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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · azuracast/azuracast

GHSA-3JP3-3WQW-JVW4

SSRF filter bypass in Station Webhooks via hostname and non-link-local private IPs

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CVSS 3.1
7.1
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición105 dDesde la divulgación, 7 ago 2026, 3:34 p. m.
Detección102 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
7 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
7 ago 26
3 sept 26
29 sept 26
25 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-3JP3-3WQW-JVW4 divulgada · CVSS 7.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
`AbstractConnector::getValidUrl()`, used by the `Generic` and `Discord` webhook connectors to validate a station-manager-supplied webhook URL before AzuraCast sends an outbound HTTP request to it, only rejects URLs whose host is a literal, link-local IP address (169.254.0.0/16 / fe80::/10 — e.g. the AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoint). It does not check loopback addresses, RFC1918 private ranges, or any hostname at all (since resolving a hostname to an `IP` object throws, and the exception path skips the check entirely). As a result, a user holding only the station-scoped `WebHooks` permission can make the server issue arbitrary outbound HTTP requests to internal/loopback/private-network targets — a Server-Side Request Forgery.

## Details
`backend/src/Webhook/Connector/AbstractConnector.php`:

protected function getValidUrl(mixed $urlString = null): ?string
{
    $uri = Urls::tryParseUserUrl($urlString, 'Webhook');
    if (null === $uri) {
        return null;
    }

    try {
        $ip = IP::create($uri->getHost());   // throws for any non-literal-IP hostname
    } catch (Throwable) {
        $ip = null;                          // -> check below is skipped entirely
    }

    if ($ip instanceof IP) {
        if ($ip->isLinkLocal()) {            // only catches 169.254.0.0/16 and fe80::/10
            return null;
        }
    }

    return (string)$uri;
}

`Urls::tryParseUserUrl()` (`backend/src/Utilities/Urls.php`) only validates that the scheme is `http`/`https`; it performs no host/IP restriction of its own.

`backend/src/Webhook/Connector/Generic.php` uses this to validate `config['webhook_url']` before calling `$this->httpClient->request('POST', $webhookUrl, ...)` with the station's live Now Playing data as the JSON body — and no re-validation happens at request time, so even if a hostname resolves differently between check-time and request-time (DNS rebinding), it would not matter here since the hostname case bypasses the check unconditionally regardless of what it resolves to.

Access to configure a webhook requires only the station-scoped `StationPermissions::WebHooks` permission (`backend/config/routes/api_station.php`, `Middleware\Permissions(StationPermissions::WebHooks, true)`), not full/global administrator rights. Additionally, `Controller/Api/Stations/Webhooks/TestAction.php` lets the same low-privileged user trigger an on-demand webhook dispatch immediately (`PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test`), without waiting for a real Now Playing event, making exploitation and result observation fast.

## Proof of Concept
Verified by executing the exact pinned dependency AzuraCast uses (`rlanvin/php-ip`, commit `7811f12256a5a610ddcb31ed9840179f4dd3784d`, as locked in `composer.lock`) against the same validation logic used in `getValidUrl()`, in an isolated local sandbox (no AzuraCast server or database was started; only the third-party IP library itself was exercised):

TARGET HOST                    DESCRIPTION                              RESULT
169.254.169.254                cloud metadata endpoint                  BLOCKED (correctly flagged link-local)
127.0.0.1                      loopback                                 ALLOWED — bypass
10.0.0.5                       RFC1918 private range                    ALLOWED — bypass
172.17.0.1                     default Docker bridge gateway            ALLOWED — bypass
192.168.1.1                    RFC1918 private range                    ALLOWED — bypass
::1                            IPv6 loopback                            ALLOWED — bypass
internal-mysql.docker.local    attacker-controlled hostname             check SKIPPED entirely — bypass
8.8.8.8                        public IP (control case)                 ALLOWED (expected/correct)

Only the literal-IP link-local case is actually blocked; every other internal/loopback/private target — and every hostname, regardless of what it resolves to — passes straight through.

## Impact
A user with only the narrow, station-scoped `WebHooks` permission (not a full server administrator) can cause the AzuraCast server to make outbound HTTP requests to:
- Loopback services on the host itself,
- Other containers/services on the internal Docker/private network,
- Any attacker-controlled hostname (trivially defeats the one existing protection),

potentially enabling internal network reconnaissance/port scanning, interaction with internal-only APIs, or (depending on deployment) reaching the cloud metadata service via a hostname that resolves to it (the literal-IP form is blocked, but a hostname pointing at the same IP is not).

## Suggested Fix
Centralize outbound-URL SSRF protection in `Urls` (or a shared helper used by every consumer, see the companion advisory on `StationRemote`) so that:
- The check always resolves the final hostname to its IP(s) (handling DNS) before evaluating it — never skip the check just because the input was a hostname.
- Block loopback, RFC1918 private ranges, and IPv6 unique-local/loopback in addition to link-local, not just link-local.
- Re-validate at request time (or pin the resolved IP for the actual request) to avoid DNS-rebinding TOCTOU gaps.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
azuracast/azuracasttodas
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistazuracast/azuracast
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-3jp3-3wqw-jvw4

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.