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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nukeviet/nukeviet

GHSA-3G6M-VV3C-9P36

Authenticated SSRF in URL file import via IPv4-mapped IPv6 address bypass

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
2.2
Baja
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición50 dDesde la divulgación, 1 oct 2026, 7:10 p. m.
Detección48 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Riesgo bajo: ni para escupir.Mis gafas de sol dicen que todo bien.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
2 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
2 oct 26
14 oct 26
27 oct 26
9 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-3G6M-VV3C-9P36 divulgada · CVSS 2.2 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address that bypasses
the private/reserved-range filter of the URL-based file import feature.

The URL-import path validates the target host in
`NukeViet\Files\Upload::save_urlfile()` → `is_safe_url_target()` →
`resolve_host_ips()` → `is_safe_ip()`, where `is_safe_ip()` relied on:

filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)

PHP does not canonicalize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses for these flags, so
`::ffff:127.0.0.1` (equivalently `::ffff:7f00:1`) is treated as an ordinary,
non-reserved IPv6 address and passes the filter, even though it is semantically
the loopback address `127.0.0.1`. The same holds for other embedded
representations of internal IPv4 space (`::ffff:169.254.169.254`,
`::ffff:10.0.0.1`, `64:ff9b::7f00:1`, `2002:7f00:1::1`, …). The validated
address is then pinned via `CURLOPT_RESOLVE` and fetched, and - on stacks that
map `::ffff:a.b.c.d` onto the IPv4 endpoint (Linux, BSD) - the request reaches
the internal service.

Who is impacted?
Only an authenticated administrator who has been granted the *upload file*
permission (submitting a hostname whose `AAAA` record resolves to a mapped
internal address). The demonstrated account is not a GOD administrator, but it
is a trusted administrator role, not an anonymous or low-privileged user.

What can an attacker actually do?
Under a default installation the practical impact is limited to:

  • Blind SSRF - cause the server to issue `GET` requests to attacker-chosen
  • Narrow internal read - persist an internal response into the upload tree

Why the impact is limited (mitigating factors).

  1. OS-dependent. The fetch only reaches the internal IPv4 service on stacks
  2. Two-layer MIME enforcement blocks text/JSON/HTML. To be saved, a response
  3. The PoC used a self-served valid PDF. A real attacker does not control

The residual, verified impact is therefore authenticated blind SSRF plus a
narrow binary-file read, not disclosure of text-based internal secrets.
A non-default deployment that enables the `text`/`xml` MIME groups widens the
confidentiality impact (e.g. `text/plain` metadata becomes readable).

Patches

Fixed in NukeViet 4.6.02
(commit `c25fefe` https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/commit/c25fefe9fda8d362dd38d328664df2f8d1392287).

IPv4-mapped / IPv4-compatible / NAT64 / 6to4 addresses are now canonicalized and
the embedded IPv4 is re-checked against an explicit denylist (loopback, RFC1918,
link-local, cloud-metadata, CGNAT `100.64.0.0/10`, benchmarking
`198.18.0.0/15`, and other reserved ranges that `filter_var` also missed) before
the request is pinned. The check is centralized in
`NukeViet\Core\Ips::is_safe_public_ip()` / `is_safe_host()` and applied to all
three URL-fetch entry points (`Files\Upload`, `Files\Image`,
`admin/seotools/sitemapPing.php`); the latter two now resolve every `A`/`AAAA`
record and pin the validated IP, closing a related DNS-rebinding gap.

Users should upgrade to 4.6.02 or later.

Workarounds

For users who cannot upgrade immediately:

  • Revoke the *upload file* permission from any administrator who does not
  • Do not enable the non-default `text` or `xml` MIME groups, which keeps
  • Ensure `NV_DEVELOPER_MODE` is not defined in production - developer mode
  • At the network layer, restrict outbound traffic from the web server to
References
  • Fix commit: https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/commit/c25fefe9fda8d362dd38d328664df2f8d1392287
  • Distinct prior SSRF advisory (different source/sink/boundary): GHSA-4chg-4752-w88r
  • CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
  • CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
  • Reported by canhieu; root-cause analysis and recommended fix adopted.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:H
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
3.6/ 10Bajo
Vector 3.6 (difícil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nukeviet/nukeviet≤ 4.5.11
4.5.11
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnukeviet/nukeviet
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/security/advisories/GHSA-3g6m-vv3c-9p36

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.