GHSA-443G-GWGP-49X4
zebrad vulnerable to getblocks/getheaders locator CPU amplification via uncapped vector length
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 4.5.0 | zebrad · -34 d desde divulgación | |
| Remediación | Parche 8.0.0 | zebra-chain · -34 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-443G-GWGP-49X4 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Am I affected
You are affected if:
- You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.
- Your node accepts inbound P2P connections.
Summary
The `read_getblocks` and `read_getheaders` codec paths accepted block locator vectors up to approximately 65,535 entries (the generic `TrustedPreallocate` ceiling derived from `MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN`), rather than the protocol-specification limit of 101 entries (matching zcashd's `MAX_LOCATOR_SZ`). Each entry in the locator vector triggers a per-hash chain lookup (`HashMap::contains_key` + `RocksDB::contains_hash`) in `find_chain_intersection` on a tokio blocking-pool thread.
A single maximally-sized `getblocks` message occupies one blocking-pool thread for approximately 10–65ms. Under sustained load from multiple peers, this can degrade state-read performance for block validation, RPC, and mempool lookups.
Details
The `read_headers` codec path already implements the correct pattern: it reads the CompactSize count, validates against `MAX_HEADERS_PER_MESSAGE = 160` before deserialization, and rejects oversized messages. The `read_getblocks` and `read_getheaders` paths were missing this pre-deserialization count check and instead relied on the generic `block::Hash::max_allocation()` bound, which allows `(MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN - 1) / 32 = 65,535` hashes.
A legitimate block locator is logarithmic in chain length (approximately 30 hashes for the current ~3M-block Zcash chain). Zebra's own send-side cap is `MAX_FIND_BLOCK_HASHES_RESULTS = 500`.
The practical impact requires significant attacker bandwidth (approximately 2 MiB per request) and multiple Sybil peers to meaningfully degrade the blocking pool, which limits real-world exploitability.
Patches
Patched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix caps `block::Hash::max_allocation()` at `MAX_BLOCK_LOCATOR_LENGTH = 101`, matching zcashd's `MAX_LOCATOR_SZ`. This causes the deserializer to reject oversized locators before any allocation or iteration occurs.
Workarounds
No specific workaround is needed. Existing backpressure mechanisms (load shedding, sequential per-peer message processing, connection limits) constrain the practical impact.
Impact
Under sustained load from multiple Sybil peers, oversized locator vectors can occupy blocking-pool threads and degrade state-read performance. The effect is bounded by connection limits and requires significant attacker bandwidth.
Credit
Vulnerability identified by `@dingledropper`, who submitted the fix in PR #10570 https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/10570. Downstream CPU/blocking-pool impact analysis contributed by `@ouicate`.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iozebrad |
Corregida | 4.5.0 | -34 d | 7.0.0 no afectada |
crates.iozebra-chain |
Corregida | 8.0.0 | -34 d | 15.0.0 no afectada |
4.5.08.0.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-443g-gwgp-49x4https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/10570https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/8981a1b95d4807cad99e5bb3b94fc8bc723ac033https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebraLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
