GHSA-3V6C-9QPG-GF63
Quadratic JWT credential rule lets a crafted upstream response stall the proxy event loop
Texto original en inglés · Ver en español
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-3V6C-9QPG-GF63 divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
memtomem-stm's shared credential detector (`proxy/privacy.py`, `CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS`) contains a JWT rule whose cost is quadratic in the length of a run of base64url characters:
\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b
A match can be attempted after every `-` inside such a run, and each attempt scans to the end of the run. The detector runs synchronously on the proxy's event loop for upstream tool responses: response cache set/get/sweep, the pending-store credential gate, tool eligibility, extraction, and the LLM-compression privacy scan. So while one crafted response is being scanned, every other call through the proxy waits.
Severity: High (availability). No data is exposed. The stall ends when the scan finishes. No CVSS vector or CVE is asserted yet.
Measured (main `5897eb75`, Python 3.13)
| input | `contains_sensitive_content` |
|---|---|
| `eyJ-` repeated, 64 KB | 0.51 s |
| `eyJ-` repeated, 128 KB | 1.87 s |
| `eyJ-` repeated, 256 KB | 7.66 s |
The decoded variant (`contains_sensitive_content_decoded`) costs the same. The default configuration is affected. `max_upstream_chars` defaults to 10,000,000. The attacker is whoever controls content that a configured upstream relays.
Related
LTM core (`memtomem`) carries the same rule byte-for-byte in its `privacy.DEFAULT_PATTERNS`. That is tracked separately, and publication of this advisory should be coordinated with its fix.
Fix
The rule is replaced with a form that gives the same yes/no answer, match count and match ends, in linear time and constant regex memory:
\beyJ(?=[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8})[A-Za-z0-9_]*+(?:-(?!eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8})[A-Za-z0-9_]*+)*+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b
The first segment does not cross another start that has eight characters after it, so the attempts scan disjoint regions. It is consumed possessively, so no backtracking state accumulates. A match can begin at a later `eyJ` in the same run, with the same end, but STM consumes only the yes/no answer.
The fix is checked against the old rule as an oracle on 20,000 seeded random strings plus structured cases. Four mutations of the rewrite each fail the checks. On the stall inputs it finishes within 2 s with under 8 MiB of traced memory; the inputs include 256 KB of `eyJ-`, a 1 MB segment, and a 1 MB hyphen-dense segment.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
PyPImemtomem-stm |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/memtomem/memtomem-stm/security/advisories/GHSA-3v6c-9qpg-gf63Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
