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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms

GHSA-3JFM-927M-Q5RG

Unsafe Reflection in dashboard widget `data_source` discloses all password hashes

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
8.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición116 dDesde la divulgación, 25 jul 2026, 7:24 p. m.
Detección115 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
26 jul 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 jul 26
24 ago 26
22 sept 26
21 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-3JFM-927M-Q5RG divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The dashboard-widget feature stores a user-supplied `data_source` string and later executes it as `new $class()` followed by `$obj->$method()`, splitting the value on `::`. The field is persisted from the request with no validation, so a low-privileged backend user who can manage widgets controls both the class that is instantiated and the (zero-argument) method that is invoked, and the return value is rendered back to them.

A user whose only relevant grants are the dashboard-widget permissions (and who has no permission on the Users module) can set `data_source` to `\CodeIgniter\Shield\Models\UserIdentityModel::findAll` and read every account's login e-mail and bcrypt password hash, including the super-admin. The hashes can be cracked offline to take over any account.

Details

The vulnerable code is resolveDataSource() in WidgetService.php. It splits the stored Data Source on "::", then instantiates the class and calls the method with no allow-list:

<img width="1005" height="481" alt="{5F3E8911-8A8D-48C7-A36D-357CBD0DBBFE}" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3c34ae97-ca2c-47c9-a000-2e78aa6f7eea" />

The value comes from the widget create/update form. The controller only trims it and never validates it (only slug and title are validated), so the attacker controls both the class and the method.

It is triggered by the read-only endpoint backend/dashboard-widgets/data/{slug}, which returns the result as JSON. As long as the widget slug is not one of the built-in names (total-users, recent-activity, and so on), this endpoint runs the attacker's class and method.

A CodeIgniter model needs no constructor arguments and findAll() takes none, so the value below fits the pattern and returns the whole identities table:

\CodeIgniter\Shield\Models\UserIdentityModel::findAll

Because the endpoint only checks the dashboard-widget read permission, a user with no access to the Users module still reads every hash. Verified on the running app: the test user can read widget data but cannot read the Users module.

PoC

Actor: a non-admin user whose group grants only the dashboard-widget permissions and has no Users-module access.

  1. Log in to the backend as the low-privileged widget user.
  1. Create a widget with:
  2. Slug: users-leak
  3. Title: ALLUSERS
  4. Type: table
  5. Data Source: \CodeIgniter\Shield\Models\UserIdentityModel::findAll

Save.

<img width="2525" height="1209" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1560ff2e-73d2-45d4-8eb2-6851297066e4" />

  1. Trigger the widget and read the response:

```
GET http://localhost:8080/backend/dashboard-widgets/data/users-leak
```
<img width="1023" height="1228" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/041d83f0-85e5-456c-a579-1e6cb53815ab" />

Impact

Any authenticated backend user with the dashboard-widget `create`/`read` permissions. No admin/super-admin rights, and crucially no Users-module permission, are required.
Disclosure of every user's login e-mail and bcrypt password hash, including the super-admin. This is a cross-module credential-disclosure issue that enables offline cracking and full account takeover.

Fix

Never derive a class/method to instantiate or call from user input. Resolve `data_source` through a fixed allow-list of approved providers:

/** Approved custom data providers: data_source value => [Class, method]. */
private const ALLOWED_DATA_SOURCES = [
    // 'sales.daily' => [\App\Widgets\SalesProvider::class, 'daily'],
];

protected function resolveDataSource(string $source): array
{
    if (!isset(self::ALLOWED_DATA_SOURCES[$source])) {
        return ['value' => '—', 'label' => 'Unknown source'];
    }
    [$class, $method] = self::ALLOWED_DATA_SOURCES[$source];
    return (array) (new $class())->{$method}();
}

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms≤ 0.32.0.0
0.32.0.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistci4-cms-erp/ci4ms
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms/security/advisories/GHSA-3jfm-927m-q5rg

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