GHSA-3R6V-F3JH-VVQM
ancestor-delegation NSEC accepted as proof of nonexistence below the zone cut
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 0.26.0 | hickory-proto · -140 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-3R6V-F3JH-VVQM divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Remediación | Parche 0.26.2 | hickory-net · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
The validating recursor's NSEC handler does not distinguish parent-side delegation NSEC records from authoritative child-side NSECs. When a parent zone returns NXDOMAIN with the signed NSEC at the zone cut the implementation accepts that record as covering both the queried name and the synthesized wildcard, and returns `Proof::Secure`. The resolver then serves NXDOMAIN with AD=1 for names that legitimately exist in the child zone, contrary to RFC 6840 §4.1, which requires that an ancestor-delegation NSEC authenticate only the absence of DS at the cut owner and never the nonexistence of names below it.
The forged response uses only records that are genuinely signed and publicly retrievable from the parent, so no key compromise is required; an attacker only needs to deliver one such response (on-path, via a rogue parent nameserver, or by winning a port+TXID race). Because the recursor caches the resulting negative under the (child., NS) key during its delegation walk, every subsequent client query for any name strictly below the cut short-circuits to the cached denial for up to the negative TTL.
A similar issue affects validation of wildcard nonexistence proofs in NOERROR responses. There is another variant related to names with DNAME records, which are also mentioned in RFC 6840 §4.1.
Reporter
Qifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iohickory-proto |
Corregida | 0.26.0 | -140 d | 0.26.3 no afectada |
crates.iohickory-net |
Corregida | 0.26.2 | 0 d | 0.26.3 no afectada |
0.26.00.26.2Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-3r6v-f3jh-vvqmLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
