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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · io.openremote:openremote-manager

GHSA-3H6W-XCW3-9XJJ

OpenRemote: Cross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 4.0
6.3
Media
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -57 d de la divulgación
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 20 nov 2026, 9:56 a. m.
Detección1 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 4.0 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Un riesgo moderado es un riesgo con modales.Sin prisa pero sin pausa, como yo en el páramo.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 1.31.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories +2
24 sept 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
24 sept 26
9 oct 26
23 oct 26
7 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 1.31.0 io.openremote:openremote-manager · -57 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-3H6W-XCW3-9XJJ divulgada · CVSS 6.3 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories
Monitoreo Fuente: OSV Registro visto por primera vez en OSV
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Cross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization

Vulnerability

The `disconnectUserSession` endpoint in `UserResourceImpl.java` (line 443) accepts a `realm` path parameter but ignores it entirely, performing no authorization or realm-boundary check before force-disconnecting an MQTT session. Any authenticated user from any realm can disconnect MQTT broker sessions belonging to users in other realms by supplying the target session ID.

File: `manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java`, lines 443-447

@Override
public void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {
    if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {
        throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
    }
}

The REST interface at `model/src/main/java/org/openremote/model/security/UserResource.java` (line 201-204) maps this to `GET {realm}/disconnect/{sessionID}` with no `@RolesAllowed` annotation, so any authenticated user (not just admins) can call it.

Root Cause

CVE-2026-54641 (commit de89b8d) fixed cross-realm information disclosure in three read methods of the same file (`get()`, `getUserClientRoles()`, `getUserRealmRoles()`) and also added a realm check to `getClientRoles()`. The fix added `throwIfCannotReadUserInRealm()` and `throwIfCannotAdminRealm()` guards. However, `disconnectUserSession` was not patched and remains unprotected. Every other mutating method in this class has either a `@RolesAllowed` annotation on the interface or an explicit realm check in the implementation. This one has neither.

Proof of Concept

Given two realms, "master" and "building":

  1. User A authenticates in the "building" realm (any role, no admin needed).
  2. User B has an active MQTT session in the "master" realm with session ID `S`.
  3. User A sends: `GET /api/master/user/master/disconnect/S` with their building-realm bearer token.
  4. The handler ignores the realm path segments, looks up session `S` in the global `connectionIDConnectionMap`, and calls `doForceDisconnect()`. User B's MQTT connection is terminated.

Session IDs use the Netty `ChannelId.asLongText()` format (deterministic, partially sequential). While not trivially brute-forceable, IDs can leak through monitoring, logs, or correlated API calls. Within the same realm, any user (not just admins) can also disconnect sessions they should not have access to.

Impact

In a multi-tenant IoT deployment, an attacker authenticated in any realm can disrupt MQTT device connectivity in other realms. Since OpenRemote is used for building management, energy monitoring, and industrial IoT, forcibly disconnecting MQTT sessions can:

  • Knock IoT sensors and actuators offline across tenant boundaries
  • Disrupt safety-critical alarm monitoring (compounding the alarm IDOR fixed in CVE-2026-57168)
  • Cause denial of service against other tenants' device fleets

The method also uses HTTP GET for a destructive operation, making it susceptible to CSRF via image tags or link prefetch.

Suggested Fix

Add a realm administration check consistent with the pattern used elsewhere in this file:

@Override
public void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {
    throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm);

    RemotingConnection connection = mqttBrokerService.getConnectionByID(sessionID);
    if (connection == null) {
        throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
    }

    // Verify the session belongs to a user in the requested realm
    // before disconnecting

    if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {
        throw new NotFoundException("User session not found");
    }
}

At minimum, add `throwIfCannotAdminRealm(realm)` as the first line, and consider adding a `@RolesAllowed(Constants.WRITE_ADMIN_ROLE)` annotation to the interface method. The HTTP method should also be changed from GET to DELETE.

AI tooling

AI assistance was used for the code audit and for drafting this report. The finding against the project's source at the location cited above was manually verified before reporting it, and the severity and impact assessment are the reporter's own.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:N
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.1/ 10Alto
Vector 7.1 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
io.openremote:openremote-manager< 1.31.0
1.31.0
1.34.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavenio.openremote:openremote-manager
Corregida 1.31.0 -57 d 1.34.1 no afectada
Versiones corregidas1.31.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104885
Otrahttps://github.com/openremote/core/security/advisories/GHSA-3h6w-xcw3-9xjj
Otrahttps://github.com/openremote/core/commit/51dce18d9e00d671a5e032d942ece186bdada560
Otrahttps://github.com/openremote/core/releases/tag/1.31.0
Otrahttps://github.com/openremote/openremote

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