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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · gitpython

GHSA-3F7W-8RR8-F37F

GitPython: Unguarded git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create() enables arbitrary file overwrite and arbitrary file read

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -8 d de la divulgación
Exposición108 dDesde la divulgación, 3 ago 2026, 3:09 p. m.
Detección105 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.57
Monitoreo
Detectada
26 jul 26
3 ago 26
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 jul 26
24 ago 26
22 sept 26
21 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.1.57 gitpython · -8 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-3F7W-8RR8-F37F divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Target: gitpython-developers/GitPython
Tested: HEAD `07e80555` (2026-07-25), latest release 3.1.55, `git version 2.50.1`
Reported instances: 2 exploitable, from a sweep of 14 unguarded call sites

Summary

GitPython blocks dangerous git options through `Git.check_unsafe_options()`, gated per method by an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. That guard is applied per call site, so any API that forwards `**kwargs` into a git command without calling it passes caller-controlled options straight to git.

A mechanical sweep of every method that forwards `kwargs` into a `.git.<command>(...)` call found 14 sites with no guard**. Two reach a git option that takes a filesystem path:

| # | Call site | git option | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `IndexFile.checkout()` → `git checkout-index` | `--prefix=<path>` | arbitrary file overwrite with repository-controlled content |
| 2 | `TagReference.create()` → `git tag` | `-F <file>` / `--file=<file>` | arbitrary file read, returned in-band |

This is the same defect class already fixed in `Commit.count()` (GHSA-p538-c434-8v24), `Repo.archive()` and `Git.ls_remote()` (GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v). Both instances below are still present at HEAD.

---

Instance 1 — `IndexFile.checkout()`: arbitrary file overwrite

`git/index/base.py:1210` accepts `**kwargs` and forwards them with no guard:

def checkout(self, paths=None, force=False, fprogress=lambda *args: None, **kwargs):
    ...
    proc = self.repo.git.checkout_index(*args, **kwargs)   # line 1331
    ...
    proc = self.repo.git.checkout_index(args, **kwargs)    # line 1349

There is no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter and no `check_unsafe_options()` call in the method.

`git checkout-index` accepts `--prefix=<string>`, prepended to every output path. It is not confined to the working tree, so an absolute prefix writes tracked file contents anywhere the process can write, and `-f` overwrites what is already there.

Reproduction
from git import Repo
Repo("/path/to/repo").index.checkout(prefix="/tmp/target_dir/", a=True, f=True)

Observed (`poc/poc_checkout_index.py`) — no exception raised, files land outside the repository:

[ALLOWED] no UnsafeOptionError raised
files written outside the repo: ['f.txt']
  f.txt: 'hi\n'

Overwrite of a pre-existing file (`poc/poc_ci_overwrite.py`) — the victim file held `ORIGINAL-DO-NOT-CLOBBER\n` before the call:

[ALLOWED] no exception
victim content now: 'hi\n'
OVERWRITTEN: True
Why this rates High

Both halves of the write are attacker-influenced:

  • Destination — the `prefix` kwarg.
  • Content — the bytes written are repository blobs, so anyone who can land a file in the repository (a pull-request branch, a mirrored or untrusted repository, an agent-cloned repository) controls exactly what is written.

Commit a file named `authorized_keys`, `.bashrc`, `config` or `post-checkout`, choose the matching prefix (`~/.ssh/`, `~/`, `.git/hooks/`), and the write becomes code execution as the service account.

For comparison within this project: GHSA-fjr4-x663-mwxc (arbitrary file overwrite via `git diff --output`) is rated High, and GHSA-p538-c434-8v24 (arbitrary file *truncation* via `git rev-list --output`) is rated Medium. `--prefix` supplies full content control, so it sits at or above the former.

---

Instance 2 — `TagReference.create()`: arbitrary file read

`git/refs/tag.py:88` forwards `**kwargs` into `git tag` with no guard, and the signature advertises the passthrough:

def create(cls, repo, path, reference="HEAD", logmsg=None, force=False, **kwargs):
    """...
    :param kwargs:
        Additional keyword arguments to be passed to :manpage:`git-tag(1)`.
    """

`git tag` accepts `-F <file>` / `--file=<file>`, which reads the tag message from an arbitrary path. The annotated tag object stores that content and GitPython returns it to the caller via `TagReference.tag.message`, so the file contents come back in-band.

Reproduction
from git import Repo
from git.refs.tag import TagReference

t = TagReference.create(Repo("/path/to/repo"), "x", force=True, a=True, F="/etc/passwd")
print(t.tag.message)

Observed (`poc/poc_tag_F.py`), reading a canary file outside the repository:

[ALLOWED] no UnsafeOptionError raised
>>> tag message recovered from arbitrary path: 'TAG-READ-CANARY-98765\nsecond-line-secret'

Impact is a read at the privileges of the process. I am not claiming code execution for this instance. The signing options (`-s`, `-u`/`--local-user`) do invoke gpg from the same unguarded kwargs, but I did not develop that into command execution and make no claim about it.

---

Sweep results — the other 12 sites

Reported so the fix can be scoped once rather than per report. `poc/sweep.py` reproduces this list.

| Call site | git command | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| `IndexFile.from_tree()` | `read-tree` | `--index-output=<path>` looked reachable but is neutralised: GitPython appends its own `--index-output` after the caller's kwargs and git honours the last occurrence. Verified — victim file unchanged (`poc/poc_readtree.py`) |
| `IndexFile.remove()` | `rm` | `--pathspec-from-file` only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found |
| `IndexFile.move()` | `mv` | same |
| `HEAD.reset()` | `reset` | same |
| `HEAD.checkout()` | `checkout` | same |
| `Head.delete()`, `RemoteReference.delete()` | `branch` | no path-taking option found |
| `Repo.merge_base()` | `merge-base` | no path-taking option found |
| `Repo._get_untracked_files()` | `status` | no path-taking option found |
| `Remote.set_url()`, `Remote.create()`, `Remote.update()` | `remote` | URL handling already addressed by GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67 |

Suggested remediation

Immediate: add `allow_unsafe_options: bool = False` to both methods and gate `Git._option_candidates(args, kwargs)` against new lists — `unsafe_git_checkout_index_options = ["--prefix"]` (consider `--temp`) and `unsafe_git_tag_options = ["--file", "-F"]` (consider `-s`, `-u`/`--local-user`, `--cleanup`) — matching the pattern used in `Repo.archive()` and `Commit.count()`.

Structural: this defect has now been fixed four times in four places (`Repo.archive()`, `Git.ls_remote()`, `Commit.count()`, and the two here), because the guard is opt-in per method: every new `**kwargs`-forwarding API starts unguarded and stays that way until someone reports it. Enforcing the check centrally in `Git._call_process()` — each git invocation consults a per-command unsafe-option table unless the caller opts out — would make new call sites safe by default rather than by review, and would close the remaining sites in the table above at the same time.

Disclosure

Reported privately via GitHub private vulnerability reporting.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
gitpython< 3.1.57
3.1.57
3.2.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypigitpython
Corregida 3.1.57 -8 d 3.2.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.57
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2193
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/3af0c2516c5e18c829da30338614688f6b69b49c
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython
Otrahttps://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.57

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