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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · zebrad

GHSA-443G-GWGP-49X4

zebrad vulnerable to getblocks/getheaders locator CPU amplification via uncapped vector length

Parche disponible
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CVSS
—
low
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -34 d de la divulgación
Exposición140 dDesde la divulgación, 2 jul 2026, 2:34 p. m.
Detección137 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.5.0 +1
Monitoreo
Detectada
29 may 26
2 jul 26
3 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
29 may 26
12 jul 26
24 ago 26
7 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.5.0 zebrad · -34 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 8.0.0 zebra-chain · -34 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-443G-GWGP-49X4 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Am I affected

You are affected if:

  1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.
  2. Your node accepts inbound P2P connections.
Summary

The `read_getblocks` and `read_getheaders` codec paths accepted block locator vectors up to approximately 65,535 entries (the generic `TrustedPreallocate` ceiling derived from `MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN`), rather than the protocol-specification limit of 101 entries (matching zcashd's `MAX_LOCATOR_SZ`). Each entry in the locator vector triggers a per-hash chain lookup (`HashMap::contains_key` + `RocksDB::contains_hash`) in `find_chain_intersection` on a tokio blocking-pool thread.

A single maximally-sized `getblocks` message occupies one blocking-pool thread for approximately 10–65ms. Under sustained load from multiple peers, this can degrade state-read performance for block validation, RPC, and mempool lookups.

Details

The `read_headers` codec path already implements the correct pattern: it reads the CompactSize count, validates against `MAX_HEADERS_PER_MESSAGE = 160` before deserialization, and rejects oversized messages. The `read_getblocks` and `read_getheaders` paths were missing this pre-deserialization count check and instead relied on the generic `block::Hash::max_allocation()` bound, which allows `(MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN - 1) / 32 = 65,535` hashes.

A legitimate block locator is logarithmic in chain length (approximately 30 hashes for the current ~3M-block Zcash chain). Zebra's own send-side cap is `MAX_FIND_BLOCK_HASHES_RESULTS = 500`.

The practical impact requires significant attacker bandwidth (approximately 2 MiB per request) and multiple Sybil peers to meaningfully degrade the blocking pool, which limits real-world exploitability.

Patches

Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix caps `block::Hash::max_allocation()` at `MAX_BLOCK_LOCATOR_LENGTH = 101`, matching zcashd's `MAX_LOCATOR_SZ`. This causes the deserializer to reject oversized locators before any allocation or iteration occurs.

Workarounds

No specific workaround is needed. Existing backpressure mechanisms (load shedding, sequential per-peer message processing, connection limits) constrain the practical impact.

Impact

Under sustained load from multiple Sybil peers, oversized locator vectors can occupy blocking-pool threads and degrade state-read performance. The effect is bounded by connection limits and requires significant attacker bandwidth.

Credit

Vulnerability identified by `@dingledropper`, who submitted the fix in PR #10570 https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/10570. Downstream CPU/blocking-pool impact analysis contributed by `@ouicate`.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
zebrad< 4.5.0
zebra-chain< 8.0.0
4.5.0
7.0.0
8.0.0
15.0.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iozebrad
Corregida 4.5.0 -34 d 7.0.0 no afectada
crates.iozebra-chain
Corregida 8.0.0 -34 d 15.0.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.5.08.0.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-443g-gwgp-49x4
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/10570
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/8981a1b95d4807cad99e5bb3b94fc8bc723ac033
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra

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