |
| `https://evil.example/p/login` | `p` | passes |
| `https://evil.example/p/deep/x` | `p` | passes |
| `https://evil.example/login` | `n` | rejected |
| `https://evil.example/p` (no trailing slash) | `/` | rejected |

Prerequisites (all verified — please do not assume a stronger claim than this)

  1. `?embed=1` is required on 3.3.10. Since 3.1.0, `/p/:pad/timeslider` without `?embed=1` returns a 302 back to the pad (`src/node/hooks/express/specialpages.ts:433-443`). With `?embed=1` the page is still served in full.
  2. The button must actually be visible. `iframe-mode` is only added when `window.parent !== window` (`src/static/js/timeslider.ts:95`), and `static/css/timeslider.css:9-19` only hides `#editbar` under `body.embedded-history-frame.iframe-mode`. So in the normal in-pad history mode the button is hidden, but for a direct top-level visit to `?embed=1` it is visible. The CSS comment documents this intent explicitly: direct visits keep their full chrome.
  3. The referrer must carry the full path. The browser default (`strict-origin-when-cross-origin`) trims a cross-origin referrer down to the origin, which fails the check. The attacker opts out in either of two ways, both verified:
  4. page-level `<meta name="referrer" content="unsafe-url">`
  5. per-link `<a href="..." referrerpolicy="unsafe-url">`

The second one is the more realistic one: the attacker only needs to place a single link on any page they control, not a whole page.

Reproduction

Environment: Etherpad 3.3.10 built from `bc693d0`, served on `http://127.0.0.1:9001`; attacker page served on `http://127.0.0.1:9999` (different origin); Chrome 155.0.8059.85 driven by Playwright. All clicks were real user clicks, not direct calls to the command handler.

  1. Attacker page at `http://127.0.0.1:9999/p/` contains `<meta name="referrer" content="unsafe-url">` and a link to `http://127.0.0.1:9001/p/payloadpad/timeslider?embed=1`.
  2. Victim clicks the link. The timeslider loads as a top-level page, with the "Return to pad" button visible in the top-right toolbar.
  3. Victim clicks "Return to pad". `document.location = document.referrer` fires and the browser navigates to `http://127.0.0.1:9999/p/`.

Observed results across five scenarios:

| # | Scenario | `document.referrer` | check | final URL after click | cross-origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | page-level `unsafe-url`, path `/p/` | `http://127.0.0.1:9999/p/` | passes | `http://127.0.0.1:9999/p/` | yes |
| 2 | default referrer policy (control) | `http://127.0.0.1:9999/` | rejected | `http://127.0.0.1:9001/p/payloadpad` | no |
| 3 | deep path `/p/deep/` | `http://127.0.0.1:9999/p/deep/` | passes | `http://127.0.0.1:9999/p/deep/` | yes |
| 4 | no referrer (direct visit) | `""` | rejected | `http://127.0.0.1:9001/p/payloadpad` | no |
| 5 | per-link `referrerpolicy` | `http://127.0.0.1:9999/plain/p/` | passes | `http://127.0.0.1:9999/plain/p/` | yes |

Scenarios 1, 3 and 5 are three independent successful redirects.

Impact

Phishing. A victim who follows an attacker link into the timeslider and then clicks the ordinary-looking "Return to pad" button is sent to an attacker-controlled origin, and the landing path is fully attacker-chosen (`/p/login` reads convincingly as an Etherpad login page). The expectation of "return to where I came from" is exactly what makes the button trustworthy.

This is not XSS: the referrer is generated by the browser and cannot be a `javascript:` or `data:` URL, so only `http(s)` destinations are reachable. Severity is therefore bounded by that.

Suggested fix

Parse the referrer instead of slicing it, and compare origins explicitly:

this.registerCommand('timeslider_returnToPad', (cmd) => {
  const padUrl = document.location.href.substring(0, document.location.href.lastIndexOf('/'));
  try {
    const ref = new URL(document.referrer);
    if (ref.origin === location.origin && /^\/p\//.test(ref.pathname)) {
      document.location = ref.href;
      return;
    }
  } catch { /* empty or unparsable referrer */ }
  document.location = padUrl;
});

A cleaner option would be to drop the referrer dependency entirely. History mode is now an in-pad iframe, so returning to the pad only needs to act on the parent window or leave history mode; the referrer check is a leftover from when the timeslider was a standalone page in 2011.

Limitations of this report

  • Not tested against a real public deployment; origins were separated by port on localhost. The condition does not involve the host at all, so behaviour should be identical, but this was not exercised.
  • Not tested with an HTTPS target and an HTTP attacker page.
  • No claim is made about browser versions other than the one used.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
ep_etherpad-lite≤ 3.3.11
1.8.14
3.3.11
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmep_etherpad-lite
Sin parche — — 1.8.14 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/ether/etherpad/security/advisories/GHSA-35rj-7vrx-29wq

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.