GHSA-3RJP-H4R9-4R6P
XCLIENT ADDR is accepted from any peer and written to RemoteIP unparsed, the unpatched sibling of CVE-2025-31135
Texto original en inglés · Ver en español
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche v1.6.7 | github.com/phires/go-guerrilla · -571 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-3RJP-H4R9-4R6P divulgada · CVSS 5.3 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
With xclient_on enabled, go-guerrilla accepts XCLIENT from any peer, any number of times, at any point in the session, and writes ADDR into client.RemoteIP without parsing it. This is the same defect as CVE-2025-31135 on the PROXY command, in the other branch of the same switch, and that branch was never given the fix.
Running the daemon built from v1.6.7 with the shipped HeadersParser and Header chain, a client that sends no XCLIENT gets Received: from 127.0.0.1. Sending XCLIENT ADDR=203.0.113.9 HELO=evil.example.net is answered 250 2.1.0 OK and the delivered header becomes Received: from 203.0.113.9, with Helo set to evil.example.net, which also skips the rfc5321 HELO parser the real HELO command goes through. Three XCLIENTs in one session were each accepted, the last carrying the literal string not-an-ip-at-all, which landed verbatim in the delivery header. A fourth case sent after MAIL FROM and RCPT TO was accepted mid-transaction. With xclient_on left at its default the same line returns 554 5.5.1 Unrecognized command, so the config flag is the only gate.
The contrast with the patched sibling is the point. PROXY now runs in its own one-shot connection state, validates the address with netip.ParseAddr, checks the family and calls client.kill() on failure. XCLIENT does none of that. Postfix treats these as two separate requirements: XCLIENT_README says use of the command must be restricted to authorized clients, and smtpd_authorized_xclient_hosts defaults to empty so that no client may use it. go-guerrilla has no equivalent. I have not prototyped a patch so I am not proposing a specific config key, only the direction.
The consequence is a Received header attributing the message to an address the sender chose, the same forged address in the operator's logs and database, and, where the shipped SPF processor is in the chain, an access decision taken on attacker-controlled input.
One thing I did not re-run: the documented nginx --with-mail deployment, where nginx relays the client's own XCLIENT after entering proxy mode. I verified the daemon behaviour directly over a socket.
Would you request a CVE for this? The PROXY sibling received CVE-2025-31135 and reached OSV, while an earlier advisory of mine here received neither and is invisible to the scanners.
I used an AI assistant while investigating and preparing this report.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/phires/go-guerrilla |
Corregida | v1.6.7 | -571 d | v1.6.7 no afectada |
v1.6.7Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/phires/go-guerrilla/security/advisories/GHSA-3rjp-h4r9-4r6pLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
