GHSA-3G82-77XR-68X5
js-toml allows uncontrolled recursion in `load()` leading `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested input
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Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 1.1.3 | js-toml · -143 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-3G82-77XR-68X5 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`load()` parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a
recursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a
maximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting
(arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack
limit, and `load()` throws an uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`.
This is a problem for two reasons:
- Denial of Service. A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any
- Error-contract violation. The library signals invalid input via
```js
try { load(input); }
catch (e) {
if (e instanceof SyntaxParseError) return badRequest();
throw e; // unexpected -> propagates
}
```
— will re-throw the `RangeError` instead of treating the input as malformed,
turning malformed input into an unexpected fatal error.
Impact
- Unauthenticated attacker who can supply a TOML string to an application using
- If the error is not caught by a generic handler, the Node.js process terminates
- Even when caught generically, the documented/expected error type contract is broken,
No confidentiality or integrity impact. The error is thrown synchronously and is
catchable, so a consumer that catches *all* exceptions is not crashed — this is why the
severity is assessed Low–Medium rather than High.
Affected code / root cause
There is no depth bound anywhere in the parse pipeline. Recursion occurs in (at least)
two independent places:
- Parser (recursive descent). `src/load/parser.ts` — `array` / `inlineTable`
- Interpreter (tree walk). `src/load/interpreter.ts` —
Because there is no configurable or hard limit, the recursion depth is bounded only by
the V8 stack, and overflow surfaces as a raw `RangeError`.
Steps to reproduce (PoC)
Environment used: Node.js v20, `js-toml@1.1.2`.
import { load, SyntaxParseError } from 'js-toml';
function probe(label, toml) {
try {
load(toml);
console.log(`[OK] ${label}`);
} catch (e) {
const expected = e instanceof SyntaxParseError;
console.log(`[${e.constructor.name}${expected ? '' : ' (UNEXPECTED)'}] ${label}: ${String(e.message).split('\n')[0]}`);
}
}
// 1) Deeply nested arrays (~2 KB payload)
probe('nested array depth 1000', 'x = ' + '['.repeat(1000) + ']'.repeat(1000));
// 2) Deeply nested inline tables
let v = '1';
for (let i = 0; i < 1000; i++) v = `{ a = ${v} }`;
probe('nested inline table depth 1000', 'x = ' + v);
// 3) Deep dotted key (interpreter recursion)
const key = Array.from({ length: 5000 }, (_, i) => 'a' + i).join('.');
probe('dotted key depth 5000', `${key} = 1`);Observed output
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested array depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] nested inline table depth 1000: Maximum call stack size exceeded
[RangeError (UNEXPECTED)] dotted key depth 5000: Maximum call stack size exceededEach case throws `RangeError`, not `SyntaxParseError`. Overflow occurs in single-digit
milliseconds, so it is not a CPU-exhaustion issue — it is an immediate, deterministic abort.
Notes on thresholds (machine-dependent; exact numbers vary by stack size):
- Nested arrays / inline tables overflow at roughly depth ~1000 (parser recursion).
- Dotted keys overflow at roughly depth ~5000 (interpreter recursion); depth 1000 still succeeds.
Suggested remediation
Enforce an explicit, documented maximum nesting/key depth and surface violations as
`SyntaxParseError` (consistent with all other invalid-input handling). For example:
- Track current depth in the parser/interpreter and throw `SyntaxParseError`
- As a defensive backstop, wrap the top-level `load()` body so that a thrown
A configurable limit (with a safe default) is preferable so legitimate deep documents can
opt into a higher bound.
Disclosure
Reported privately via GitHub Security Advisory. Happy to provide additional reproducers
or test against a candidate patch.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmjs-toml |
Corregida | 1.1.3 | -143 d | 2.0.1 no afectada |
1.1.3Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63386https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/commit/4e10acf1f99ff3cb443c58b8f0a57664e41e87c6https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-tomlhttps://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/releases/tag/v1.1.3Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
